The principle of least authority states that each component of the system should be given authority to access only the information and resources that it needs for its operation. This principle is fundamental to the secure design of software systems, as it helps to limit an application's attack surface and to isolate vulnerabilities and faults. Unfortunately, current programming languages do not provide adequate help in controlling the authority of application modules, an issue that is particularly acute in the case of untrusted third-party extensions. In this paper, we present a language design that facilitates controlling the authority granted to each application module. The key technical novelty of our approach is that modules are first-class, statically typed capabilities. First-class modules are essentially objects, and so we formalize our module system by translation into an object calculus and prove that the core calculus is type-safe and authority-safe. Unlike prior formalizations, our work defines authority non-transitively, allowing engineers to reason about software designs that use wrappers to provide an attenuated version of a more powerful capability. Our approach allows developers to determine a module's authority by examining the capabilities passed as module arguments when the module is created, or delegated to the module later during execution. The type system facilitates this by identifying which objects provide capabilities to sensitive resources, and by enabling security architects to examine the capabilities passed into and out of a module based only on the module's interface, without needing to examine the module's implementation code. An implementation of the module system and illustrative examples in the Wyvern programming language suggest that our approach can be a practical way to control module authority.

Mutation analysis has many applications, such as asserting the quality of test suites and localizing faults. One important bottleneck of mutation analysis is scalability. The latest work explores the possibility of reducing the redundant execution via split-stream execution. However, split-stream execution is only able to remove redundant execution before the first mutated statement.