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J. Thomas Haigh

dblp:20/1155 · DBLP profile ↗
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7ranked-venue papers
5as first author
0since 2021 · last 1990
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 5 · 3 first-authorSoftware engineering, systems software and programming languages · 2 · 2 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
4 papers
Systems and software security · 66% Network security · 17% Authentication and access control · 17%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
2 papers
Operating systems · 50% Program verification · 50%

Topics — the 7 heaviest of 8, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Systems and software security
multilevel security		 0.031987
Extending the Noninterference Version of MLS for SAT · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 1987
An Experience Using Two Covert Channel Analysis Techniques on a Real System Design · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 1987
Extending the Non-Interference Version of MLS for SAT · S&P 1986
Systems and software security › information flow control
noninterference		 0.031987
Extending the Noninterference Version of MLS for SAT · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 1987
An Experience Using Two Covert Channel Analysis Techniques on a Real System Design · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 1987
Extending the Non-Interference Version of MLS for SAT · S&P 1986
Network security › covert channel
covert channel analysis		 0.021987
An Experience Using Two Covert Channel Analysis Techniques on a Real System Design · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 1987
An Experience Using Two Covert Channel Analysis Techniques on a Real System Design · S&P 1986
Authentication and access control › access control › access control mechanisms
type enforcement		 0.021987
Extending the Noninterference Version of MLS for SAT · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 1987
Extending the Non-Interference Version of MLS for SAT · S&P 1986
Systems and software security › information flow control
non-interference analysis		 0.011986
An Experience Using Two Covert Channel Analysis Techniques on a Real System Design · S&P 1986
Systems and software security
security verification		 0.021987
Extending the Noninterference Version of MLS for SAT · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 1987
An Experience Using Two Covert Channel Analysis Techniques on a Real System Design · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 1987
Operating systems › system security
multilevel security		 0.011986
An Experience Using Two Covert Channel Analysis Techniques on a Real System Design · S&P 1986

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

shared resource matrix method · 0.0noninterference model · 0.0formal verification · 0.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
1990 A comparison of type enforcement and Unix setuid implementation of well-formed transactions
abstract
Two security mechanisms are compared and contrasted based on their implementation of the concept of well-formed transactions (D. Clark et al., 1987). They introduced the notion of transformation procedures which are intended to perform integrity preserving or enhancing operations on various classes of data. These operations are called well-formed transactions. This paper compares the effectiveness of two mechanisms for implementing the concept of a well-formed transaction, the Secure Ada Target (SAT) type enforcement mechanism and the Unix setuid mechanism.>
Dan Thomsen, J. Thomas Haigh
 ACSAC2
1989 Noninterference and the Unwinding for LOCK
abstract
The LOCK noninterference policy for analyzing security properties of systems is presented. An unwinding theorem is developed. Difficulties resulting from trying to apply an abstract noninterference policy to a real system are discussed. A comparison is made between the LOCK noninterference policy and other versions of noninterference.>
Todd Fine, J. Thomas Haigh, Richard C. O'Brien, Dana L. Toups
 CSFW2
1987 Modeling Datbase Security Requirements
J. Thomas Haigh
 DBSec1
1987 An Experience Using Two Covert Channel Analysis Techniques on a Real System Design
abstract
This paper examines the application of two covert channel analysis techniques to a high level design for a real system, the Honeywell Secure Ada® Target (SAT). The techniques used were a version of the noninterference model of multilevel security due to Goguen and Meseguer and the shared resource matrix method of Kemmerer. Both techniques were applied to the Gypsy Abstract Model of the SAT. The paper discusses the application of the techniques and the nature of the covert channels discovered. The relative strengths and weaknesses of the two methods are discussed and criteria for an ideal covert channel tool are developed.
J. Thomas Haigh, Richard A. Kemmerer, John McHugh, William D. Young
 IEEE Trans. Software Eng.1
1987 Extending the Noninterference Version of MLS for SAT
abstract
A noninterference formulation of MLS applicable to the Secure Ada® Target (SAT) Abstract Model is developed. An analogous formulation is developed to handle the SAT type enforcement policy. Unwinding theorems are presented for both MLS and Multidomain Security (MDS) and the SAT Abstract Model is shown to satisfy both MLS and MDS. Generalizations and extensions are also considered.
J. Thomas Haigh, William D. Young
 IEEE Trans. Software Eng.1
1986 An Experience Using Two Covert Channel Analysis Techniques on a Real System Design
abstract
This paper examines the application of two covert channel analysis techniques to a high level design for a real system the Honeywell Secure Ada Target (SAT). The techniques used were a version of the non-interference model of multilevel security due to Goguen and Meseguer and the shared resource matrix method of Kemmerer. Both techniques were applied to the Gypsy abstract model of the SAT. The paper discusses the application of the techniques and the nature of the covert channels discovered. The relative strengths and weaknesses of the two methods are discussed and criteria for an ideal covert channel tool are developed.
J. Thomas Haigh, Richard A. Kemmerer, John McHugh, William D. Young
 S&P1
1986 Extending the Non-Interference Version of MLS for SAT
abstract
A non-interference formulation ofMLS applicable to the Secure Ada Target (SAT) Abstract Model is developed. An analogous formulation is developed to handle the SAT type enforcement policy. Unwinding theorems are presented for both MLS and Multi-Domain Security (MDS) and the SAT Abstract Model is shown to satisfy both MLS and MDS. Generalizations and extensions are also considered.
J. Thomas Haigh, William D. Young
 S&P1