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Yanhui Luo

dblp:184/4551 · DBLP profile ↗
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4ranked-venue papers
1as first author
1since 2021 · last 2025
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Systems, architecture and hardware · 2 · 1 first-authorSecurity and privacy · 1Applied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Hardware security and side channels · 100%

Topics — the 1 heaviest of 1, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Hardware security and side channels › hardware attacks
scan-based attack
0.312017
Static and Dynamic Obfuscations of Scan Data Against Scan-Based Side-Channel Attacks · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2017

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

static obfuscation · 0.3dynamic obfuscation · 0.3
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 Robust and Efficient Place Recognition via Camera-LiDAR Fusion and Semantic Descriptor
Tengquan You, Yanhui Luo
ICIC (14)4
2017 Why current secure scan designs fail and how to fix them?
Aijiao Cui, Yanhui Luo, Huawei Li 0001, Gang Qu 0001
Integr.2
2017 Static and Dynamic Obfuscations of Scan Data Against Scan-Based Side-Channel Attacks
abstract
Due to the fallibility of advanced integrated circuit (IC) fabrication processes, scan test has been widely used by cryptographic ICs to provide high fault coverage. Full controllability and observability offered by the scan design also open out the trapdoor to side-channel attacks. To better resist signature attacks on scan testable cryptochip, we propose to fortify the key and lock method by the static obfuscation of scan data. Instead of spatially reshuffling the scan cells, the working mode of some scan cells is altered to jumble up the scan data when the scan test is performed with an incorrect test key. However, when the plaintext is fed directly through the primary inputs for test efficiency, the static obfuscation of scan data is inadequate as demonstrated by a new test-mode-only signature attack (TMOSA) proposed in this paper. To thwart TMOSA, a new countermeasure based on the dynamic obfuscation of scan data is proposed. By cyclically shifting the incorrect test key throughout the test phase, the blocking cells due to the mismatched bits of the test key are made to move temporally to dynamically obfuscate the scan data. This latter scheme is unconditionally resilient against TMOSA and all other known scan-based attacks while preserving the merits of high testability and low area overhead compared with other countermeasures.
Aijiao Cui, Yanhui Luo, Chip-Hong Chang
IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur.2
2016 A new countermeasure against scan-based side-channel attacks
abstract
Scan design has been widely used to facilitate the testing of integrated circuits (ICs). However, it also provides attackers a side-channel to access the internal states of crypto chips and thus becomes a great threat to the security of the cipher keys. We propose a secure scan design scheme to protect crypto chips against such scan-based side-channel attacks. In this scheme, we introduce a shift register to control the working mode of certain scan cells. Only when the user configures the shift register correctly, can the scan design work normally under testing mode. We show that the proposed secure scan design can effectively resist the existing scan-based attacks. We also demonstrate that this approach has low area overhead while maintaining the testability of original design.
Yanhui Luo, Aijiao Cui, Gang Qu 0001, Huawei Li 0001
ISCAS1