Demo Data from VLDB 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Jared M. Smith
dblp:180/3218
· DBLP profile ↗
9ranked-venue papers
3as first author
2since 2021 · last 2023
0000-0002-3240-2405ORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 7 · 3 first-author · 1 since 2021Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 since 2021Systems, architecture and hardware · 1Databases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 1 · 1 since 2021Applied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
5 papers |
Network security · 40% Digital forensics and information hiding · 29% Systems and software security · 26% | |
| Computer networks
3 papers |
Routing and switching · 100% |
Topics — the 14 heaviest of 14, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Routing and switching › inter-domain routing
BGP |
0.6 | 2 | 2021 | Flexsealing BGP Against Route Leaks: Peerlock Active Measurement and Analysis · NDSS 2021 Withdrawing the BGP Re-Routing Curtain: Understanding the Security Impact of BGP Poisoning through Real-World Measurements · NDSS 2020 |
Routing and switching › routing
secure routing |
0.5 | 1 | 2021 | Flexsealing BGP Against Route Leaks: Peerlock Active Measurement and Analysis · NDSS 2021 |
Systems and software security › memory safety
memory isolation |
0.4 | 1 | 2020 | PKU Pitfalls: Attacks on PKU-based Memory Isolation Systems · USENIX Security Symposium 2020 |
Network security
routing security |
0.4 | 1 | 2020 | Withdrawing the BGP Re-Routing Curtain: Understanding the Security Impact of BGP Poisoning through Real-World Measurements · NDSS 2020 |
Routing and switching › routing protocol
BGP route selection |
0.3 | 1 | 2018 | Routing Around Congestion: Defeating DDoS Attacks and Adverse Network Conditions via Reactive BGP Routing · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2018 |
Routing and switching
inter-domain routing |
0.3 | 1 | 2018 | Routing Around Congestion: Defeating DDoS Attacks and Adverse Network Conditions via Reactive BGP Routing · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2018 |
Network security › attack resilience › attack mitigation › denial-of-service defense
DDoS defense |
0.3 | 1 | 2018 | Routing Around Congestion: Defeating DDoS Attacks and Adverse Network Conditions via Reactive BGP Routing · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2018 |
Digital forensics and information hiding › digital forensics
memory forensics |
0.3 | 1 | 2018 | Towards Architecture and OS-Independent Malware Detection via Memory Forensics · CCS 2018 |
Digital forensics and information hiding › digital forensics
forensic analysis |
0.3 | 1 | 2017 | DEMO: Akatosh: Automated Cyber Incident Verification and Impact Analysis · CCS 2017 |
Systems and software security › memory protection
memory protection keys |
0.1 | 1 | 2020 | PKU Pitfalls: Attacks on PKU-based Memory Isolation Systems · USENIX Security Symposium 2020 |
Routing and switching › inter-domain routing
autonomous system routing |
0.1 | 1 | 2018 | Routing Around Congestion: Defeating DDoS Attacks and Adverse Network Conditions via Reactive BGP Routing · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2018 |
Routing and switching
traffic engineering |
0.1 | 1 | 2018 | Routing Around Congestion: Defeating DDoS Attacks and Adverse Network Conditions via Reactive BGP Routing · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2018 |
Malware analysis › rootkit detection
compromise detection |
0.1 | 1 | 2018 | Towards Architecture and OS-Independent Malware Detection via Memory Forensics · CCS 2018 |
Network security › intrusion detection and prevention
intrusion detection |
0.1 | 1 | 2017 | DEMO: Akatosh: Automated Cyber Incident Verification and Impact Analysis · CCS 2017 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
internet-scale simulation · 0.7active measurement · 0.5machine learning · 0.3deep learning · 0.3snapshot-based monitoring · 0.3
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | AI ATAC 1: An Evaluation of Prominent Commercial Malware DetectorsabstractThis work presents an evaluation of six prominent commercial endpoint malware detectors, a network malware detector, and a file-conviction algorithm from a cyber technology vendor. The evaluation was administered as the first of the Artificial I ntelligence Applications t o Autonomous Cybersecurity (AI ATAC) prize challenges, funded by / completed in service of the US Navy. The experiment employed 100K files (50/50% benign/malicious) with a stratified distribution of file types, including ~1K zero-day program executables (increasing experiment size two orders of magnitude over previous work). We present an evaluation process of delivering a file to a fresh virtual machine donning the detection technology, waiting 90s to allow static detection, then executing the file and waiting another period for dynamic detection; this allows greater fidelity in the observational data than previous experiments, in particular, resource and time-to-detection statistics. To execute all 800K trials (100K files × 8 tools), a software framework is designed to choreograph the experiment into an automated, time-synced, and reproducible workflow with substantial parallelization. Software with base classes for this framework are provided. A cost-benefit model was configured to integrate the tools’ detection statistics into a comparable quantity by simulating costs of use. This provides a ranking methodology for cyber competitions and a lens for reasoning about the varied statistical results. The results provide insights on state of commercial malware detection. Robert A. Bridges, Brian Weber, Justin M. Beaver, Jared M. Smith, Miki E. Verma, Savannah Norem, Kevin D. Spakes, Cory L. Watson, Jeffrey A. Nichols, Brian Jewell, Michael D. Iannacone, Chelsey Dunivan Stahl, Kelly M. T. Huffer, Sean Oesch |
