We introduce RobotPerf, a vendor-agnostic bench-marking suite designed to evaluate robotics computing performance across a diverse range of hardware platforms using ROS 2 as its common baseline. The suite encompasses ROS 2 packages covering the full robotics pipeline and integrates two distinct benchmarking approaches: black-box testing, which measures performance by eliminating upper layers and replacing them with a test application, and grey-box testing, an application-specific measure that observes internal system states with minimal interference. Our benchmarking framework provides ready-to-use tools and is easily adaptable for the assessment of custom ROS 2 computational graphs. Drawing from the knowledge of leading robot architects and system architecture experts, RobotPerf establishes a standardized approach to robotics benchmarking. As an open-source initiative, RobotPerf remains committed to evolving with community input to advance the future of hardware-accelerated robotics.

Mobility, power, and price points often dictate that robots do not have sufficient computing power on board to run contemporary robot algorithms at desired rates. Cloud computing providers such as AWS, GCP, and Azure offer immense computing power and increasingly low latency on demand, but tapping into that power from a robot is non-trivial. We present FogROS2, an open-source platform to facilitate cloud and fog robotics that is included in the Robot Operating System 2 (ROS 2) distribution. FogROS2 is distinct from its predecessor FogROS1 in 9 ways, including lower latency, overhead, and startup times; improved usability, and additional automation, such as region and computer type selection. Additionally, FogROS2 gains performance, timing, and additional improvements associated with ROS 2. In common robot applications, FogROS2 reduces SLAM latency by 50 %, reduces grasp planning time from 14 s to 1.2 s, and speeds up motion planning 45x. When compared to FogROS1, FogROS2 reduces network utilization by up to 3.8x, improves startup time by 63 %, and network round-trip latency by 97 % for images using video compression. The source code, examples, and documentation for FogROS2 are available at https://github.com/BerkeleyAutomation/FogROS2, and is available through the official ROS 2 repository at https://index.ros.org/p/FogROS2/.

This paper proposes a novel game-theoretic framework for defending against Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). It applies the original Cut-The-Rope model into an experimental study extending the previously studied attacker movements beyond the Poisson distribution to a realistic set of attack actions. More importantly, it demonstrates the value of this framework on an experimental study of an APT defense game on attack graphs, which lets a security officer establish an optimized defense policy against stealthy intrusions. The security model and algorithm under study is designed for practical use with attack graphs as threat models, possibly including vulnerability information if available. The game-theoretic optimization delivers a proactive defense policy under the following assumptions or requirements: first, we do not need to assume that the system is, or has been, clean from adversaries at any time. At the moment when the defender computes the defense policy, the attacker is assumed to already be in the system (also having penetrated it until an unknown depth). Second, the defender does not rely on any signaling or other indicators of adversarial activity, nor is there a reliable feedback mechanism to tell the defender if its actions were successful or not. Third, the model can use information on exploits, such as Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) numbers, to refine the defense game, but can also operate without such information. We corroborate our findings on publicly documented attack graphs from the robotics domain; without and with CVE information. We run experiments against two different types of defense regimes, and compare the results against an intuitive baseline defense heuristic. The results show that the optimized defense strongly outperforms simple heuristics, like taking the shortest or easiest attack paths.

Hardware acceleration can revolutionize robotics, enabling new applications by speeding up robot response times while remaining power-efficient. However, the diversity of acceleration options makes it difficult for roboticists to easily deploy accelerated systems without expertise in each specific hardware platform. In this work, we address this challenge with RobotCore, an architecture to integrate hardware acceleration in the widely-used ROS 2 robotics software framework. This architecture is target-agnostic (supports edge, workstation, data center, or cloud targets) and accelerator-agnostic (supports both FPGAs and GPUs). It builds on top of the common ROS 2 build system and tools and is easily portable across different research and commercial solutions through a new firmware layer. We also leverage the Linux Tracing Toolkit next generation (LTTng) to enable low-overhead real-time tracing and benchmarking of accelerated ROS 2 systems. To demonstrate the acceleration enabled by this architecture, we use it to deploy a ROS 2 perception computational graph on a CPU and FPGA. We also employ our integrated tracing and benchmarking to analyze bottlenecks, uncovering insights that guide us to improve FPGA communication efficiency. In particular, we design an intra-FPGA ROS 2 node communication queue template and use it in conjunction with FPGA-accelerated nodes to achieve a 24.42% speedup over a CPU.

ROS 2 is rapidly becoming a standard in the robotics industry. Built upon DDS as its default communication middleware and used in safety-critical scenarios, adding secu-rity to robots and ROS computational graphs is increasingly becoming a concern. The present work introduces SROS2, a series of developer tools and libraries that facilitate adding security to ROS 2 graphs. Focusing on a usability-centric approach in SROS2, we present a methodology for securing graphs systematically while following the DevSecOps model. We also demonstrate the use of our security tools by presenting an application case study that considers securing a graph using the popular Navigation2 and SLAM Toolbox stacks applied in a TurtieBot3 robot. We analyse the current capabilities of SROS2 and discuss the shortcomings, which provides insights for future contributions and extensions. Ultimately, we present SROS2 as usable security tools for ROS 2 and argue that without usability, security in robotics will be greatly impaired.