Epistemic planning is useful in situations where multiple agents have different knowledge and beliefs about the world, such as in robot-human interaction. One aspect that has been largely neglected in the literature is planning with observations in the presence of false beliefs. This is a particularly challenging problem because it requires belief revision. We introduce a simple specification language for reasoning about actions with knowledge and belief. We demonstrate our approach on well-known false-belief tasks such as the Sally-Anne Task and compare it to other action languages. Our logic leads to an epistemic planning formalism that is expressive enough to model second-order false-belief tasks, yet has the same computational complexity as classical planning.

Epistemic planning can be used to achieve implicit coordination in cooperative multi-agent settings where knowledge and capabilities are distributed between the agents. In these scenarios, agents plan and act on their own without having to agree on a common plan or protocol beforehand. However, epistemic planning is undecidable in general. In this paper, we show how implicit coordination can be achieved in a simpler, propositional setting by using nondeterminism as a means to allow the agents to take the other agents' perspectives. We identify a decidable fragment of epistemic planning that allows for arbitrary initial state uncertainty and non-determinism, but where actions can never increase the uncertainty of the agents. We show that in this fragment, planning for implicit coordination can be reduced to a version of fully observable nondeterministic (FOND) planning and that it thus has the same computational complexity as FOND planning. We provide a small case study, modeling the problem of multi-agent path finding with destination uncertainty in FOND, to show that our approach can be successfully applied in practice.

Epistemic planning has been employed as a means to achieve implicit coordination in cooperative multi-agent systems where world knowledge is distributed between the agents, and agents plan and act individually. However, recent work has shown that even if all agents act with respect to plans that they consider optimal from their own subjective perspective, infinite executions can occur. In this paper, we analyze the idea of using a single token that can be passed around between the agents and which is used as a prerequisite for acting. We show that introducing such a token to any planning task will prevent the existence of infinite executions. We furthermore analyze the conditions under which solutions to a planning task are preserved under our tokenization.

In multi-agent path finding, it is usually assumed that planning is performed centrally and that the destinations of the agents are common knowledge. We will drop both assumptions and analyze under which conditions it can be guaranteed that the agents reach their respective destinations using implicitly coordinated plans without communication.

In multi-agent path finding (MAPF), it is usually assumed that planning is performed centrally and that the destinations of the agents are common knowledge. We will drop both assumptions and analyze under which conditions it can be guaranteed that the agents reach their respective destinations using implicitly coordinated plans without communication. Furthermore, we will analyze what the computational costs associated with such a coordination regime are. As it turns out, guarantees can be given assuming that the agents are of a certain type. However, the implied computational costs are quite severe. In the distributed setting, we either have to solve a sequence of NP-complete problems or have to tolerate exponentially longer executions. In the setting with destination uncertainty, bounded plan existence becomes PSPACE-complete. This clearly demonstrates the value of communicating about plans before execution starts.

Several different frameworks have been proposed to model and reason about knowledge in dynamic multi-agent settings, among them the logic-programming-based game description language GDL-III, and dynamic epistemic logic (DEL), based on possible-worlds semantics. GDL-III and DEL have complementary strengths and weaknesses in terms of ease of modeling and simplicity of semantics. In this paper, we formally study the expressiveness of GDL-III vs. DEL. We clarify the commonalities and differences between those languages, demonstrate how to bridge the differences where possible, and identify large fragments of GDL-III and DEL that are equivalent in the sense that they can be used to encode games or planning tasks that admit the same legal action sequences. We prove the latter by providing compilations between those fragments of GDL-III and DEL.