David Aspinall 0001

dblp:19/6243 · DBLP profile ↗
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39ranked-venue papers
14as first author
6since 2021 · last 2024
0000-0002-6073-9013ORCID · verified

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Theory of computation · 14 · 8 first-authorSecurity and privacy · 11 · 4 since 2021Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 10 · 4 first-author · 2 since 2021Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 10 · 4 first-authorHuman-computer interaction and ubiquitous computing · 2Databases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 1 · 1 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1Applied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 1 · 1 since 2021
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2024 Bad Design Smells in Benchmark NIDS Datasets
abstract
Synthetically generated benchmark datasets are vitally important for machine learning and network intrusion research. When producing intrusion datasets for research, providers make complex, subtle and sometimes unwary decisions that can affect data utility. Unfortunately, examining network data is difficult, so these decisions are rarely audited. We perform an in-depth manual analysis of seven highly-cited benchmark datasets, discovering six suspect design patterns, which we term ‘data design smells’. We formulate six heuristics to measure the prevalence of these issues. These design choices, if not properly accounted for, can introduce severe experimental bias, which we demonstrate with four concrete examples. We then conduct a systematic impact analysis of the wider literature that relies on these datasets. Our results suggest that bad design smells correlate with poor data diversity, murky labelling and poorly-defined generalisation criteria. Worryingly, we find that improper usage of these datasets can weaken their utility as benchmarks which, in turn, biases downstream intrusion detection research. We conclude with some recommendations for using and creating NIDS datasets to help alleviate these issues.
Robert Flood, Gints Engelen, David Aspinall 0001, Lieven Desmet
EuroS&P3
2023 Tactics for Account Access Graphs
Luca Arnaboldi 0001, David Aspinall 0001, Christina Kolb, Sasa Radomirovic
ESORICS (3)2
2021 Evaluating Model Robustness to Adversarial Samples in Network Intrusion Detection
abstract
Adversarial machine learning, a technique which seeks to deceive machine learning (ML) models, threatens the utility and reliability of ML systems. This is particularly relevant in critical ML implementations such as those found in Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS). This paper considers the impact of adversarial influence on NIDS and proposes ways to improve ML based systems. Specifically, we consider five feature robustness metrics to determine which features in a model are most vulnerable, and four defense methods. These methods are tested on six ML models with four adversarial sample generation techniques. Our results show that across different models and adversarial generation techniques, there is limited consistency in vulnerable features or in effectiveness of defense method.
Madeleine Schneider, David Aspinall 0001, Nathaniel D. Bastian
IEEE BigData2
2021 Checking Contact Tracing App Implementations
abstract
In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, contact tracing apps have been developed based on digital contact tracing frameworks. These allow developers to build privacy-conscious apps that detect whether an infected individual is in close-proximity with others. Given the urgency of the problem, these apps have been developed at an accelerated rate with a brief testing period. Such quick development may have led to mistakes in the apps’ implementations, resulting in problems with their functionality, privacy and security. To mitigate these concerns, we develop and apply a methodology for evaluating the functionality, privacy and security of Android apps using the Google/Apple Exposure Notification API. This is a three-pronged approach consisting of a manual analysis, general static analysis and a bespoke static analysis, using a tool we’ve developed, dubbed MonSTER. As a result, we have found that, although most apps met the basic standards outlined by Google/Apple, there are issues with th e functionality of some of these apps that could impact user safety.
Robert Flood, Sheung Shi Chan, Wei Chen 0023, David Aspinall 0001
ICISSP4
2021 Controlling Network Traffic Microstructures for Machine-Learning Model Probing
Henry Clausen, Robert Flood, David Aspinall 0001
SecureComm (1)3
2021 Formalising $\varSigma$-Protocols and Commitment Schemes Using CryptHOL
abstract
Machine-checked proofs of security are important to increase the rigour of provable security. In this work we present a formalised theory of two fundamental two party cryptographic primitives: Σ-protocols and Commitment Schemes. Σ-protocols allow a prover to convince a verifier that they possess some knowledge without leaking information about the knowledge. Commitment schemes allow a committer to commit to a message and keep it secret until revealing it at a later time. We use CryptHOL (Lochbihler in Archive of formal proofs, 2017) to formalise both primitives and prove secure multiple examples namely; the Schnorr, Chaum-Pedersen and Okamoto Σ-protocols as well as a construction that allows for compound (AND and OR) Σ-protocols and the Pedersen and Rivest commitment schemes. A highlight of the work is a formalisation of the construction of commitment schemes from Σ-protocols (Damgard in Lecture notes, 2002). We formalise this proof at an abstract level using the modularity available in Isabelle/HOL and CryptHOL. This way, the proofs of the instantiations come for free.
