AI governance efforts increasingly rely on audit standards: agreed-upon practices for conducting audits. However, poorly designed standards can hide and lend credibility to inadequate systems. We explore how an audit standard’s design influences its effectiveness through a case study of ASB 018, a standard for auditing probabilistic genotyping software—software that the U.S. criminal legal system increasingly uses to analyze DNA samples. Through qualitative analysis of ASB 018 and five audit reports, we identify numerous gaps between the standard’s desired outcomes and the auditing practices it enables. For instance, ASB 018 envisions that compliant audits establish restrictions on software use based on observed failures. However, audits can comply without establishing such boundaries. We connect these gaps to the design of the standard’s requirements such as vague language and undefined terms. We conclude with recommendations for designing audit standards and evaluating their effectiveness.

Annotation and classification of legal text are central components of empirical legal research. Traditionally, these tasks are often delegated to trained research assistants. Motivated by the advances in language modeling, empirical legal scholars are increasingly turning to commercial models, hoping that it will alleviate the significant cost of human annotation. In this work, we present a comprehensive analysis of large language models’ current abilities to perform legal annotation tasks. To do so, we construct CaselawQA, a benchmark comprising 260 legal text classification tasks, nearly all new to the machine learning community. We demonstrate that commercial models, such as GPT-4.5 and Claude 3.7 Sonnet, achieve non-trivial accuracy but generally fall short of the performance required for legal work. We then demonstrate that small, lightly fine-tuned models vastly outperform commercial models. A few dozen to a few hundred labeled examples are usually enough to achieve higher accuracy. Our work points to a viable alternative to the predominant practice of prompting commercial models. For concrete legal annotation tasks with some available labeled data, researchers are likely better off using a fine-tuned open-source model. Code, datasets, and fine-tuned models are available at https://github.com/socialfoundations/lawma.

Algorithmic predictions are increasingly informing societal resource allocations by identifying individuals for targeting. Policymakers often build these systems with the assumption that by gathering more observations on individuals, they can improve predictive accuracy and, consequently, allocation efficiency. An overlooked yet consequential aspect of prediction-driven allocations is that of timing. The planner has to trade off relying on earlier and potentially noisier predictions to intervene before individuals experience undesirable outcomes, or they may wait to gather more observations to make more precise allocations. We examine this tension using a simple mathematical model, where the planner collects observations on individuals to improve predictions over time. We analyze both the ranking induced by these predictions and optimal resource allocation. We show that though individual prediction accuracy improves over time, counter-intuitively, the average ranking loss can worsen. As a result, the planner's ability to improve social welfare can decline. We identify inequality as a driving factor behind this phenomenon. Our findings provide a nuanced perspective and challenge the conventional wisdom that it is preferable to wait for more accurate predictions to ensure the most efficient allocations.

Improving social welfare is a complex challenge requiring policymakers to optimize objectives across multiple time horizons. Evaluating the impact of such policies presents a fundamental challenge, as those that appear suboptimal in the short run may yield significant long-term benefits. We tackle this challenge by analyzing the long-term dynamics of two prominent policy frameworks: Rawlsian policies, which prioritize those with the greatest need, and utilitarian policies, which maximize immediate welfare gains. Conventional wisdom suggests these policies are at odds, as Rawlsian policies are assumed to come at the cost of reducing the average social welfare, which their utilitarian counterparts directly optimize. We challenge this assumption by analyzing these policies in a sequential decision-making framework where individuals' welfare levels stochastically decay over time, and policymakers can intervene to prevent this decay. Under reasonable assumptions, we prove that interventions following Rawlsian policies can outperform utilitarian policies in the long run, even when the latter dominate in the short run. We characterize the exact conditions under which Rawlsian policies can outperform utilitarian policies. We further illustrate our theoretical findings using simulations, which highlight the risks of evaluating policies based solely on their short-term effects. Our results underscore the necessity of considering long-term horizons in designing and evaluating welfare policies; the true efficacy of even well-established policies may only emerge over time.

Alignment with human preferences is commonly framed using a universal reward function, even though human preferences are inherently heterogeneous. We formalize this heterogeneity by introducing user types and examine the limits of the homogeneity assumption. We show that aligning to heterogeneous preferences with a single policy is best achieved using the average reward across user types. However, this requires additional information about annotators. We examine improvements under different information settings, focusing on direct alignment methods. We find that minimal information can yield first-order improvements, while full feedback from each user type leads to consistent learning of the optimal policy. Surprisingly, however, no sample-efficient consistent direct loss exists in this latter setting. These results reveal a fundamental tension between consistency and sample efficiency in direct policy alignment.

