We consider the finite-horizon offline reinforcement learning (RL) setting, and are motivated by the challenge of learning the policy at any step h in dynamic programming (DP) algorithms. To learn this, it is sufficient to evaluate the treatment effect of deviating from the behavioral policy at step h after having optimized the policy for all future steps. Since the policy at any step can affect next-state distributions, the related distributional shift challenges can make this problem far more statistically hard than estimating such treatment effects in the stochastic contextual bandit setting. However, the hardness of many real-world RL instances lies between the two regimes. We develop a flexible and general method called selective uncertainty propagation for confidence interval construction that adapts to the hardness of the associated distribution shift challenges. We show benefits of our approach on toy environments and demonstrate the benefits of these techniques for offline policy learning.

Model selection in supervised learning provides costless guarantees as if the model that best balances bias and variance was known a priori. We study the feasibility of similar guarantees for cumulative regret minimization in the stochastic contextual bandit setting. Recent work [Marinov and Zimmert, 2021] identifies instances where no algorithm can guarantee costless regret bounds. Nevertheless, we identify benign conditions where costless model selection is feasible: gradually increasing class complexity, and diminishing marginal returns for best-in-class policy value with increasing class complexity. Our algorithm is based on a novel misspecification test, and our analysis demonstrates the benefits of using model selection for reward estimation. Unlike prior work on model selection in contextual bandits, our algorithm carefully adapts to the evolving bias-variance trade-off as more data is collected. In particular, our algorithm and analysis go beyond adapting to the complexity of the simplest realizable class and instead adapt to the complexity of the simplest class whose estimation variance dominates the bias. For short horizons, this provides improved regret guarantees that depend on the complexity of simpler classes.

Contextual bandit algorithms often estimate reward models to inform decision-making. However, true rewards can contain action-independent redundancies that are not relevant for decision-making. We show it is more data-efficient to estimate any function that explains the reward differences between actions, that is, the treatment effects. Motivated by this observation, building on recent work on oracle-based bandit algorithms, we provide the first reduction of contextual bandits to general-purpose heterogeneous treatment effect estimation, and we design a simple and computationally efficient algorithm based on this reduction. Our theoretical and experimental results demonstrate that heterogeneous treatment effect estimation in contextual bandits offers practical advantages over reward estimation including more efficient model estimation and greater flexibility to model misspecification.

In many applications, e.g. in healthcare and e-commerce, the goal of a contextual bandit may be to learn an optimal treatment assignment policy at the end of the experiment. That is, to minimize simple regret. However, this objective remains understudied. We propose a new family of computationally efficient bandit algorithms for the stochastic contextual bandit setting, where a tuning parameter determines the weight placed on cumulative regret minimization (where we establish near-optimal minimax guarantees) versus simple regret minimization (where we establish state-of-the-art guarantees). Our algorithms work with any function class, are robust to model misspecification, and can be used in continuous arm settings. This flexibility comes from constructing and relying on “conformal arm sets" (CASs). CASs provide a set of arms for every context, encompassing the context-specific optimal arm with a certain probability across the context distribution. Our positive results on simple and cumulative regret guarantees are contrasted with a negative result, which shows that no algorithm can achieve instance-dependent simple regret guarantees while simultaneously achieving minimax optimal cumulative regret guarantees.

Tractable contextual bandit algorithms often rely on the realizability assumption – i.e., that the true expected reward model belongs to a known class, such as linear functions. In this work, we present a tractable bandit algorithm that is not sensitive to the realizability assumption and computationally reduces to solving a constrained regression problem in every epoch. When realizability does not hold, our algorithm ensures the same guarantees on regret achieved by realizability-based algorithms under realizability, up to an additive term that accounts for the misspecification error. This extra term is proportional to T times a function of the mean squared error between the best model in the class and the true model, where T is the total number of time-steps. Our work sheds light on the bias-variance trade-off for tractable contextual bandits. This trade-off is not captured by algorithms that assume realizability, since under this assumption there exists an estimator in the class that attains zero bias.

Computationally efficient contextual bandits are often based on estimating a predictive model of rewards given contexts and arms using past data. However, when the reward model is not well-specified, the bandit algorithm may incur unexpected regret, so recent work has focused on algorithms that are robust to misspecification. We propose a simple family of contextual bandit algorithms that adapt to misspecification error by reverting to a good safe policy when there is evidence that misspecification is causing a regret increase. Our algorithm requires only an offline regression oracle to ensure regret guarantees that gracefully degrade in terms of a measure of the average misspecification level. Compared to prior work, we attain similar regret guarantees, but we do no rely on a master algorithm, and do not require more robust oracles like online or constrained regression oracles (e.g., Foster et al. (2020), Krishnamurthy et al. (2020)). This allows us to design algorithms for more general function approximation classes.