David Butler 0002, Andreas Lochbihler, David Aspinall 0001, Adrià Gascón
J. Autom. Reason.3
2020 Neural Networks, Secure by Construction - An Exploration of Refinement Types
Wen Kokke, Ekaterina Komendantskaya, Daniel Kienitz, Robert Atkey, David Aspinall 0001
APLAS5
2020 Formalising oblivious transfer in the semi-honest and malicious model in CryptHOL
abstract
Multi-Party Computation (MPC) allows multiple parties to compute a function together while keeping their inputs private. Large scale implementations of MPC protocols are becoming practical thus it is important to have strong guarantees for the whole development process, from the underlying cryptography to the implementation. Computer aided proofs are a way to provide such guarantees.
David Butler 0002, David Aspinall 0001, Adrià Gascón
CPP2
2020 Evading Stepping-Stone Detection with Enough Chaff
Henry Clausen, Michael Gibson 0002, David Aspinall 0001
NSS3
2018 Formal Analysis of Sneak-Peek: A Data Centre Attack and Its Mitigations
Wei Chen 0023, Yuhui Lin, Vashti Galpin, Vivek Nigam, Myungjin Lee, David Aspinall 0001
SEC6
2018 Secure information sharing in social agent interactions using information flow analysis
Shahriar Bijani, David Stuart Robertson 0001, David Aspinall 0001
Eng. Appl. Artif. Intell.3
2018 Foreword
Martin Hofmann 0001, David Aspinall 0001, Brian Campbell 0001, Ian Stark, Perdita Stevens
Theor. Comput. Sci.2
2017 How to Simulate It in Isabelle: Towards Formal Proof for Secure Multi-Party Computation
David Butler 0002, David Aspinall 0001, Adrià Gascón
ITP2
2017 Capturing Policies for BYOD
Joseph Hallett, David Aspinall 0001
SEC2
2016 POSTER: Weighing in eHealth Security
abstract
eHealth devices such as smart scales and wearable fitness trackers are a key part of many health technology solutions. However, these eHealth devices can be vulnerable to privacy and security related attacks. In this poster, we propose a security analysis framework for eHealth devices, called mH-PriSe, that will yield useful information for security analysts, vendors, health care providers, and consumers. We demonstrate our framework by analysing scales from 6 vendors. Our results show that while vendors strive to address security and privacy issues correctly, challenges remain in many cases. Only 5 out of 8 solutions can be recommended with some caveats whereas the remaining 3 solutions expose severe vulnerabilities.
Martin Krämer, David Aspinall 0001, Maria Klara Wolters
CCS2
2016 Towards Formal Proof Metrics
David Aspinall 0001, Cezary Kaliszyk
FASE1
2016 On Robust Malware Classifiers by Verifying Unwanted Behaviours
Wei Chen 0023, David Aspinall 0001, Andrew D. Gordon 0001, Charles Sutton, Igor Muttik
IFM2
2016 What's in a Theorem Name?
David Aspinall 0001, Cezary Kaliszyk
ITP1
2016 More Semantics More Robust: Improving Android Malware Classifiers
abstract
Automatic malware classifiers often perform badly on the detection of new malware, i.e., their robustness is poor. We study the machine-learning-based mobile malware classifiers and reveal one reason: the input features used by these classifiers can't capture general behavioural patterns of malware instances. We extract the best-performing syntax-based features like permissions and API calls, and some semantics-based features like happen-befores and unwanted behaviours, and train classifiers using popular supervised and semi-supervised learning methods. By comparing their classification performance on industrial datasets collected across several years, we demonstrate that using semantics-based features can dramatically improve robustness of malware classifiers.
Wei Chen 0023, David Aspinall 0001, Andrew D. Gordon 0001, Charles Sutton, Igor Muttik
WISEC2
2015 EviCheck: Digital Evidence for Android
Mohamed Nassim Seghir, David Aspinall 0001
ATVA2
2015 Type Inference for ZFH
Steven Obua, Jacques D. Fleuriot, Phil Scott, David Aspinall 0001
CICM4
2015 Sensor use and usefulness: Trade-offs for data-driven authentication on mobile devices
abstract
Modern mobile devices come with an array of sensors that support many interesting applications. However, sensors have different sampling costs (e.g., battery drain) and benefits (e.g., accuracy) under different circumstances. In this work we investigate the trade-off between the cost of using a sensor and the benefit gained from its use, with application to data-driven authentication on mobile devices. Current authentication practice, where user behaviour is first learned from the sensor data and then used to detect anomalies, typically assumes a fixed sampling rate and does not consider the battery consumption and usefulness of sensors. In this work we study how battery consumption and sensor effectiveness (e.g., for detecting attacks) vary when using different sensors and different sensor sampling rates. We use data from both controlled lab studies, as well as field trials, for our experiments. We also propose an adaptive sampling technique that adjusts the sampling rate based on an expected device vigilance level. Our results show that it is possible to reduce the battery consumption tenfold without significantly impacting the detection of attacks.