Algorithmic predictions are emerging as a promising solution concept for efficiently allocating societal resources. Fueling their use is an underlying assumption that such systems are necessary to identify individuals for interventions. We propose a principled framework for assessing this assumption: Using a simple mathematical model, we evaluate the efficacy of prediction-based allocations in settings where individuals belong to larger units such as hospitals, neighborhoods, or schools. We find that prediction-based allocations outperform baseline methods using aggregate unit-level statistics only when between-unit inequality is low and the intervention budget is high. Our results hold for a wide range of settings for the price of prediction, treatment effect heterogeneity, and unit-level statistics’ learnability. Combined, we highlight the potential limits to improving the efficacy of interventions through prediction.

Though majority vote among annotators is typically used for ground truth labels in machine learning, annotator disagreement in tasks such as hate speech detection may reflect systematic differences in opinion across groups, not noise.Thus, a crucial problem in hate speech detection is determining if a statement is offensive to the demographic group that it targets, when that group may be a small fraction of the annotator pool.We construct a model that predicts individual annotator ratings on potentially offensive text and combines this information with the predicted target group of the text to predict the ratings of target group members.We show gains across a range of metrics, including raising performance over the baseline by 22% at predicting individual annotators' ratings and by 33% at predicting variance among annotators, which provides a metric for model uncertainty downstream.We find that annotators' ratings can be predicted using their demographic information as well as opinions on online content, and that non-invasive questions on annotators' online experiences minimize the need to collect demographic information when predicting annotators' opinions.

Rotating savings and credit associations (roscas) are informal financial organizations common in settings where communities have reduced access to formal financial institutions. In a rosca, a fixed group of participants regularly contribute sums of money to a pot. This pot is then allocated periodically using lottery, aftermarket, or auction mechanisms. Roscas are empirically well-studied in economics. They are, however, challenging to study theoretically due to their dynamic nature. Typical economic analyses of roscas stop at coarse ordinal welfare comparisons to other credit allocation mechanisms, leaving much of roscas' ubiquity unexplained. In this work, we take an algorithmic perspective on the study of roscas. Building on techniques from the price of anarchy literature, we present worst-case welfare approximation guarantees. We further experimentally compare the welfare of outcomes as key features of the environment vary. These cardinal welfare analyses further rationalize the prevalence of roscas. We conclude by discussing several other promising avenues.

The tendency for individuals to form social ties with others who are similar to themselves, known as homophily, is one of the most robust sociological principles. Since this phenomenon can lead to patterns of interactions that segregate people along different demographic dimensions, it can also lead to inequalities in access to information, resources, and opportunities. As we consider potential interventions that might alleviate the effects of segregation, we face the challenge that homophily constitutes a pervasive and organic force that is difficult to push back against. Designing effective interventions can therefore benefit from identifying counterbalancing social processes that might be harnessed to work in opposition to segregation.

A long line of work in social psychology has studied variations in people’s susceptibility to persuasion—the extent to which they are willing to modify their opinions on a topic. This body of literature suggests an interesting perspective on theoretical models of opinion formation by interacting parties in a network: in addition to considering interventions that directly modify people’s intrinsic opinions, it is also natural to consider interventions that modify people’s susceptibility to persuasion. In this work, motivated by this fact, we propose an influence optimization problem. Specifically, we adopt a popular model for social opinion dynamics, where each agent has some fixed innate opinion, and a resistance that measures the importance it places on its innate opinion; agents influence one another’s opinions through an iterative process. Under certain conditions, this iterative process converges to some equilibrium opinion vector. For the unbudgeted variant of the problem, the goal is to modify the resistance of any number of agents (within some given range) such that the sum of the equilibrium opinions is minimized; for the budgeted variant, in addition the algorithm is given upfront a restriction on the number of agents whose resistance may be modified. We prove that the objective function is in general non-convex. Hence, formulating the problem as a convex program as in an early version of this work (Abebe et al., KDD’18) might have potential correctness issues. We instead analyze the structure of the objective function, and show that any local optimum is also a global optimum, which is somehow surprising as the objective function might not be convex. Furthermore, we combine the iterative process and the local search paradigm to design very efficient algorithms that can solve the unbudgeted variant of the problem optimally on large-scale graphs containing millions of nodes. Finally, we propose and evaluate experimentally a family of heuristics for the budgeted variant of the problem.

Poverty and economic hardship are understood to be highly complex and dynamic phenomena. Due to the multi-faceted nature of welfare, assistance programs targeted at alleviating hardship can face challenges, as they often rely on simpler welfare measurements, such as income or wealth, that fail to capture to full complexity of each family's state. Here, we explore one important dimension – susceptibility to income shocks. We introduce a model of welfare that incorporates income, wealth, and income shocks and analyze this model to show that it can vary, at times substantially, from measures of welfare that only use income or wealth. We then study the algorithmic problem of optimally allocating subsidies in the presence of income shocks. We consider two well-studied objectives: the first aims to minimize the expected number of agents that fall below a given welfare threshold (a min-sum objective) and the second aims to minimize the likelihood that the most vulnerable agent falls below this threshold (a min-max objective). We present optimal and near-optimal algorithms for various general settings. We close with a discussion on future directions on allocating societal resources and ethical implications of related approaches.

