The Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN) initiative, characterized by open interfaces and AI/ML-capable RAN Intelligent Controller (RIC), facilitates effective spectrum sharing among RANs. In this context, we introduce AdapShare, an ORAN-compatible solution leveraging Reinforcement Learning (RL) for intent-based spectrum management, with the primary goal of minimizing resource surpluses or deficits in RANs. By employing RL agents, AdapShare intelligently learns network demand patterns and uses them to allocate resources. We demonstrate the efficacy of AdapShare in the spectrum sharing scenario between LTE and NR networks, incorporating real-world LTE resource usage data and synthetic NR usage data to demonstrate its practical use. We use the average surplus or deficit and Jain's fairness index to measure the RL system's performance in various scenarios. AdapShare outperforms a quasi-static resource allocation scheme based on long-term network demand statistics, particularly when available resources are scarce or exceed the aggregate demand from the networks. Lastly, we present a high-level O-RAN-compatible architecture using RL agents, which demonstrates the seamless integration of AdapShare into real-world deployment scenarios.

The Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN), an industry-driven initiative, utilizes intelligent Radio Access Network (RAN) controllers and open interfaces to facilitate efficient spectrum sharing between LTE and NR RANs. In this paper, we introduce the Proactive Spectrum Adaptation Scheme (ProSAS), a data-driven, O-RAN-compatible spectrum sharing solution. ProSAS is an intelligent radio resource demand prediction and management scheme for intent-driven spectrum management that minimizes surplus or deficit experienced by both RANs. We illustrate the effectiveness of this solution using real-world LTE resource usage data and synthetically generated NR data. Lastly, we discuss a high-level O-RAN-compatible architecture of the proposed solution.

We consider selfish sources that send updates to a monitor over a shared wireless access. The sources would like to minimize the age of their information at the monitor. Our goal is to devise strategies that incentivize such sources to use the shared spectrum cooperatively. Earlier work has modeled such a setting using a non-cooperative one-shot game, played over a single access slot, and has shown that under certain access settings the dominant strategy of each source is to transmit in any slot, resulting in packet collisions between the sources' transmissions and causing all of them to be decoded in error at the monitor. We capture the interaction of the sources over an infinitely many medium access slots using infinitely repeated games. We investigate strategies that enable cooperation resulting in an efficient use of the wireless access, while disincentivizing any source from unilaterally deviating from the strategy. Formally, we are interested in strategies that are a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE). We begin by investigating the properties of the one-stage (slot) optimal and access-fair correlated strategies. We then consider their many-slot variants, the age-fair and access-fair strategies, in the infinitely repeated game model. We prove that the access-fair and age-fair strategies are SPNEs for when collision slots are longer than successful transmission slots. Otherwise, neither is a SPNE. We end with simulations that shed light on a possible SPNE for the latter case.

We investigate the coexistence of an age optimizing network (AON) and a throughput optimizing network (TON) that share a common spectrum band. We consider two modes of long run coexistence: (a) networks compete with each other for spectrum access, causing them to interfere and (b) networks cooperate to achieve non-interfering access. To model competition, we define a non-cooperative stage game parameterized by the average age of the AON at the beginning of the stage, derive its mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE), and analyze the evolution of age and throughput over an infinitely repeated game in which each network plays the MSNE at every stage. Cooperation uses a coordination device that performs a coin toss during each stage to select the network that must access the medium. Networks use the grim trigger punishment strategy, reverting to playing the MSNE every stage forever if the other disobeys the device. We determine if there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium, i.e., the networks obey the device forever as they find cooperation beneficial. We show that networks choose to cooperate only when they consist of a sufficiently small number of nodes, otherwise they prefer to disobey the device and compete.

Real-time monitoring applications have Internet-of- Things (IoT) devices sense and communicate information (status updates) to a monitoring facility. Such applications desire the status updates available at the monitor to be fresh and would like to minimize the age of delivered updates. Networks of such devices may share wireless spectrum with WiFi networks. Often, they use a CSMA/CA based medium access similar to WiFi. However, unlike them, a WiFi network would like to provide high throughputs for its users.We model the coexistence of such networks as a repeated game with two players, an age optimizing network (AON) and a throughput optimizing network (TON), where an AON aims to minimize the age of updates and a TON seeks to maximize throughput. We define the stage game, parameterized by the average age of the AON at the beginning of the stage, and derive its mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE). We study the evolution of the equilibrium strategies over time, when players play the MSNE in each stage, and the resulting average discounted payoffs of the networks. It turns out that it is more favorable for a TON to share spectrum with an AON in comparison to sharing with another TON. The key to this lies in the equilibrium strategy of the AON that occasionally refrains all its nodes from transmitting during a stage. Such stages allow the TON competition free access to the medium.

White-Fi networks are CSMA/CA networks that are deployed in TV white spaces. In outdoor deployments, nodes in such networks can have a communication range of several kilometers. As a result, nodes in range have heterogeneous channel gains from the TV transmitters. Also, they have heterogeneous channel gains to TV receivers. While the nodes in the network may be configured as an ad hoc network of peers or in infrastructure (access point based) mode, they use the 802.11 distributed control function (DCF) to gain access to the medium. We investigate optimization of the DCF throughput in such a White-Fi network when there are restrictions on the aggregate interference (specifically, we consider its expectation and maximum) that it can create at TV receivers. To gain insights into the interplay between the TV networks and the White-Fi network, we allow nodes in the White-Fi network to choose their payload rates, access probabilities, overhead transmission rates, and channels. The resulting optimization problem is non-convex. Our proposed solution methodology obtains large gains (about 200% for 50 nodes) in throughput over a baseline that respects restrictions on aggregate interference but assigns the same power and probability of medium access, across available channels, to all nodes in the network.