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Jinchao Ye

dblp:194/1725 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
2since 2021 · last 2026
0009-0004-4479-0961ORCID · reported

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 since 2021Databases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Databases, data mining, and information retrieval
1 paper
Information retrieval · 56% Web and social media mining · 44%
Theoretical computer science
1 paper
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100%
Interdisciplinary, comprehensive, and emerging computing
1 paper
Computational finance and economics · 100%

Topics — the 6 heaviest of 7, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Web and social media mining
trend detection
1.012026
LLM-Enhanced Topical Trend Detection at Snapchat · SIGIR 2026
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design
auction design
0.512021
Reserve Price Optimization for First Price Auctions in Display Advertising · ICML 2021
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › auction theory › sealed-bid auction
first-price auction
0.512021
Reserve Price Optimization for First Price Auctions in Display Advertising · ICML 2021
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design › auction design
reserve price optimization
0.512021
Reserve Price Optimization for First Price Auctions in Display Advertising · ICML 2021
Information retrieval › ranking
content ranking
0.312026
LLM-Enhanced Topical Trend Detection at Snapchat · SIGIR 2026
Computational finance and economics › online advertising
display advertising
0.112021
Reserve Price Optimization for First Price Auctions in Display Advertising · ICML 2021

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

variance reduction · 1.0time-series burst detection · 1.0large language model · 1.0gradient-based optimization · 1.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 LLM-Enhanced Topical Trend Detection at Snapchat
abstract
Automatic detection of topical trends at scale is both challenging and essential for maintaining a dynamic content ecosystem on social media platforms. In this work, we present a large-scale system for identifying emerging topical trends on Snapchat, one of the world's largest short-video social platforms. Our system integrates multimodal topic extraction, time-series burst detection, and LLM-based consolidation and enrichment to enable accurate and timely trend discovery. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first published end-to-end system for topical trend detection on short-video platforms at production scale. Continuous offline human evaluation over six months demonstrates high precision in identifying meaningful trends. The system has been deployed in production at global scale and applied to downstream surfaces including content ranking and search, driving measurable improvements in content freshness and user experience.
Hangqi Zhao, Jay Li, Abhiruchi Bhattacharya, Cong Ni, Jason Yeung, Jinchao Ye, Akshat Malu, Manish Malik
SIGIR6
2021 Reserve Price Optimization for First Price Auctions in Display Advertising
abstract
The display advertising industry has recently transitioned from second- to first-price auctions as its primary mechanism for ad allocation and pricing. In light of this, publishers need to re-evaluate and optimize their auction parameters, notably reserve prices. In this paper, we propose a gradient-based algorithm to adaptively update and optimize reserve prices based on estimates of bidders’ responsiveness to experimental shocks in reserves. Our key innovation is to draw on the inherent structure of the revenue objective in order to reduce the variance of gradient estimates and improve convergence rates in both theory and practice. We show that revenue in a first-price auction can be usefully decomposed into a \emph{demand} component and a \emph{bidding} component, and introduce techniques to reduce the variance of each component. We characterize the bias-variance trade-offs of these techniques and validate the performance of our proposed algorithm through experiments on synthetic data and real display ad auctions data from a major ad exchange.
Zhe Feng 0004, Sébastien Lahaie, Jon Schneider, Jinchao Ye
ICML4