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Benjamin Heymann

dblp:193/0427 · DBLP profile ↗
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6ranked-venue papers
2as first author
6since 2021 · last 2025
0000-0002-0318-5333ORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 5 · 1 first-author · 5 since 2021Databases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 2 · 2 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 since 2021Applied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Databases, data mining, and information retrieval
3 papers
Information retrieval · 34% Data mining · 26% Machine learning and data management · 20%
Theoretical computer science
2 papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100%
Interdisciplinary, comprehensive, and emerging computing
1 paper
Computational finance and economics · 100%

Topics — the 14 heaviest of 14, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Machine learning and data management
data valuation
0.812024
DU-Shapley: A Shapley Value Proxy for Efficient Dataset Valuation · NeurIPS 2024
Database theory
shapley value computation
0.812024
DU-Shapley: A Shapley Value Proxy for Efficient Dataset Valuation · NeurIPS 2024
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › auction theory
bidding strategy
0.812024
Maximizing the Success Probability of Policy Allocations in Online Systems · AAAI 2024
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
cooperative game theory
0.812024
DU-Shapley: A Shapley Value Proxy for Efficient Dataset Valuation · NeurIPS 2024
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
online advertising
0.812024
Maximizing the Success Probability of Policy Allocations in Online Systems · AAAI 2024
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › cooperative game theory › solution concepts
shapley value
0.812024
DU-Shapley: A Shapley Value Proxy for Efficient Dataset Valuation · NeurIPS 2024
Information retrieval › similarity search › nearest neighbor search
maximum inner product search
0.612022
Reward Optimizing Recommendation using Deep Learning and Fast Maximum Inner Product Search · KDD 2022
Information retrieval
similarity search
0.612022
Reward Optimizing Recommendation using Deep Learning and Fast Maximum Inner Product Search · KDD 2022
Computational finance and economics
online advertising
0.512021
Causal Models for Real Time Bidding with Repeated User Interactions · KDD 2021
Computational finance and economics › online advertising
real-time bidding
0.512021
Causal Models for Real Time Bidding with Repeated User Interactions · KDD 2021
Data mining
causal inference
0.512021
Causal Models for Real Time Bidding with Repeated User Interactions · KDD 2021
Data mining › causal inference
causal modeling
0.512021
Causal Models for Real Time Bidding with Repeated User Interactions · KDD 2021
Machine learning › Probabilistic and Bayesian machine learning › monte carlo methods
monte carlo integration
0.212024
DU-Shapley: A Shapley Value Proxy for Efficient Dataset Valuation · NeurIPS 2024
Information retrieval
user interaction
0.112021
Causal Models for Real Time Bidding with Repeated User Interactions · KDD 2021

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

monte carlo integration · 2.3discrete uniform distribution · 2.3value estimation · 1.0causal models · 1.0multiple treatment allocation · 0.8knapsack optimization · 0.8maximum inner product search · 0.6deep learning · 0.6
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 Learning in Games with Progressive Hiding
Benjamin Heymann, Marc Lanctot
AAMAS1
2024 Maximizing the Success Probability of Policy Allocations in Online Systems
abstract
The effectiveness of advertising in e-commerce largely depends on the ability of merchants to bid on and win impressions for their targeted users. The bidding procedure is highly complex due to various factors such as market competition, user behavior, and the diverse objectives of advertisers. In this paper we consider the problem at the level of user timelines instead of individual bid requests, manipulating full policies (i.e. pre-defined bidding strategies) and not bid values. In order to optimally allocate policies to users, typical multiple treatments allocation methods solve knapsack-like problems which aim at maximizing an expected value under constraints. In the specific context of online advertising, we argue that optimizing for the probability of success is a more suited objective than expected value maximization, and we introduce the SuccessProbaMax algorithm that aims at finding the policy allocation which is the most likely to outperform a fixed reference policy. Finally, we conduct comprehensive experiments both on synthetic and real-world data to evaluate its performance. The results demonstrate that our proposed algorithm outperforms conventional expected-value maximization algorithms in terms of success rate.
Artem Betlei, Mariia Vladimirova, Mehdi Sebbar, Nicolas Urien, Thibaud Rahier, Benjamin Heymann
AAAI6
2024 DU-Shapley: A Shapley Value Proxy for Efficient Dataset Valuation
abstract
We consider the dataset valuation problem, that is the problem of quantifying the incremental gain, to some relevant pre-defined utility of a machine learning task, of aggregating an individual dataset to others. The Shapley value is a natural tool to perform dataset valuation due to its formal axiomatic justification, which can be combined with Monte Carlo integration to overcome the computational tractability challenges. Such generic approximation methods, however, remain expensive in some cases. In this paper, we exploit the knowledge about the structure of the dataset valuation problem to devise more efficient Shapley value estimators. We propose a novel approximation, referred to as discrete uniform Shapley, which is expressed as an expectation under a discrete uniform distribution with support of reasonable size. We justify the relevancy of the proposed framework via asymptotic and non-asymptotic theoretical guarantees and illustrate its benefits via an extensive set of numerical experiments.
Felipe Garrido-Lucero, Benjamin Heymann, Maxime Vono, Patrick Loiseau, Vianney Perchet
NeurIPS2
2024 Repeated Bidding with Dynamic Value
Benjamin Heymann, Alexandre Gilotte, Rémi Chan-Renous-Legoubin
WINE1
2022 Reward Optimizing Recommendation using Deep Learning and Fast Maximum Inner Product Search
abstract
How can we build and optimize a recommender system that must rapidly fill slates (i.e. banners) of personalized recommendations? The combination of deep learning stacks with fast maximum inner product search (MIPS) algorithms have shown it is possible to deploy flexible models in production that can rapidly deliver personalized recommendations to users. Albeit promising, this methodology is unfortunately not sufficient to build a recommender system which maximizes the reward, e.g. the probability of click. Usually instead a proxy loss is optimized and A/B testing is used to test if the system actually improved performance. This tutorial takes participants through the necessary steps to model the reward and directly optimize the reward of recommendation engines built upon fast search algorithms to produce high-performance reward-optimizing recommender systems.
Imad Aouali, Amine Benhalloum, Martin Bompaire, Achraf Ait Sidi Hammou, Benjamin Heymann, David Rohde, Otmane Sakhi, Flavian Vasile, Maxime Vono
KDD6
2021 Causal Models for Real Time Bidding with Repeated User Interactions
abstract
A large portion of online advertising displays are sold through an auction mechanism called Real Time Bidding (RTB). Each auction corresponds to a display opportunity, for which the competing advertisers need to precisely estimate the economical value in order to bid accordingly. This estimate is typically taken as the advertiser's payoff for the target event -- such as a purchase on the merchant website attributed to this display -- times this event estimated probability. However, this greedy approach is too naive when several displays are shown to the same user. The purpose of the present paper is to discuss how such an estimation should be made when a user has already been shown one or more displays. Intuitively, while a user is more likely to make a purchase if the number of displays increases, the marginal effect of each display is expected to be decreasing. In this work, we first frame this bidding problem with repeated user interactions by using causal models to value each display individually. Then, based on this approach, we introduce a simple rule to improve the value estimate. This change shows both interesting qualitative properties that follow our previous intuition as well as quantitative improvements on a public data set and online in a production environment.
Martin Bompaire, Alexandre Gilotte, Benjamin Heymann
KDD3