In this paper, we investigate tradeoffs among differential privacy (DP) and several important voting axioms: Pareto efficiency, SD-efficiency, PC-efficiency, Condorcet criterion, and Condorcet loser criterion. We provide upper and lower bounds on the two-way tradeoffs between DP and each axiom. We also provide upper and lower bounds on three-way tradeoffs among DP and every pairwise combination of all the axioms, showing that, while the axioms are compatible without DP, their upper bounds cannot be achieved simultaneously under DP. Our results illustrate the effect of DP on the satisfaction and compatibility of voting axioms.

Designing private voting rules is an important and pressing problem for trustworthy democracy. In this paper, under the framework of differential privacy, we propose a novel famliy of randomized voting rules based on the well-known Condorcet method, and focus on three classes of voting rules in this family: Laplacian Condorcet method (CMLAP), exponential Condorcet method (CMEXP), and randomized response Condorcet method (CMRR), where λ represents the level of noise. We prove that all of our rules satisfy absolute monotonicity, lexi-participation, probabilistic Pareto efficiency, approximate probabilistic Condorcet criterion, and approximate SD-strategyproofness. In addition, CMRR satisfies (non-approximate) probabilistic Condorcet criterion, while CMLAP and CMEXP satisfy strong lexi-participation. Finally, we regard differential privacy as a voting axiom, and discuss its relations to other axioms.

Voting is used widely to aggregate preferences to make a collective decision. In this paper, we focus on evaluating and designing voting rules that support both the privacy of the voting agents and a notion of fairness over such agents. First, we introduce a novel notion of group fairness and adopt the existing notion of local differential privacy. We then evaluate the level of group fairness in several existing voting rules, as well as the trade-offs between fairness and privacy, showing that it is not possible to always obtain maximal economic efficiency with high fairness. Then, we present both a machine learning and a constrained optimization approach to design new voting rules that are fair while maintaining a high level of economic efficiency. Finally, we empirically examine the effect of adding noise to create local differentially private voting rules and discuss the three-way trade-off between economic efficiency, fairness, and privacy.

Studying the computational complexity and designing fast algorithms for determining winners under voting rules are classical and fundamental questions in computational social choice. In this paper, we accelerate voting by leveraging quantum computation: we propose a quantum-accelerated voting algorithm that can be applied to any anonymous voting rule. We show that our algorithm can be quadratically faster than any classical algorithm (based on sampling with replacement) under a wide range of common voting rules, including positional scoring rules, Copeland, and single transferable voting (STV). Precisely, our quantum-accelerated voting algorithm outputs the correct winner with high probability in $\Theta\left(\frac{n}{\text{MOV}}\right)$ time, where $n$ is the number of votes and $\text{MOV}$ is margin of victory, the smallest number of voters to change the winner. In contrast, any classical voting algorithm based on sampling with replacement requires $\Omega\left(\frac{n^2}{\text{MOV}^2}\right)$ time under a large class of voting rules. Our theoretical results are supported by experiments under plurality, Borda, Copeland, and STV.

When aggregating logically interconnected judgements from n agents, the result might be logically inconsistent. This phenomenon is known as the doctrinal paradox, which plays a central role in the field of judgement aggregation. Previous work has mostly focused on the worst-case analysis of the doctrinal paradox, leading to many impossibility results. Little is known about its likelihood of occurrence in practical settings, except for the study under certain distributions by List in 2005. In this paper, we characterize the likelihood of the doctrinal paradox under a general and realistic model called semi-random social choice framework (proposed by Xia in 2020). In the framework, agents' ground truth judgements can be arbitrarily correlated, while the noises are independent. Our main theorem states that under mild conditions, the semi-random likelihood of the doctrinal paradox is either 0, exp(-Θ(n)), Θ(n\^~(-0.5)) or Θ(1). This not only answers open questions by List in 2005, but also draws clear lines between situations with frequent paradoxes and with vanishing paradoxes.

