The axiom of choice (AC) states that every total relation contains a function. It enjoys a pivotal role in both classical and constructive dialects of mathematics. In the former, it is seen as a useful closure property invoked especially in set-theoretic contexts, in the latter it is seen either as a tautology, following from a constructive reading of totality proofs, or as a taboo, as by an extensional reading of totality proofs it enforces full classical logic. It has therefore been debated how much of AC should be accepted in constructive foundations and authors like Richman argued for "Constructive mathematics without choice" where even countable choice, not immediately jeopardising constructive reasoning, is avoided. With this paper, we propose a continuation of Richman’s programme of more radical extent and systematically study constructive foundations absent of countable, unique, or quantifier-free choice principles as well as the spurious fragments of (the actual) AC in form of extensionality principles: "Constructive mathematics without any choice" We argue that such a minimalistic setting is advantageous, for instance for studies in constructive reverse mathematics and synthetic computability theory. Apart from these programmatic considerations and a careful encyclopedia of choice principles, we revisit and refine several results from the literature: We show that already the partition principle (a consequence of AC of unknown strength) implies the excluded middle, that already logically decidable (inductive) equality of propositions implies proof irrelevance, and that function inversion principles such as the Cantor-Bernstein theorem not only rely on the excluded middle but also on unique choice. To the best of our knowledge, the latter is the first reverse mathematics result regarding the full axiom of unique choice, enabled by our minimal setting. Implementing such a minimalistic foundation, the proofs of all our results have been mechanised with the Rocq prover.

Realizability interprets propositions as specifications for computational entities in programming languages. Specifically, syntactic realizability is a powerful machinery that handles realizability as a syntactic translation of propositions into new propositions that describe what it means to realize the input proposition. This paper introduces EffHOL (Effectful Higher-Order Logic), a novel framework that expands syntactic realizability to uniformly support modern programming paradigms with side effects. EffHOL combines higher-kinded polymorphism, enabling typing of realizers for higher-order propositions, with a computational term language that uses monads to represent and reason about effectful computations. We craft a syntactic realizability translation from (intuitionistic) higher-order logic (HOL) to EffHOL, ensuring the extraction of computable realizers through a constructive soundness proof. EffHOL’s parameterization by monads allows for the synthesis of effectful realizers for propositions unprovable in pure HOL, bridging the gap between traditional and effectful computational paradigms. Examples, including continuations and memoization, showcase EffHOL’s capability to unify diverse computational models, with traditional ones as special cases. For a semantic connection, we show that any instance of EffHOL induces an evidenced frame, which, in turn, yields a tripos and a realizability topos.

In the setting of constructive reverse mathematics, we analyse the downward Löwenheim-Skolem (DLS) theorem of first-order logic, stating that every infinite model has a countable elementary submodel. Refining the well-known equivalence of the DLS theorem to the axiom of dependent choice (DC) over classical base theories, our constructive approach allows for several finer logical decompositions: Just assuming countable choice (CC), the DLS theorem is equivalent to the conjunction of DC with a newly identified fragment of the excluded middle (LEM) that we call the blurred drinker paradox (BDP). Further without CC, the DLS theorem is equivalent to the conjunction of BDP with similarly blurred weakenings of DC and CC. Independently of their connection with the DLS theorem, we also study BDP and the blurred choice axioms on their own, for instance by showing that BDP is LEM without a contribution of Markov's principle and that blurred DC is DC without a contribution of CC. The paper is hyperlinked with an accompanying Coq development.

Using the Coq proof assistant, we investigate the minimal non-constructive principles needed to show soundness and completeness of propositional bi-intuitionistic logic. Before being revisited and corrected by Goré and Shillito, the completeness of bi-intuitionistic logic, an extension of intuitionistic logic with a dual operation to implication, had a rather erratic history, making it an ideal case for computer mechanisation. Moreover, contributing a constructive perspective, we observe that the completeness of bi-intuitionistic logic explicates the same characteristics already observed in an ongoing effort to analyse completeness theorems in general.

