Kristina Gligoric, Tijana Zrnic, Cinoo Lee, Emmanuel Candes, Dan Jurafsky. Proceedings of the 2025 Conference of the Nations of the Americas Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics: Human Language Technologies (Volume 1: Long Papers). 2025.

Active statistical inference is a new method for inference with AI-assisted data collection. Given a budget on the number of labeled data points that can be collected and assuming access to an AI predictive model, the basic idea is to improve estimation accuracy by prioritizing the collection of labels where the model is most uncertain. The drawback, however, is that inaccurate uncertainty estimates can make active sampling produce highly noisy results, potentially worse than those from naive uniform sampling. In this work, we present robust sampling strategies for active statistical inference. Robust sampling ensures that the resulting estimator is never worse than the estimator using uniform sampling. Furthermore, with reliable uncertainty estimates, the estimator usually outperforms standard active inference. This is achieved by optimally interpolating between uniform and active sampling, depending on the quality of the uncertainty scores, and by using ideas from robust optimization. We demonstrate the utility of the method on a series of real datasets from computational social science and survey research.

On many learning platforms, the optimization criteria guiding model training reflect the priorities of the designer rather than those of the individuals they affect. Consequently, users may act strategically to obtain more favorable outcomes. While past work has studied strategic user behavior on learning platforms, the focus has largely been on individual strategic responses to a deployed model, without considering the behavior of other users. In contrast, *look-ahead reasoning* takes into account that user actions are coupled, and---at scale---impact future predictions. Within this framework, we first formalize level-k thinking, a concept from behavioral economics, where users aim to outsmart their peers by looking one step ahead. We show that, while convergence to an equilibrium is accelerated, the equilibrium remains the same, providing no benefit of higher-level reasoning for individuals in the long run. Then, we focus on collective reasoning, where users take coordinated actions by optimizing through their joint impact on the model. By contrasting collective with selfish behavior, we characterize the benefits and limits of coordination; a new notion of alignment between the learner's and the users' utilities emerges as a key concept. Look-ahead reasoning can be seen as a generalization of algorithmic collective action; we thus offer the first results characterizing the utility trade-offs of coordination when contesting algorithmic systems.

When predictions are performative, the choice of which predictor to deploy influences the distribution of future observations. The overarching goal in learning under performativity is to find a predictor that has low performative risk, that is, good performance on its induced distribution. One family of solutions for optimizing the performative risk, including bandits and other derivative-free methods, is agnostic to any structure in the performative feedback, leading to exceedingly slow convergence rates. A complementary family of solutions makes use of explicit models for the feedback, such as best-response models in strategic classification, enabling faster rates. However, these rates critically rely on the feedback model being correct. In this work we study a general protocol for making use of possibly misspecified models in performative prediction, called plug-in performative optimization. We show this solution can be far superior to model-agnostic strategies, as long as the misspecification is not too extreme. Our results support the hypothesis that models, even if misspecified, can indeed help with learning in performative settings.

Inspired by the concept of active learning, we propose active inference—a methodology for statistical inference with machine-learning-assisted data collection. Assuming a budget on the number of labels that can be collected, the methodology uses a machine learning model to identify which data points would be most beneficial to label, thus effectively utilizing the budget. It operates on a simple yet powerful intuition: prioritize the collection of labels for data points where the model exhibits uncertainty, and rely on the model’s predictions where it is confident. Active inference constructs valid confidence intervals and hypothesis tests while leveraging any black-box machine learning model and handling any data distribution. The key point is that it achieves the same level of accuracy with far fewer samples than existing baselines relying on non-adaptively-collected data. This means that for the same number of collected samples, active inference enables smaller confidence intervals and more powerful tests. We evaluate active inference on datasets from public opinion research, census analysis, and proteomics.

We initiate a principled study of algorithmic collective action on digital platforms that deploy machine learning algorithms. We propose a simple theoretical model of a collective interacting with a firm’s learning algorithm. The collective pools the data of participating individuals and executes an algorithmic strategy by instructing participants how to modify their own data to achieve a collective goal. We investigate the consequences of this model in three fundamental learning-theoretic settings: nonparametric optimal learning, parametric risk minimization, and gradient-based optimization. In each setting, we come up with coordinated algorithmic strategies and characterize natural success criteria as a function of the collective’s size. Complementing our theory, we conduct systematic experiments on a skill classification task involving tens of thousands of resumes from a gig platform for freelancers. Through more than two thousand model training runs of a BERT-like language model, we see a striking correspondence emerge between our empirical observations and the predictions made by our theory. Taken together, our theory and experiments broadly support the conclusion that algorithmic collectives of exceedingly small fractional size can exert significant control over a platform’s learning algorithm.

