Demo Data from VLDB 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
David Brazdil
dblp:198/2599
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2017
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Systems, architecture and hardware · 1Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Systems and software security · 87% Authentication and access control · 13% | |
| Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper |
Runtime systems and virtual machines · 100% |
Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Systems and software security › memory protection
hardware-assisted memory protection |
0.3 | 1 | 2017 | CHERI JNI: Sinking the Java Security Model into the C · ASPLOS 2017 |
Systems and software security
memory safety |
0.3 | 1 | 2017 | CHERI JNI: Sinking the Java Security Model into the C · ASPLOS 2017 |
Runtime systems and virtual machines
language runtime |
0.3 | 1 | 2017 | CHERI JNI: Sinking the Java Security Model into the C · ASPLOS 2017 |
Authentication and access control › access control
capability-based security |
0.1 | 1 | 2017 | CHERI JNI: Sinking the Java Security Model into the C · ASPLOS 2017 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
capability hardware · 0.6CHERI · 0.6
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2017 | CHERI JNI: Sinking the Java Security Model into the CabstractJava provides security and robustness by building a high-level security model atop the foundation of memory protection. Unfortunately, any native code linked into a Java program -- including the million lines used to implement the standard library -- is able to bypass both the memory protection and the higher-level policies. We present a hardware-assisted implementation of the Java native code interface, which extends the guarantees required for Java's security model to native code. David Chisnall, Brooks Davis, Khilan Gudka, David Brazdil, Alexandre Joannou, Jonathan Woodruff, A. Theodore Markettos, Ed Maste, Robert M. Norton, Stacey D. Son, Michael Roe, Simon W. Moore, Peter G. Neumann, Ben Laurie, Robert N. M. Watson |
ASPLOS | 4 |