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David Brazdil

dblp:198/2599 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2017
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Systems, architecture and hardware · 1Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Systems and software security · 87% Authentication and access control · 13%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Runtime systems and virtual machines · 100%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Systems and software security › memory protection
hardware-assisted memory protection
0.312017
CHERI JNI: Sinking the Java Security Model into the C · ASPLOS 2017
Systems and software security
memory safety
0.312017
CHERI JNI: Sinking the Java Security Model into the C · ASPLOS 2017
Runtime systems and virtual machines
language runtime
0.312017
CHERI JNI: Sinking the Java Security Model into the C · ASPLOS 2017
Authentication and access control › access control
capability-based security
0.112017
CHERI JNI: Sinking the Java Security Model into the C · ASPLOS 2017

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

capability hardware · 0.6CHERI · 0.6
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2017 CHERI JNI: Sinking the Java Security Model into the C
abstract
Java provides security and robustness by building a high-level security model atop the foundation of memory protection. Unfortunately, any native code linked into a Java program -- including the million lines used to implement the standard library -- is able to bypass both the memory protection and the higher-level policies. We present a hardware-assisted implementation of the Java native code interface, which extends the guarantees required for Java's security model to native code.
David Chisnall, Brooks Davis, Khilan Gudka, David Brazdil, Alexandre Joannou, Jonathan Woodruff, A. Theodore Markettos, Ed Maste, Robert M. Norton, Stacey D. Son, Michael Roe, Simon W. Moore, Peter G. Neumann, Ben Laurie, Robert N. M. Watson
ASPLOS4