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Markov's principle (MP) is an axiom in some varieties of constructive mathematics, stating that Σ01 propositions (i.e. existential quantification over a decidable predicate on N) are stable under double negation. However, there are various non-equivalent definitions of decidable predicates and thus Σ01 in constructive foundations, leading to non-equivalent Markov's principles. While this fact is well-reported in the literature, it is often overlooked, leading to wrong claims in standard references and published papers.

Tennenbaum's theorem states that the only countable model of Peano arithmetic (PA) with computable arithmetical operations is the standard model of natural numbers. In this paper, we use constructive type theory as a framework to revisit, analyze and generalize this result. The chosen framework allows for a synthetic approach to computability theory, exploiting that, externally, all functions definable in constructive type theory can be shown computable. We then build on this viewpoint, and furthermore internalize it by assuming a version of Church's thesis, which expresses that any function on natural numbers is representable by a formula in PA. This assumption provides for a conveniently abstract setup to carry out rigorous computability arguments, even in the theorem's mechanization. Concretely, we constructivize several classical proofs and present one inherently constructive rendering of Tennenbaum's theorem, all following arguments from the literature. Concerning the classical proofs in particular, the constructive setting allows us to highlight differences in their assumptions and conclusions which are not visible classically. All versions are accompanied by a unified mechanization in the Coq proof assistant.

Abstract Dialogues are turn-taking games which model debates about the satisfaction of logical formulas. A novel variant played over first-order structures gives rise to a notion of first-order satisfaction. We study the induced notion of validity for classical and intuitionistic first-order logic in the constructive setting of the calculus of inductive constructions. We prove that such material dialogue semantics for classical first-order logic admits constructive soundness and completeness proofs, setting it apart from standard model-theoretic semantics of first-order logic. Furthermore, we prove that completeness with regard to intuitionistic material dialogues fails in both constructive and classical settings. As an alternative, we propose material dialogues played over Kripke structures. These Kripke material dialogues exhibit constructive completeness when restricting to the negative fragment. The results concerning classical material dialogues have been mechanized using the Coq interactive theorem prover.

Gödel published his groundbreaking first incompleteness theorem in 1931, stating that a large class of formal logics admits independent sentences which are neither provable nor refutable. This result, in conjunction with his second incompleteness theorem, established the impossibility of concluding Hilbert’s program, which pursued a possible path towards a single formal system unifying all of mathematics. Using a technical trick to refine Gödel’s original proof, the incompleteness result was strengthened further by Rosser in 1936 regarding the conditions imposed on the formal systems. Computability theory, which also originated in the 1930s, was quickly applied to formal logics by Turing, Kleene, and others to yield incompleteness results similar in strength to Gödel’s original theorem, but weaker than Rosser’s refinement. Only much later, Kleene found an improved but far less well-known proof based on computational notions, yielding a result as strong as Rosser’s. In this expository paper, we work in constructive type theory to reformulate Kleene’s incompleteness results abstractly in the setting of synthetic computability theory and assuming a form of Church’s thesis, an axiom internalising the fact that all functions definable in such a setting are computable. Our novel, greatly condensed reformulation showcases the simplicity of the computational argument while staying formally entirely precise, a combination hard to achieve in typical textbook presentations. As an application, we instantiate the abstract result to first-order logic in order to derive essential incompleteness and, along the way, essential undecidability of Robinson arithmetic. This paper is accompanied by a Coq mechanisation covering all our results and based on existing libraries of undecidability proofs and first-order logic, complementing the extensive work on mechanised incompleteness using the Gödel-Rosser approach. In contrast to the related mechanisations, our development follows Kleene’s ideas and utilises Church’s thesis for additional simplicity.

