Today, we use smartphones as multi-purpose devices that communicate with their environment to implement context-aware services, including asset tracking, indoor localization, contact tracing, or access control. As a de-facto standard, Bluetooth is available in virtually every smartphone to provide short-range wireless communication. Importantly, many Bluetooth-driven applications such as Phone as a Key (PaaK) for vehicles and buildings require proximity of legitimate devices, which must be protected against unauthorized access. In earlier access control systems, attackers were able to violate proximity-verification through relay station attacks. However, the vulnerability of Bluetooth against such attacks was yet unclear as existing relay attack strategies are not applicable or can be defeated through wireless distance measurement.

The aviation industry's increasing reliance on GPS to facilitate navigation and air traffic monitoring opens new attack vectors with the purpose of hijacking UAVs or interfering with air safety. We propose Crowd-GPS-Sec to detect and localize GPS spoofing attacks on moving airborne targets such as UAVs or commercial airliners. Unlike previous attempts to secure GPS, Crowd-GPS-Sec neither requires any updates of the GPS infrastructure nor of the airborne GPS receivers, which are both unlikely to happen in the near future. In contrast, Crowd-GPS-Sec leverages crowdsourcing to monitor the air traffic from GPS-derived position advertisements that aircraft periodically broadcast for air traffic control purposes. Spoofing attacks are detected and localized by an independent infrastructure on the ground which continuously analyzes the contents and the times of arrival of these advertisements. We evaluate our system with real-world data from a crowdsourced air traffic monitoring sensor network and by simulations. We show that Crowd-GPS-Sec is able to globally detect GPS spoofing attacks in less than two seconds and to localize the attacker up to an accuracy of 150 meters after 15 minutes of monitoring time.

Systems relying on satellite positioning techniques such as GPS can be targeted by spoofing attacks, where attackers try to inject fake positioning information. With the growing spread of flying drones and their usage of GPS for localization, these systems become interesting targets of attacks with the purpose of hijacking or to distract air safety surveillance. The most recent development in air traffic surveillance is the automatic dependent surveillance -- broadcast (ADS-B). Aircraft periodically broadcast their location, speed, or environmental measurements via ADS-B. The open research project OpenSky Network collects ADS-B reports and makes them available for research purposes. This poster presents a concept to detect and localize spoofing devices by utilizing the information provided by a large-scale air traffic surveillance system. We utilize ADS-B reports collected by the OpenSky Network and provide first results on the effectiveness of localizing spoofing sources.

In this paper, we report on recent advancements in attacking satellite-based positioning systems and on shortcomings of proposed countermeasures. Applications based on satellite positioning and navigation systems make use of a deployed infrastructure that is challenging to protect and secure against attacks. Many of the proposed protection mechanisms and solutions in the wild are based on and analyzed with respect to single-antenna attacker models that should in the meantime be considered outdated as they are no longer appropriate. Due to a significant drop in complexity and cost to perform multi-device attacks on these systems, the attacker models need to be adjusted to comprise more powerful adversaries that have recently become a reality. By demonstrating the implementation of a simple yet effective multi-antenna setup, we outline possible attacks against systems that are otherwise considered secure.