IEEE Big Data | 4 |
| 2021 | Flexsealing BGP Against Route Leaks: Peerlock Active Measurement and Analysis
Tyler McDaniel, Jared M. Smith, Max Schuchard |
NDSS | 2 |
| 2020 | Withdrawing the BGP Re-Routing Curtain: Understanding the Security Impact of BGP Poisoning through Real-World Measurements
Jared M. Smith, Kyle Birkeland, Tyler McDaniel, Max Schuchard |
NDSS | 1 |
| 2020 | The Maestro Attack: Orchestrating Malicious Flows with BGP
Tyler McDaniel, Jared M. Smith, Max Schuchard |
SecureComm (1) | 2 |
| 2020 | PKU Pitfalls: Attacks on PKU-based Memory Isolation Systems
R. Joseph Connor, Tyler McDaniel, Jared M. Smith, Max Schuchard |
USENIX Security Symposium | 3 |
| 2018 | Towards Architecture and OS-Independent Malware Detection via Memory ForensicsabstractIn this work, we take a fundamentally different approach to the problem of analyzing a device for compromises via malware; our approach is OS and instruction architecture independent and relies only on having the raw binary data extracted from the memory dump of a device. Our system leverages a multi-hundred TB dataset of both compromised host memory dumps extracted from the MalRec dataset [8] and the first known dataset of benign host memory dumps running normal, non-compromised software. After an average of 30 to 45 seconds of pre-processing on a single memory dump, our system leverages both traditional machine learning and deep learning algorithms to achieve an average of 98% accuracy of detecting a compromised host. Rachel Petrik, Berat Arik, Jared M. Smith |
CCS | 3 |
| 2018 | Routing Around Congestion: Defeating DDoS Attacks and Adverse Network Conditions via Reactive BGP RoutingabstractIn this paper, we present Nyx, the first system to both effectively mitigate modern Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks regardless of the amount of traffic under adversarial control and function without outside cooperation or an Internet redesign. Nyx approaches the problem of DDoS mitigation as a routing problem rather than a filtering problem. This conceptual shift allows Nyx to avoid many of the common shortcomings of existing academic and commercial DDoS mitigation systems. By leveraging how Autonomous Systems (ASes) handle route advertisement in the existing Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), Nyx allows the deploying AS to achieve isolation of traffic from a critical upstream AS off of attacked links and onto alternative, uncongested, paths. This isolation removes the need for filtering or de-prioritizing attack traffic. Nyx controls outbound paths through normal BGP path selection, while return paths from critical ASes are controlled through the use of specific techniques we developed using existing traffic engineering principles and require no outside coordination. Using our own realistic Internet-scale simulator, we find that in more than 98% of cases our system can successfully route critical traffic around network segments under transit-link DDoS attacks; a new form of DDoS attack where the attack traffic never reaches the victim AS, thus invaliding defensive filtering, throttling, or prioritization strategies. More significantly, in over 95% of those cases, the alternate path provides complete congestion relief from transit-link DDoS. Nyx additionally provides complete congestion relief in over 75% of cases when the deployer is being directly attacked. Jared M. Smith, Max Schuchard |
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy | 1 |
| 2017 | DEMO: Akatosh: Automated Cyber Incident Verification and Impact AnalysisabstractAkatosh, a U.S. Department of Homeland Security Transition to Practice Program (TTP) project developed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory with industry and academic partnership, enables automated, real-time forensic analysis of endpoints after malware-attacks and other cyber security incidents by automatically maintaining detailed snapshots of host-level activity on endpoints over time. It achieves this by integrating intrusion detection systems (IDS) with forensic tools. The combination allows Akatosh to collect vast amounts of endpoint data and assists in verifying, tracking, and analyzing endpoints in real time. This provides operations personnel and analysts as well as managers and executives with continuous feedback on the impact of malicious software and other security incidents on endpoints in their network. Jared M. Smith, Elliot Greenlee, Aaron E. Ferber |
CCS | 1 |
| 2016 | The impact of analog computational error on an analog boolean satisfiability solverabstractWe present an analog implementation of a dynamical system for solving Boolean satisfiability, an NP-complete problem. Simulations of modest-sized hardware implementations in the presence of noise and integrator offset demonstrate that the algorithm is suitable for implementation in analog electronics. David A. Basford, Jared M. Smith, R. Joseph Connor, Bruce J. MacLennan, Jeremy Holleman |
ISCAS | 2 |