In multiple domains, large amounts of data are daily generated and combined to be analyzed. The interpretation of these analyses requires to track back the provenance of combined data with respect to initial, raw data. The correctness of the provenance is crucial in many critical domains, such as medicine to prescribe treatments. In this article, we propose the first provenance-aware extended relational algebra formalized in a proof assistant (Coq), for a non trivial subset of database queries: queries containing aggregates, null values, and correlated sub-queries. The formalization is validated by an adequacy proof with respect to standard evaluation of queries. This development is a first step towards a posteriori certification of provenance for data manipulation, with strong guaranties.

We describe a Martin-Lof-style dependent type theory, called Cocon, that allows us to mix the intensional function space that is used to represent higher-order abstract syntax (HOAS) trees with the extensional function space that describes (recursive) computations. We mediate between HOAS representations and computations using contextual modal types. Our type theory also supports an infinite hierarchy of universes and hence supports type-level computation thereby providing metaprogramming and (small-scale) reflection. Our main contribution is the development of a Kripke-style model for Cocon that allows us to prove normalization. From the normalization proof, we derive subject reduction and consistency. Our work lays the foundation to incorporate the methodology of logical frameworks into systems such as Agda and bridges the longstanding gap between these two worlds.

Differential power analysis (DPA) is a side-channel attack in which an adversary retrieves cryptographic material by measuring and analyzing the power consumption of the device on which the cryptographic algorithm under attack executes. An effective countermeasure against DPA is to mask secrets by probabilistically encoding them over a set of shares, and to run masked algorithms that compute on these encodings. Masked algorithms are often expected to provide, at least, a certain level of probing security. Leveraging the deep connections between probabilistic information flow and probing security, we develop a precise, scalable, and fully automated methodology to verify the probing security of masked algorithms, and generate them from unprotected descriptions of the algorithm. Our methodology relies on several contributions of independent interest, including a stronger notion of probing security that supports compositional reasoning, and a type system for enforcing an expressive class of probing policies. Finally, we validate our methodology on examples that go significantly beyond the state-of-the-art.