In performative prediction, the deployment of a predictive model triggers a shift in the data distribution. As these shifts are typically unknown ahead of time, the learner needs to deploy a model to get feedback about the distribution it induces. We study the problem of finding near-optimal models under performativity while maintaining low regret. On the surface, this problem might seem equivalent to a bandit problem. However, it exhibits a fundamentally richer feedback structure that we refer to as performative feedback: after every deployment, the learner receives samples from the shifted distribution rather than bandit feedback about the reward. Our main contribution is regret bounds that scale only with the complexity of the distribution shifts and not that of the reward function. The key algorithmic idea is careful exploration of the distribution shifts that informs a novel construction of confidence bounds on the risk of unexplored models. The construction only relies on smoothness of the shifts and does not assume convexity. More broadly, our work establishes a conceptual approach for leveraging tools from the bandits literature for the purpose of regret minimization with performative feedback.

In performative prediction, predictions guide decision-making and hence can influence the distribution of future data. To date, work on performative prediction has focused on finding performatively stable models, which are the fixed points of repeated retraining. However, stable solutions can be far from optimal when evaluated in terms of the performative risk, the loss experienced by the decision maker when deploying a model. In this paper, we shift attention beyond performative stability and focus on optimizing the performative risk directly. We identify a natural set of properties of the loss function and model-induced distribution shift under which the performative risk is convex, a property which does not follow from convexity of the loss alone. Furthermore, we develop algorithms that leverage our structural assumptions to optimize the performative risk with better sample efficiency than generic methods for derivative-free convex optimization.

We consider a sequential setting in which a single dataset of individuals is used to perform adaptively-chosen analyses, while ensuring that the differential privacy loss of each participant does not exceed a pre-specified privacy budget. The standard approach to this problem relies on bounding a worst-case estimate of the privacy loss over all individuals and all possible values of their data, for every single analysis. Yet, in many scenarios this approach is overly conservative, especially for "typical" data points which incur little privacy loss by participation in most of the analyses. In this work, we give a method for tighter privacy loss accounting based on the value of a personalized privacy loss estimate for each individual in each analysis. To implement the accounting method we design a filter for Rényi differential privacy. A filter is a tool that ensures that the privacy parameter of a composed sequence of algorithms with adaptively-chosen privacy parameters does not exceed a pre-specified budget. Our filter is simpler and tighter than the known filter for $(\epsilon,\delta)$-differential privacy by Rogers et al. (2016). We apply our results to the analysis of noisy gradient descent and show that personalized accounting can be practical, easy to implement, and can only make the privacy-utility tradeoff tighter.

As predictive models are deployed into the real world, they must increasingly contend with strategic behavior. A growing body of work on strategic classification treats this problem as a Stackelberg game: the decision-maker "leads" in the game by deploying a model, and the strategic agents "follow" by playing their best response to the deployed model. Importantly, in this framing, the burden of learning is placed solely on the decision-maker, while the agents’ best responses are implicitly treated as instantaneous. In this work, we argue that the order of play in strategic classification is fundamentally determined by the relative frequencies at which the decision-maker and the agents adapt to each other’s actions. In particular, by generalizing the standard model to allow both players to learn over time, we show that a decision-maker that makes updates faster than the agents can reverse the order of play, meaning that the agents lead and the decision-maker follows. We observe in standard learning settings that such a role reversal can be desirable for both the decision-maker and the strategic agents. Finally, we show that a decision-maker with the freedom to choose their update frequency can induce learning dynamics that converge to Stackelberg equilibria with either order of play.

We consider the problem of asynchronous online testing, aimed at providing control of the false discovery rate (FDR) during a continual stream of data collection and testing, where each test may be a sequential test that can start and stop at arbitrary times. This setting increasingly characterizes real-world applications in science and industry, where teams of researchers across large organizations may conduct tests of hypotheses in a decentralized manner. The overlap in time and space also tends to induce dependencies among test statistics, a challenge for classical methodology, which either assumes (overly optimistically) independence or (overly pessimistically) arbitrary dependence between test statistics. We present a general framework that addresses both of these issues via a unified computational abstraction that we refer to as “conflict sets.” We show how this framework yields algorithms with formal FDR guarantees under a more intermediate, local notion of dependence. We illustrate our algorithms in simulations by comparing to existing algorithms for online FDR control.

One important partition of algorithms for controlling the false discovery rate (FDR) in multiple testing is into offline and online algorithms. The first generally achieve significantly higher power of discovery, while the latter allow making decisions sequentially as well as adaptively formulating hypotheses based on past observations. Using existing methodology, it is unclear how one could trade off the benefits of these two broad families of algorithms, all the while preserving their formal FDR guarantees. To this end, we introduce Batch-BH and Batch-St-BH, algorithms for controlling the FDR when a possibly infinite sequence of batches of hypotheses is tested by repeated application of one of the most widely used offline algorithms, the Benjamini-Hochberg (BH) method or Storey’s improvement of the BH method. We show that our algorithms interpolate between existing online and offline methodology, thus trading off the best of both worlds.

