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Julian Lettner

dblp:182/6599 · DBLP profile ↗
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5ranked-venue papers
2as first author
0since 2021 · last 2019
0000-0003-3548-9558ORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 4 · 1 first-authorSystems, architecture and hardware · 1 · 1 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
3 papers
Systems and software security · 84% Hardware security and side channels · 16%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Program analysis · 100%
Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
1 paper
Memory systems · 100%

Topics — the 7 heaviest of 7, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Systems and software security
memory safety		 0.622019
SoK: Sanitizing for Security · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2019
Subversive-C: Abusing and Protecting Dynamic Message Dispatch · USENIX ATC 2016
Systems and software security › memory safety
memory sanitizer		 0.412019
SoK: Sanitizing for Security · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2019
Program analysis
dynamic analysis		 0.412019
SoK: Sanitizing for Security · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2019
Hardware security and side channels › side-channel countermeasures
cache side-channel defense		 0.312017
Strong and Efficient Cache Side-Channel Protection using Hardware Transactional Memory · USENIX Security Symposium 2017
Systems and software security › exploitation
control-flow hijacking		 0.212016
Subversive-C: Abusing and Protecting Dynamic Message Dispatch · USENIX ATC 2016
Systems and software security
exploitation		 0.212016
Subversive-C: Abusing and Protecting Dynamic Message Dispatch · USENIX ATC 2016
Memory systems
cache		 0.112017
Strong and Efficient Cache Side-Channel Protection using Hardware Transactional Memory · USENIX Security Symposium 2017

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

systematic literature review · 0.8hardware transactional memory · 0.6
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2019 SoK: Sanitizing for Security
abstract
The C and C++ programming languages are notoriously insecure yet remain indispensable. Developers therefore resort to a multi-pronged approach to find security issues before adversaries. These include manual, static, and dynamic program analysis. Dynamic bug finding tools-henceforth "sanitizers"-can find bugs that elude other types of analysis because they observe the actual execution of a program, and can therefore directly observe incorrect program behavior as it happens. A vast number of sanitizers have been prototyped by academics and refined by practitioners. We provide a systematic overview of sanitizers with an emphasis on their role in finding security issues. Specifically, we taxonomize the available tools and the security vulnerabilities they cover, describe their performance and compatibility properties, and highlight various trade-offs.
Dokyung Song, Julian Lettner, Prabhu Rajasekaran, Yeoul Na, Stijn Volckaert, Per Larsen, Michael Franz
 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy2
2018 Bytecode Corruption Attacks Are Real - And How to Defend Against Them
Taemin Park, Julian Lettner, Yeoul Na, Stijn Volckaert, Michael Franz
 DIMVA2
2018 PartiSan: Fast and Flexible Sanitization via Run-Time Partitioning
Julian Lettner, Dokyung Song, Taemin Park, Per Larsen, Stijn Volckaert, Michael Franz
 RAID1
2017 Strong and Efficient Cache Side-Channel Protection using Hardware Transactional Memory
Daniel Gruss, Julian Lettner, Felix Schuster, Olga Ohrimenko, István Haller, Manuel Costa
 USENIX Security Symposium2
2016 Subversive-C: Abusing and Protecting Dynamic Message Dispatch
Julian Lettner, Benjamin Kollenda, Andrei Homescu, Per Larsen, Felix Schuster, Lucas Davi, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Thorsten Holz, Michael Franz
 USENIX ATC1