We revisit the well-studied problem of designing mechanisms for one-sided matching markets, where a set of n agents needs to be matched to a set of n heterogeneous items. Each agent i has a value νi,j for each item j, and these values are private information that the agents may misreport if doing so leads to a preferred outcome. Ensuring that the agents have no incentive to misreport requires a careful design of the matching mechanism, and mechanisms proposed in the literature mitigate this issue by eliciting only the ordinal preferences of the agents, i.e., their ranking of the items from most to least preferred. However, the efficiency guarantees of these mechanisms are based only on weak measures that are oblivious to the underlying values. In this paper we achieve stronger performance guarantees by introducing a mechanism that truthfully elicits the full cardinal preferences of the agents, i.e., all of the νi,j values. We evaluate the performance of this mechanism using the much more demanding Nash bargaining solution as a benchmark, and we prove that our mechanism significantly outperforms all ordinal mechanisms (even non-truthful ones). To prove our approximation bounds, we also study the population monotonicity of the Nash bargaining solution in the context of matching markets, providing both upper and lower bounds which are of independent interest.

While most mortality rates have decreased in the US, maternal mortality has increased and is among the highest of any OECD nation. Extensive public health research is ongoing to better understand the characteristics of communities with relatively high or low rates. In this work, we explore the role that social media language can play in providing insights into such community characteristics. Analyzing pregnancy-related tweets generated in US counties, we reveal a diverse set of latent topics including Morning Sickness, Celebrity Pregnancies, and Abortion Rights. We find that rates of mentioning these topics on Twitter predicts maternal mortality rates with higher accuracy than standard socioeconomic and risk variables such as income, race, and access to health-care, holding even after reducing the analysis to six topics chosen for their interpretability and connections to known risk factors. We then investigate psychological dimensions of community language, finding the use of less trustful, more stressed, and more negative affective language is significantly associated with higher mortality rates, while trust and negative affect also explain a significant portion of racial disparities in maternal mortality. We discuss the potential for these insights to inform actionable health interventions at the community-level.

In traditional models for word-of-mouth recommendations and viral marketing, the objective function has generally been based on reaching as many people as possible. However, a number of studies have shown that the indiscriminate spread of a product by word-of-mouth can result in overexposure, reaching people who evaluate it negatively. This can lead to an effect in which the over-promotion of a product can produce negative reputational effects, by reaching a part of the audience that is not receptive to it. How should one make use of social influence when there is a risk of overexposure? In this paper, we develop and analyze a theoretical model for this process; we show how it captures a number of the qualitative phenomena associated with overexposure, and for the main formulation of our model, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm to find the optimal marketing strategy. We also present simulations of the model on real network topologies, quantifying the extent to which our optimal strategies outperform natural baselines.

Computational techniques show immense promise to both deepen our understanding of socioeconomic inequality and inform interventions to alleviate it. With the increased prevalence of collaborations across disciplines and the availability of large data-sets, there is a wealth of areas in which nuanced questions and novel techniques can reveal powerful observations and point towards innovative solutions. In this piece, we highlight ways for using algorithmic, computational, and network-based techniques, in conjunction with insights from the social sciences, to improve access to opportunity for historically disadvantaged and under-served communities. We underline opportunities for work at the interface of these disciplines using examples from health, housing, and economic inequality.

A long line of work in social psychology has studied variations in people's susceptibility to persuasion -- the extent to which they are willing to modify their opinions on a topic. This body of literature suggests an interesting perspective on theoretical models of opinion formation on social networks: in addition to considering interventions that directly modify people's intrinsic opinions, it is also natural to consider those that modify people's susceptibility to persuasion. Here, we adopt a popular model for social opinion dynamics, and formalize the opinion maximization and minimization problems where interventions happen at the level of susceptibility. We show that modeling interventions at the level of susceptibility leads to an interesting family of new questions in network opinion dynamics. We find that the questions are quite different depending on whether there is an overall budget constraining the number of agents we can target or not. We give a polynomial-time algorithm for finding the optimal target-set to optimize the sum of opinions when there are no budget constraints on the size of the target-set. We show that this problem is NP-hard when there is a budget, and that the objective function is neither submodular nor supermodular. Finally, we propose a heuristic for the budgeted opinion optimization problem and show its efficacy at finding target-sets that optimize the sum of opinions on real world networks, including a Twitter network with real opinion estimates.