Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is vital to the security of inter-domain routing. However, RPKI enables Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) to unilaterally takedown IP prefixes - indeed, such attacks have been launched by nation-state adversaries. The threat of IP prefix takedowns is one of the factors hindering RPKI adoption.In this work, we propose the first distributed RPKI system, based on threshold signatures, that requires the coordination of a number of RIRs to make changes to RPKI objects; hence, preventing unilateral prefix takedown. We perform extensive evaluations using our implementation demonstrating the practicality of our solution. Furthermore, we show that our system is scalable and remains efficient even when RPKI is widely deployed.

Secure Two Party Computation (2PC) has the potential to facilitate a wide range of real life applications where privacy of the computation and participants is critical. Nevertheless, this potential has not translated to widespread industry acceptance due to performance issues. Over the years a significant research effort has focused on optimising the performance of 2PC. The computation complexity has been continually improved and recently, following circuit optimisations and hardware support for cryptographic operations, evaluations of 2PC on a single host currently produce efficient results. Unfortunately, when evaluated on remote hosts, the performance remains prohibitive for practical purposes. The bottleneck is believed to be the bandwidth. In this work we explore the networking layer of 2PC implementations and show that the performance bottleneck is inherent in the usage of TCP sockets in implementations of 2PC schemes. Through experimental evaluations, we demonstrate that other transport protocols can significantly improve the performance of 2PC, making it suitable for practical applications.