Abstract We mechanise the undecidability of various first-order axiom systems in Coq, employing the synthetic approach to computability underlying the growing Coq Library of Undecidability Proofs. Concretely, we cover both semantic and deductive entailment in fragments of Peano arithmetic (PA) as well as ZF and related finitary set theories, with their undecidability established by many-one reductions from solvability of Diophantine equations, i.e. Hilbert’s tenth problem (H10), and the Post correspondence problem (PCP), respectively. In the synthetic setting based on the computability of all functions definable in a constructive foundation, such as Coq’s type theory, it suffices to define these reductions as meta-level functions with no need for further encoding in a formalised model of computation. The concrete cases of PA and the considered set theories are supplemented by a general synthetic theory of undecidable axiomatisations, focusing on well-known connections to consistency and incompleteness. Specifically, our reductions rely on the existence of standard models, necessitating additional assumptions in the case of full ZF, and all axiomatic extensions still justified by such standard models are shown incomplete. As a by-product of the undecidability of set theories formulated using only membership and no equality symbol, we obtain the undecidability of first-order logic with a single binary relation.

We mechanise central metatheoretic results about second-order logic (SOL) using the Coq proof assistant. Concretely, we consider undecidability via many-one reduction from Diophantine equations (Hilbert's tenth problem), incompleteness regarding full semantics via categoricity of second-order Peano arithmetic, and completeness regarding Henkin semantics via translation to mono-sorted first-order logic (FOL). Moreover, this translation is used to transport further characteristic properties of FOL to SOL, namely the compactness and Löwenheim-Skolem theorems.

Tennenbaum’s theorem states that the only countable model of Peano arithmetic (PA) with computable arithmetical operations is the standard model of natural numbers. In this paper, we use constructive type theory as a framework to revisit and generalize this result. The chosen framework allows for a synthetic approach to computability theory, by exploiting the fact that, externally, all functions definable in constructive type theory can be shown computable. We internalize this fact by assuming a version of Church’s thesis expressing that any function on natural numbers is representable by a formula in PA. This assumption allows for a conveniently abstract setup to carry out rigorous computability arguments and feasible mechanization. Concretely, we constructivize several classical proofs and present one inherently constructive rendering of Tennenbaum’s theorem, all following arguments from the literature. Concerning the classical proofs in particular, the constructive setting allows us to highlight differences in their assumptions and conclusions which are not visible classically. All versions are accompanied by a unified mechanization in the Coq proof assistant.

We study finite first-order satisfiability (FSAT) in the constructive setting of dependent type theory. Employing synthetic accounts of enumerability and decidability, we give a full classification of FSAT depending on the first-order signature of non-logical symbols. On the one hand, our development focuses on Trakhtenbrot's theorem, stating that FSAT is undecidable as soon as the signature contains an at least binary relation symbol. Our proof proceeds by a many-one reduction chain starting from the Post correspondence problem. On the other hand, we establish the decidability of FSAT for monadic first-order logic, i.e. where the signature only contains at most unary function and relation symbols, as well as the enumerability of FSAT for arbitrary enumerable signatures. To showcase an application of Trakhtenbrot's theorem, we continue our reduction chain with a many-one reduction from FSAT to separation logic. All our results are mechanised in the framework of a growing Coq library of synthetic undecidability proofs.

Abstract Artemov and Protopopescu proposed intuitionistic epistemic logic (IEL) to capture an intuitionistic conception of knowledge. By establishing completeness, they provided the base for a meta-theoretic investigation of IEL, which was continued by Krupski with a proof of cut-elimination, and Su and Sano establishing semantic cut-elimination and the finite model property. However, no analysis of these results in a constructive meta-logic has been conducted, arguably impeding the intuitionistic justification of IEL. We aim to close this gap and investigate IEL in the constructive-type theory of the Coq proof assistant. Concretely, we present a constructive and mechanised completeness proof for IEL, employing a syntactic decidability proof based on cut-elimination to constructivise the ideas from the literature. Following Su and Sano, we then also give constructive versions of semantic cut-elimination and the finite model property. Given our constructive and mechanised setting, all these results now bear executable algorithms. Our particular strategy to establish constructive completeness exploiting syntactic decidability can be used for similar modal logics, which we illustrate with the examples of the classical modal logics K, D and T. For modal logics including the four axioms, however, the method seems not to apply immediately.

