Demo Data from VLDB 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Benjamin N. Roth
dblp:201/5951
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
1as first author
0since 2021 · last 2017
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 first-authorTheory of computation · 1 · 1 first-author
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Theoretical computer science
1 paper |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100% |
Topics — the 6 heaviest of 7, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design
dominant strategy |
0.3 | 1 | 2017 | Making it Safe to Use Centralized Markets: Epsilon - Dominant Individual Rationality and Applications to Market Design · EC 2017 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
equilibrium analysis |
0.3 | 1 | 2017 | Making it Safe to Use Centralized Markets: Epsilon - Dominant Individual Rationality and Applications to Market Design · EC 2017 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design
individual rationality |
0.3 | 1 | 2017 | Making it Safe to Use Centralized Markets: Epsilon - Dominant Individual Rationality and Applications to Market Design · EC 2017 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
market design |
0.3 | 1 | 2017 | Making it Safe to Use Centralized Markets: Epsilon - Dominant Individual Rationality and Applications to Market Design · EC 2017 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
mechanism design |
0.3 | 1 | 2017 | Making it Safe to Use Centralized Markets: Epsilon - Dominant Individual Rationality and Applications to Market Design · EC 2017 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design › implementation theory
mediator design |
0.3 | 1 | 2017 | Making it Safe to Use Centralized Markets: Epsilon - Dominant Individual Rationality and Applications to Market Design · EC 2017 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
mechanism design · 0.3game-theoretic modeling · 0.3
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2017 | Making it Safe to Use Centralized Markets: Epsilon - Dominant Individual Rationality and Applications to Market DesignabstractA critical, yet underappreciated feature of market design is that centralized markets operate within a broader economic context; often market designers cannot force participants to join a centralized market. As such, well-designed centralized markets must induce participants to join voluntarily, in spite of pre-existing decentralized institutions they may already be using. Utilizing the general framework of Monderer and Tennenholtz (2006), we take the view that centralizing a market is akin to designing a mediator to which people may sign away their decision rights. The mediator is voluntary in the sense that it cannot condition the actions of those who participate on the actions of those who do not. Benjamin N. Roth, Ran I. Shorrer |
EC | 1 |