Nicholas Micallef, Hilmi Günes Kayacik, Mike Just, Lynne Baillie, David Aspinall 0001
PerCom5
2015 On the Privacy, Security and Safety of Blood Pressure and Diabetes Apps
Konstantin Knorr, David Aspinall 0001, Maria Klara Wolters
SEC2
2013 A Semantic Basis for Proof Queries and Transformations
David Aspinall 0001, Ewen Denney, Christoph Lüth
LPAR1
2013 Polar: A Framework for Proof Refactoring
Dominik Dietrich, Iain Whiteside, David Aspinall 0001
LPAR3
2012 Querying Proofs
David Aspinall 0001, Ewen Denney, Christoph Lüth
LPAR1
2009 Personal choice and challenge questions: a security and usability assessment
abstract
Challenge questions are an increasingly important part of mainstream authentication solutions, yet there are few published studies concerning their usability or security. This paper reports on an experimental investigation into user-chosen questions. We collected questions from a large cohort of students, in a way that encouraged participants to give realistic data. The questions allow us to consider possible modes of attack and to judge the relative effort needed to crack a question, according to an innovative model of the knowledge of the attacker. Using this model, we found that many participants were likely to have chosen questions with low entropy answers, yet they believed that their challenge questions would resist attacks from a stranger. Though by asking multiple questions, we are able to show a marked improvement in security for most users. In a second stage of our experiment, we applied existing metrics to measure the usability of the questions and answers. Despite having youthful memories and choosing their own questions, users made errors more frequently than desirable.
Mike Just, David Aspinall 0001
SOUPS2
2008 On Validity of Program Transformations in the Java Memory Model
Jaroslav Sevcík, David Aspinall 0001
ECOOP2
2008 A type system with usage aspects
abstract
Abstract Linear typing schemes can be used to guarantee non-interference and so the soundness of in-place update with respect to a functional semantics. But linear schemes are restrictive in practice, and more restrictive than necessary to guarantee soundness of in-place update. This limitation has prompted research into static analysis and more sophisticated typing disciplines to determine when in-place update may be safely used, or to combine linear and non-linear schemes. Here we contribute to this direction by defining a new typing scheme that better approximates the semantic property of soundness of in-place update for a functional semantics. We begin from the observation that some data are used only in a “read-only” context, after which it may be safely re-used before being destroyed. Formalising the in-place update interpretation in a machine model semantics allows us to refine this observation, motivating three usage aspects apparent from the semantics that are used to annotate function argument types. The aspects are (1) used destructively, (2), used read-only but shared with result, and (3) used read-only and not shared with the result. The main novelty is aspect (2), which allows a linear value to be safely read and even aliased with a result of a function without being consumed. This novelty makes our type system more expressive than previous systems for functional languages in the literature. The system remains simple and intuitive, but it enjoys a strong soundness property whose proof is non-trivial. Moreover, our analysis features principal types and feasible type reconstruction, as shown in M. Konečn'y (In TYPES 2002 workshop, Nijmegen, Proceedings , Springer-Verlag, 2003).
David Aspinall 0001, Martin Hofmann 0001, Michal Konecný
J. Funct. Program.1
2007 Datatypes in Memory
David Aspinall 0001, Piotr Hoffman
CALCO1
2007 Special Issue on User Interfaces in Theorem Proving: Preface
David Aspinall 0001, Christoph Lüth
J. Autom. Reason.1
2007 A program logic for resources
David Aspinall 0001, Lennart Beringer, Martin Hofmann 0001, Hans-Wolfgang Loidl, Alberto Momigliano
Theor. Comput. Sci.1
2005 Proof General / Eclipse: A Generic Interface for Interactive Proof
Daniel Winterstein, David Aspinall 0001, Christoph Lüth
IJCAI2
2003 Heap-Bounded Assembly Language
David Aspinall 0001, Adriana B. Compagnoni
J. Autom. Reason.1
2002 Another Type System for In-Place Update
David Aspinall 0001, Martin Hofmann 0001
ESOP1
2001 Subtyping dependent types
David Aspinall 0001, Adriana B. Compagnoni
Theor. Comput. Sci.1
2000 Subtyping with Power Types
David Aspinall 0001
CSL1
2000 Proof General: A Generic Tool for Proof Development
David Aspinall 0001
TACAS1
1996 Subtyping Dependent Types (Summary)
abstract
The need for subtyping in type-systems with dependent types has been realized for some years. But it is hard to prove that systems combining the two features have fundamental properties such as subject reduction. Here we investigate a subtyping extension of the system /spl lambda/P, which is an abstract version of the type system of the Edinburgh Logical Framework LF. By using an equivalent formulation, we establish some important properties of the new system /spl lambda/P/sub /spl les//, including subject reduction. Our analysis culminates in a complete and terminating algorithm which establishes the decidability of type-checking.
David Aspinall 0001, Adriana B. Compagnoni
LICS1