Egon Kidmose

dblp:184/8430 · DBLP profile ↗
← Back
3ranked-venue papers
0as first author
3since 2021 · last 2022
0000-0003-0542-5334ORCID · verified

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 2 · 2 since 2021
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2022 Understanding the Challenges of Blocking Unnamed Network Traffic
abstract
Network traffic that is not preceded by any Domain Name System (DNS) resolutions is referred to as unnamed traffic. Any DNS-based security system is ineffective against malicious content distributed through this traffic. In this paper, we introduce a novel method for identifying unnamed traffic based on the correlation of flows and DNS responses extracted from raw network traces. We describe two challenges that affect the validity of our method, and how to handle them. By applying our method to a one-week trace of network traffic, we illustrate that unnamed traffic is ubiquitous in a university network across nearly all client systems, destination IP addresses, and destination services. We conclude by presenting several open problems that prevent us from blocking unnamed traffic for security reasons.
Kaspar Hageman, Egon Kidmose, René Rydhof Hansen, Jens Myrup Pedersen
NOMS2
2021 An Architecture for Processing a Dynamic Heterogeneous Information Network of Security Intelligence
Marios Anagnostopoulos, Egon Kidmose, Amine Laghaout, Rasmus L. Olsen, Sajad Homayoun, Christian Damsgaard Jensen, Jens Myrup Pedersen
NSS2
2021 Can a TLS Certificate Be Phishy?
abstract
This paper investigates the potential of using digital certificates for the detection of phishing domains. This i motivated by phishing domains that have started to abuse the (erroneous) trust of the public in browser padloc symbols, and by the large-scale adoption of the Certificate Transparency (CT) framework. This publicl accessible evidence trail of Transport Layer Security (TLS) certificates has made the TLS landscape mor transparent than ever. By comparing samples of phishing, popular benign, and non-popular benign domains we provide insight into the TLS certificates issuance behavior for phishing domains, focusing on the selectio of the certificate authority, the validation level of the certificates, and the phenomenon of certificate sharin among phishing domains. Our results show that phishing domains gravitate to a relatively small selection o certificate authorities, and disproportionally to cPanel, and tend to rely on certificates with a low, and cheap validation level. Additionally, we demonstrate that the vast majority of certificates issued for phishing domain cover more than only phishing domains. These results suggest that a more pro-active role of CAs and puttin more emphasis on certificate revocation can have a crucial impact in the defense against phishing attacks.
Kaspar Hageman, Egon Kidmose, René Rydhof Hansen, Jens Myrup Pedersen
SECRYPT2