We discuss and compare two Coq mechanisations of Sierpinski's result that the generalised continuum hypothesis (GCH) implies the axiom of choice (AC). The first version shows the result, originally stated in first-order ZF set-theory, for a higher-order set theory convenient to work with in Coq. The second version presents a corresponding theorem for Coq's type theory itself, concerning type-theoretic formulations of GCH and AC. Both versions rely on the classical law of excluded middle and extensionality assumptions but we localise the use of axioms where possible.

We mechanise the undecidability of various first-order axiom systems in Coq, employing the synthetic approach to computability underlying the growing Coq Library of Undecidability Proofs. Concretely, we cover both semantic and deductive entailment in fragments of Peano arithmetic (PA) and Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZF), with their undecidability established by many-one reductions from solvability of Diophantine equations, i.e. Hilbert’s tenth problem (H10), and the Post correspondence problem (PCP), respectively. In the synthetic setting based on the computability of all functions definable in a constructive foundation, such as Coq’s type theory, it suffices to define these reductions as meta-level functions with no need for further encoding in a formalised model of computation. The concrete cases of PA and ZF are prepared by a general synthetic theory of undecidable axiomatisations, focusing on well-known connections to consistency and incompleteness. Specifically, our reductions rely on the existence of standard models, necessitating additional assumptions in the case of full ZF, and all axiomatic extensions still justified by such standard models are shown incomplete. As a by-product of the undecidability of ZF formulated using only membership and no equality symbol, we obtain the undecidability of first-order logic with a single binary relation.

Abstract We study various formulations of the completeness of first-order logic phrased in constructive type theory and mechanised in the Coq proof assistant. Specifically, we examine the completeness of variants of classical and intuitionistic natural deduction and sequent calculi with respect to model-theoretic, algebraic, and game-theoretic semantics. As completeness with respect to the standard model-theoretic semantics à la Tarski and Kripke is not readily constructive, we analyse connections of completeness theorems to Markov’s Principle and Weak Kőnig’s Lemma and discuss non-standard semantics admitting assumption-free completeness. We contribute a reusable Coq library for first-order logic containing all results covered in this paper.

We formalise the computational undecidability of validity, satisfiability, and provability of first-order formulas following a synthetic approach based on the computation native to Coq's constructive type theory. Concretely, we consider Tarski and Kripke semantics as well as classical and intuitionistic natural deduction systems and provide compact many-one reductions from the Post correspondence problem (PCP). Moreover, developing a basic framework for synthetic computability theory in Coq, we formalise standard results concerning decidability, enumerability, and reducibility without reference to a concrete model of computation. For instance, we prove the equivalence of Post's theorem with Markov's principle and provide a convenient technique for establishing the enumerability of inductive predicates such as the considered proof systems and PCP.

We study various models of classical second-order set theories in the dependent type theory of Coq. Without logical assumptions, Aczel’s sets-as-trees interpretation yields an intensional model of second-order ZF with functional replacement. Building on work of Werner and Barras, we discuss the need for quotient axioms in order to obtain extensional models with relational replacement and to construct large sets. Specifically, we show that the consistency strength of Coq extended by excluded middle and a description operator on well-founded trees allows for constructing models with exactly n Grothendieck universes for every natural number n. By a previous categoricity result based on Zermelo’s embedding theorem, it follows that those models are unique up to isomorphism. Moreover, we show that the smallest universe contains exactly the hereditarily finite sets and give a concise independence proof of the foundation axiom based on permutation models.