Random Utility Models (RUMs), which subsume Plackett-Luce model (PL) as a special case, are among the most popular models for preference learning. In this paper, we consider RUMs with features and their mixtures, where each alternative has a vector of features, possibly different across agents. Such models significantly generalize the standard PL and RUMs, but are not as well investigated in the literature. We extend mixtures of RUMs with features to models that generate incomplete preferences and characterize their identifiability. For PL, we prove that when PL with features is identifiable, its MLE is consistent with a strictly concave objective function under mild assumptions, by characterizing a bound on root-mean-square-error (RMSE), which naturally leads to a sample complexity bound. We also characterize identifiability of more general RUMs with features and propose a generalized RBCML to learn them. Our experiments on synthetic data demonstrate the effectiveness of MLE on PL with features with tradeoffs between statistical efficiency and computational efficiency. Our experiments on real-world data show the prediction power of PL with features and its mixtures.

Voting is used widely to identify a collective decision for a group of agents, based on their preferences. In this paper, we focus on evaluating and designing voting rules that support both the privacy of the voting agents and a notion of fairness over such agents. To do this, we introduce a novel notion of group fairness and adopt the existing notion of local differential privacy. We then evaluate the level of group fairness in several existing voting rules, as well as the trade-offs between fairness and privacy, showing that it is not possible to always obtain maximal economic efficiency with high fairness or high privacy levels. Then, we present both a machine learning and a constrained optimization approach to design new voting rules that are fair while maintaining a high level of economic efficiency. Finally, we empirically examine the effect of adding noise to create local differentially private voting rules and discuss the three-way trade-off between economic efficiency, fairness, and privacy. This paper appears in the special track on AI & Society.

Differential privacy has been widely applied to provide privacy guarantees by adding random noise to the function output. However, it inevitably fails in many high-stakes voting scenarios, where voting rules are required to be deterministic. In this work, we present the first framework for answering the question:“How private are commonly-used voting rules?" Our answers are two-fold. First, we show that deterministic voting rules provide sufficient privacy in the sense of distributional differential privacy (DDP). We show that assuming the adversarial observer has uncertainty about individual votes, even publishing the histogram of votes achieves good DDP. Second, we introduce the notion of exact privacy to compare the privacy preserved in various commonly-studied voting rules, and obtain dichotomy theorems of exact DDP within a large subset of voting rules called generalized scoring rules.

This paper studies a stylized, yet natural, learning-to-rank problem and points out the critical incorrectness of a widely used nearest neighbor algorithm. We consider a model with n agents (users) {xi}i∈[n] and m alternatives (items) {yl}l∈[m], each of which is associated with a latent feature vector. Agents rank items nondeterministically according to the Plackett-Luce model, where the higher the utility of an item to the agent, the more likely this item will be ranked high by the agent. Our goal is to identify near neighbors of an arbitrary agent in the latent space for prediction.We first show that the Kendall-tau distance based kNN produces incorrect results in our model. Next, we propose a new anchor-based algorithm to find neighbors of an agent. A salient feature of our algorithm is that it leverages the rankings of many other agents (the so-called “anchors”) to determine the closeness/similarities of two agents. We provide a rigorous analysis for one-dimensional latent space, and complement the theoretical results with experiments on synthetic and real datasets. The experiments confirm that the new algorithm is robust and practical.

We propose an EM-based framework for learning Plackett-Luce model and its mixtures from partial orders. The core of our framework is the efficient sampling of linear extensions of partial orders under Plackett-Luce model. We propose two Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) samplers: Gibbs sampler and the generalized repeated insertion method tuned by MCMC (GRIM-MCMC), and prove the efficiency of GRIM-MCMC for a large class of preferences.Experiments on synthetic data show that the algorithm with Gibbs sampler outperforms that with GRIM-MCMC. Experiments on real-world data show that the likelihood of test dataset increases when (i) partial orders provide more information; or (ii) the number of components in mixtures of PlackettLuce model increases.

As large eye-tracking datasets are created, data privacy is a pressing concern for the eye-tracking community. De-identifying data does not guarantee privacy because multiple datasets can be linked for inferences. A common belief is that aggregating individuals' data into composite representations such as heatmaps protects the individual. However, we analytically examine the privacy of (noise-free) heatmaps and show that they do not guarantee privacy. We further propose two noise mechanisms that guarantee privacy and analyze their privacy-utility tradeoff. Analysis reveals that our Gaussian noise mechanism is an elegant solution to preserve privacy for heatmaps. Our results have implications for interdisciplinary research to create differentially private mechanisms for eye tracking.