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Michael Ummels

dblp:18/2442 · DBLP profile ↗
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11ranked-venue papers
5as first author
0since 2021 · last 2013
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Theory of computation · 10 · 5 first-authorSoftware engineering, systems software and programming languages · 4 · 2 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Theoretical computer science
1 paper
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 50% Automated reasoning and model checking · 50%

Topics — the 2 heaviest of 2, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › solution concepts in games › equilibrium concepts
nash equilibrium
0.112009
The Complexity of Nash Equilibria in Simple Stochastic Multiplayer Games · ICALP (2) 2009
Automated reasoning and model checking › probabilistic verification
stochastic multiplayer games
0.112009
The Complexity of Nash Equilibria in Simple Stochastic Multiplayer Games · ICALP (2) 2009
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2013 Computing Quantiles in Markov Reward Models
Michael Ummels, Christel Baier
FoSSaCS1
2012 Playing Stochastic Games Precisely
Taolue Chen 0001, Vojtech Forejt, Marta Z. Kwiatkowska, Aistis Simaitis, Ashutosh Trivedi 0001, Michael Ummels
CONCUR6
2012 Concurrent Games with Ordered Objectives
Patricia Bouyer, Romain Brenguier, Nicolas Markey, Michael Ummels
FoSSaCS4
2012 The Complexity of Quantitative Information Flow in Recursive Programs
abstract
Information-theoretic measures based upon mutual information can be employed to quantify the information that an execution of a program reveals about its secret inputs. The information leakage bounding problem asks whether the information leaked by a program does not exceed a given threshold. We consider this problem for two scenarios: a) the outputs of the program are revealed, and b)the timing (measured in the number of execution steps) of the program is revealed. For both scenarios, we establish complexity results in the context of deterministic boolean programs, both for programs with and without recursion. In particular, we prove that for recursive programs the information leakage bounding problem is no harder than checking reachability.
Rohit Chadha, Michael Ummels
FSTTCS2
2011 Measuring Permissiveness in Parity Games: Mean-Payoff Parity Games Revisited
Patricia Bouyer, Nicolas Markey, Jörg Olschewski, Michael Ummels
ATVA4
2011 The Complexity of Nash Equilibria in Limit-Average Games
Michael Ummels, Dominik Wojtczak
CONCUR1
2011 Nash Equilibria in Concurrent Games with Büchi Objectives
abstract
We study the problem of computing pure-strategy Nash equilibria in multiplayer concurrent games with Büchi-definable objectives. First, when the objectives are Büchi conditions on the game, we prove that the existence problem can be solved in polynomial time. In a second part, we extend our technique to objectives defined by deterministic Büchi automata, and prove that the problem then becomes EXPTIME-complete. We prove PSPACE-completeness for the case where the Büchi automata are 1-weak.
Patricia Bouyer, Romain Brenguier, Nicolas Markey, Michael Ummels
FSTTCS4
2010 The Complexity of Finding Reset Words in Finite Automata
Jörg Olschewski, Michael Ummels
MFCS2
2009 The Complexity of Nash Equilibria in Simple Stochastic Multiplayer Games
Michael Ummels, Dominik Wojtczak
ICALP (2)1
2008 The Complexity of Nash Equilibria in Infinite Multiplayer Games
Michael Ummels
FoSSaCS1
2006 Rational Behaviour and Strategy Construction in Infinite Multiplayer Games
Michael Ummels
FSTTCS1