We study Fisher markets that admit equilibria wherein each good is integrally assigned to some agent. While strong existence and computational guarantees are known for equilibria of Fisher markets with additive valuations (Eisenberg and Gale 1959; Orlin 2010), such equilibria, in general, assign goods fractionally to agents. Hence, Fisher markets are not directly applicable in the context of indivisible goods. In this work we show that one can always bypass this hurdle and, up to a bounded change in agents’ budgets, obtain markets that admit an integral equilibrium. We refer to such markets as pure markets and show that, for any given Fisher market (with additive valuations), one can efficiently compute a “near-by,” pure market with an accompanying integral equilibrium.Our work on pure markets leads to novel algorithmic results for fair division of indivisible goods. Prior work in discrete fair division has shown that, under additive valuations, there always exist allocations that simultaneously achieve the seemingly incompatible properties of fairness and efficiency (Caragiannis et al. 2016); here fairness refers to envyfreeness up to one good (EF1) and efficiency corresponds to Pareto efficiency. However, polynomial-time algorithms are not known for finding such allocations. Considering relaxations of proportionality and EF1, respectively, as our notions of fairness, we show that fair and Pareto efficient allocations can be computed in strongly polynomial time.

We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among n agents in a fair manner. For this problem, maximin share (MMS) is a well-studied solution concept which provides a fairness threshold. Specifically, maximin share is defined as the minimum utility that an agent can guarantee for herself when asked to partition the set of goods into n bundles such that the remaining (n-1) agents pick their bundles adversarially. An allocation is deemed to be fair if every agent gets a bundle whose valuation is at least her maximin share. Even though maximin shares provide a natural benchmark for fairness, it has its own drawbacks and, in particular, it is not sufficient to rule out unsatisfactory allocations. Motivated by these considerations, in this work we define a stronger notion of fairness, called groupwise maximin share guarantee (GMMS). In GMMS, we require that the maximin share guarantee is achieved not just with respect to the grand bundle, but also among all the subgroups of agents. Hence, this solution concept strengthens MMS and provides an ex-post fairness guarantee. We show that in specific settings, GMMS allocations always exist. We also establish the existence of approximate GMMS allocations under additive valuations, and develop a polynomial-time algorithm to find such allocations. Moreover, we establish a scale of fairness wherein we show that GMMS implies approximate envy freeness. Finally, we empirically demonstrate the existence of GMMS allocations in a large set of randomly generated instances. For the same set of instances, we additionally show that our algorithm achieves an approximation factor better than the established, worst-case bound.

We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods among a set of agents in a fair and efficient manner. An allocation is said to be fair if it is envy-free up to one good (EF1), which means that each agent prefers its own bundle over the bundle of any other agent up to the removal of one good. In addition, an allocation is deemed efficient if it satisfies Pareto efficiency. While each of these well-studied properties is easy to achieve separately, achieving them together is far from obvious. Recently, Caragiannis et al. (2016) established the surprising result that when agents have additive valuations for the goods, there always exists an allocation that simultaneously satisfies these two seemingly incompatible properties. Specifically, they showed that an allocation that maximizes the Nash social welfare objective is both EF1 and Pareto efficient. However, the problem of maximizing Nash social welfare is NP-hard. As a result, this approach does not provide an efficient algorithm for finding a fair and efficient allocation. In this paper, we bypass this barrier, and develop a pseudopolynomial time algorithm for finding allocations that are EF1 and Pareto efficient; in particular, when the valuations are bounded, our algorithm finds such an allocation in polynomial time. Furthermore, we establish a stronger existence result compared to Caragiannis et al. (2016): For additive valuations, there always exists an allocation that is EF1 and fractionally Pareto efficient. Another key contribution of our work is to show that our algorithm provides a polynomial-time 1.45-approximation to the Nash social welfare objective. This improves upon the best known approximation ratio for this problem (namely, the 2-approximation algorithm of Cole et al., 2017), and also matches the lower bound on the integrality gap of the convex program of Cole et al. (2017). Unlike many of the existing approaches, our algorithm is completely combinatorial, and relies on constructing integral Fisher markets wherein specific equilibria are not only efficient, but also fair.

We consider the problem of dividing indivisible goods fairly among n agents who have additive and submodular valuations for the goods. Our fairness guarantees are in terms of the maximin share, that is defined to be the maximum value that an agent can ensure for herself, if she were to partition the goods into n bundles, and then receive a minimum valued bundle. Since maximin fair allocations (i.e., allocations in which each agent gets at least her maximin share) do not always exist, prior work has focussed on approximation results that aim to find allocations in which the value of the bundle allocated to each agent is (multiplicatively) as close to her maximin share as possible. In particular, Procaccia and Wang (2014) along with Amanatidis et al. (2015) have shown that under additive valuations a 2/3-approximate maximin fair allocation always exists and can be found in polynomial time. We complement these results by developing a simple and efficient algorithm that achieves the same approximation guarantee.