When predictions support decisions they may influence the outcome they aim to predict. We call such predictions performative; the prediction influences the target. Performativity is a well-studied phenomenon in policy-making that has so far been neglected in supervised learning. When ignored, performativity surfaces as undesirable distribution shift, routinely addressed with retraining. We develop a risk minimization framework for performative prediction bringing together concepts from statistics, game theory, and causality. A conceptual novelty is an equilibrium notion we call performative stability. Performative stability implies that the predictions are calibrated not against past outcomes, but against the future outcomes that manifest from acting on the prediction. Our main results are necessary and sufficient conditions for the convergence of retraining to a performatively stable point of nearly minimal loss. In full generality, performative prediction strictly subsumes the setting known as strategic classification. We thus also give the first sufficient conditions for retraining to overcome strategic feedback effects.

In performative prediction, the choice of a model influences the distribution of future data, typically through actions taken based on the model's predictions. We initiate the study of stochastic optimization for performative prediction. What sets this setting apart from traditional stochastic optimization is the difference between merely updating model parameters and deploying the new model. The latter triggers a shift in the distribution that affects future data, while the former keeps the distribution as is. Assuming smoothness and strong convexity, we prove rates of convergence for both greedily deploying models after each stochastic update (greedy deploy) as well as for taking several updates before redeploying (lazy deploy). In both cases, our bounds smoothly recover the optimal $O(1/k)$ rate as the strength of performativity decreases. Furthermore, they illustrate how depending on the strength of performative effects, there exists a regime where either approach outperforms the other. We experimentally explore the trade-off on both synthetic data and a strategic classification simulator.

Adaptive data analysis is frequently criticized for its pessimistic generalization guarantees. The source of these pessimistic bounds is a model that permits arbitrary, possibly adversarial analysts that optimally use information to bias results. While being a central issue in the field, still lacking are notions of natural analysts that allow for more optimistic bounds faithful to the reality that typical analysts aren’t adversarial. In this work, we propose notions of natural analysts that smoothly interpolate between the optimal non-adaptive bounds and the best-known adaptive generalization bounds. To accomplish this, we model the analyst’s knowledge as evolving according to the rules of an unknown dynamical system that takes in revealed information and outputs new statistical queries to the data. This allows us to restrict the analyst through different natural control-theoretic notions. One such notion corresponds to a recency bias, formalizing an inability to arbitrarily use distant information. Another complementary notion formalizes an anchoring bias, a tendency to weight initial information more strongly. Both notions come with quantitative parameters that smoothly interpolate between the non-adaptive case and the fully adaptive case, allowing for a rich spectrum of intermediate analysts that are neither non-adaptive nor adversarial. Natural not only from a cognitive perspective, we show that our notions also capture standard optimization methods, like gradient descent in various settings. This gives a new interpretation to the fact that gradient descent tends to overfit much less than its adaptive nature might suggest.

In the online false discovery rate (FDR) problem, one observes a possibly infinite sequence of $p$-values $P_1,P_2,…$, each testing a different null hypothesis, and an algorithm must pick a sequence of rejection thresholds $\alpha_1,\alpha_2,…$ in an online fashion, effectively rejecting the $k$-th null hypothesis whenever $P_k \leq \alpha_k$. Importantly, $\alpha_k$ must be a function of the past, and cannot depend on $P_k$ or any of the later unseen $p$-values, and must be chosen to guarantee that for any time $t$, the FDR up to time $t$ is less than some pre-determined quantity $\alpha \in (0,1)$. In this work, we present a powerful new framework for online FDR control that we refer to as “SAFFRON”. Like older alpha-investing algorithms, SAFFRON starts off with an error budget (called alpha-wealth) that it intelligently allocates to different tests over time, earning back some alpha-wealth whenever it makes a new discovery. However, unlike older methods, SAFFRON’s threshold sequence is based on a novel estimate of the alpha fraction that it allocates to true null hypotheses. In the offline setting, algorithms that employ an estimate of the proportion of true nulls are called “adaptive”, hence SAFFRON can be seen as an online analogue of the offline Storey-BH adaptive procedure. Just as Storey-BH is typically more powerful than the Benjamini-Hochberg (BH) procedure under independence, we demonstrate that SAFFRON is also more powerful than its non-adaptive counterparts such as LORD.

We consider the problem of crowdsourced clustering of a set of items based on queries of the similarity of triple of objects. Such an approach, called triangle queries, was proposed in [1], where it was shown that, for a fixed query budget, it outperforms clustering based on edge queries (i.e, comparing pairs of objects). In [1] the clustering algorithm for triangle and edge queries was identical and each triangle query response was treated as 3 separate edge query responses. In this paper we directly exploit the triangle structure of the responses by embedding them into a 3-way tensor. Since there are 5 possible responses to each triangle query, it is a priori not clear how best to embed them into the tensor. We give sufficient conditions on non-trivial embedding such that the resulting tensor has a rank equal to the underlying number of clusters (akin to what happens with the rank of the adjacency matrix). We then use an alternating least squares tensor decomposition algorithm to cluster a noisy and partially observed tensor and show, through extensive numerical simulations, that it significantly outperforms methods that make use only of the adjacency matrix.