This paper presents a security analysis of the InfiniBand architecture, a prevalent RDMA standard, and NVMe-over-Fabrics (NVMe-oF), a prominent protocol for industrial disaggregated storage that exploits RDMA protocols to achieve low-latency and high-bandwidth access to remote solid-state devices. Our work, NeVerMore, discovers new vulnerabilities in RDMA protocols that unveils several attack vectors on RDMA-enabled applications and the NVMe-oF protocol, showing that the current security mechanisms of the NVMe-oF protocol do not address the security vulnerabilities posed by the use of RDMA. In particular, we show how an unprivileged user can inject packets into any RDMA connection created on a local network controller, bypassing security mechanisms of the operating system and its kernel, and how the injection can be used to acquire unauthorized block access to NVMe-oF devices. Overall, we implement four attacks on RDMA protocols and seven attacks on the NVMe-oF protocol and verify them on the two most popular implementations of NVMe-oF: SPDK and the Linux kernel. To mitigate the discovered attacks we propose multiple mechanisms that can be implemented by RDMA and NVMe-oF providers.

Current probabilistic flow-size monitoring can only detect heavy hitters (e.g., flows utilizing 10 times their permitted bandwidth), but cannot detect smaller overuse (e.g., flows utilizing 50-100 % more than their permitted bandwidth). Thus, these systems lack accuracy in the challenging environment of high-throughput packet processing, where fast-memory resources are scarce. Nevertheless, many applications rely on accurate flow-size estimation, e.g., for network monitoring, anomaly detection and Quality of Service. We design, analyze, implement, and evaluate LOFT, a new approach for efficiently detecting overuse flows that achieves dramatically better properties than prior work. LOFT can detect 1.50x overuse flows in one second, whereas prior approaches can only reliably detect flows that overuse their allocation by at least 3x. We demonstrate LOFT's suitability for high-speed packet processing with implementations in the DPDK framework and on an FPGA.

Denial-of-service attacks have become increasingly prevalent in the Internet. In many cases they are enabled or facilitated by the lack of source authentication?it is often easy for an attacker to spoof its own IP address and thus launch reflection attacks or evade detection. There have been attempts in the past to resolve this issue through filtering or cryptography-based techniques; however, there is still no sufficiently strong system in place today-all proposals either provide weak security guarantees, are not efficient enough, or lack incentives for deployment. In this paper we present PISKES, a pragmatic Internet-scale key-establishment system enabling firstpacket authentication. Through the PISKES infrastructure, any host can locally obtain a symmetric key to enable a remote service to perform source-address authentication. The remote service can itself locally derive the same key with efficient cryptographic operations. PISKES thus enables packet authentication for a wide variety of systems including high-throughput applications like DNS. We have implemented a prototype system that enables a DNS server to verify the source of every received packet within 85 ns, which is over 220 times faster than a system based on asymmetric cryptography. PISKES has been developed for the SCION secure Internet architecture but is also applicable to today's Internet. With its strong source-authentication properties and highly efficient operation it has the potential to finally bring network-layer authentication to the Internet