Demo Data from VLDB 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Yarik Markov
dblp:197/1217
· DBLP profile ↗
2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2017
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 2
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
2 papers |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 57% Authentication and access control · 24% Network security · 19% |
Topics — the 5 heaviest of 7, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › hash function cryptanalysis
collision attack |
0.3 | 1 | 2017 | The First Collision for Full SHA-1 · CRYPTO (1) 2017 |
Authentication and access control › authentication › authentication attack
credential theft |
0.3 | 1 | 2017 | Data Breaches, Phishing, or Malware?: Understanding the Risks of Stolen Credentials · CCS 2017 |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis
hash functions |
0.3 | 1 | 2017 | The First Collision for Full SHA-1 · CRYPTO (1) 2017 |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › hash functions › dedicated hash functions
SHA-1 |
0.3 | 1 | 2017 | The First Collision for Full SHA-1 · CRYPTO (1) 2017 |
Authentication and access control › authentication
risk-based authentication |
0.1 | 1 | 2017 | Data Breaches, Phishing, or Malware?: Understanding the Risks of Stolen Credentials · CCS 2017 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
phishing kit analysis · 0.3longitudinal measurement study · 0.3keylogger analysis · 0.3cryptanalysis · 0.3
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2017 | Data Breaches, Phishing, or Malware?: Understanding the Risks of Stolen CredentialsabstractIn this paper, we present the first longitudinal measurement study of the underground ecosystem fueling credential theft and assess the risk it poses to millions of users. Over the course of March, 2016--March, 2017, we identify 788,000 potential victims of off-the-shelf keyloggers; 12.4 million potential victims of phishing kits; and 1.9 billion usernames and passwords exposed via data breaches and traded on blackmarket forums. Using this dataset, we explore to what degree the stolen passwords---which originate from thousands of online services---enable an attacker to obtain a victim's valid email credentials---and thus complete control of their online identity due to transitive trust. Drawing upon Google as a case study, we find 7--25% of exposed passwords match a victim's Google account. For these accounts, we show how hardening authentication mechanisms to include additional risk signals such as a user's historical geolocations and device profiles helps to mitigate the risk of hijacking. Beyond these risk metrics, we delve into the global reach of the miscreants involved in credential theft and the blackhat tools they rely on. We observe a remarkable lack of external pressure on bad actors, with phishing kit playbooks and keylogger capabilities remaining largely unchanged since the mid-2000s. Kurt Thomas, Frank Li 0001, Ali Zand, Jacob Barrett, Juri Ranieri, Luca Invernizzi, Yarik Markov, Oxana Comanescu, Vijay Eranti, Angelique Moscicki, Dan Margolis, Vern Paxson, Elie Bursztein |
CCS | 7 |
| 2017 | The First Collision for Full SHA-1
Marc Stevens 0001, Elie Bursztein, Pierre Karpman, Ange Albertini, Yarik Markov |
CRYPTO (1) | 5 |