Algorithmic fairness research often disregards concerns related to systemic injustice.We study how contextualizing algorithms within systemic injustice impacts lay perceptions of algorithmic discrimination.Using the hiring domain as a case-study, we conduct a 2x3 between-participants experiment (𝑁 =716), studying how people's views of algorithmic fairness are influenced by information about (i) systemic injustice in historical hiring decisions and (ii) algorithms' propensity to perpetuate biases learned from past human decisions.We find that shedding light on systemic injustice has heterogeneous effects: participants from historically advantaged groups became more negative about discriminatory algorithms, while those from disadvantaged groups reported more positive attitudes.Explaining that algorithms learn from past human decisions had null effects on people's views, adding nuances to calls for improving public understanding of algorithms.Our findings reveal that contextualizing algorithms in systemic injustice can have unintended consequences and show how different ways of framing existing inequalities influence perceptions of injustice.

Prior research in psychology has found that people's decisions are often inconsistent. An individual's decisions vary across time, and decisions vary even more across people. Inconsistencies have been identified not only in subjective matters, like matters of taste, but also in settings one might expect to be more objective, such as sentencing, job performance evaluations, or real estate appraisals. In our study, we explore whether algorithmic decision aids can be used to moderate the degree of inconsistency in human decision-making in the context of real estate appraisal. In a large-scale human-subject experiment, we study how different forms of algorithmic assistance influence the way that people review and update their estimates of real estate prices. We find that both (i) asking respondents to review their estimates in a series of algorithmically chosen pairwise comparisons and (ii) providing respondents with traditional machine advice are effective strategies for influencing human responses. Compared to simply reviewing initial estimates one by one, the aforementioned strategies lead to (i) a higher propensity to update initial estimates, (ii) a higher accuracy of post-review estimates, and (iii) a higher degree of consistency between the post-review estimates of different respondents. While these effects are more pronounced with traditional machine advice, the approach of reviewing algorithmically chosen pairs can be implemented in a wider range of settings, since it does not require access to ground truth data.

Artificial intelligence (AI) systems can cause harm to people. This research examines how individuals react to such harm through the lens of blame. Building upon research suggesting that people blame AI systems, we investigated how several factors influence people’s reactive attitudes towards machines, designers, and users. The results of three studies (N = 1,153) indicate differences in how blame is attributed to these actors. Whether AI systems were explainable did not impact blame directed at them, their developers, and their users. Considerations about fairness and harmfulness increased blame towards designers and users but had little to no effect on judgments of AI systems. Instead, what determined people’s reactive attitudes towards machines was whether people thought blaming them would be a suitable response to algorithmic harm. We discuss implications, such as how future decisions about including AI systems in the social and moral spheres will shape laypeople’s reactions to AI-caused harm.

In the media, in policy-making, but also in research articles, algorithmic decision-making (ADM) systems are referred to as algorithms, artificial intelligence, and computer programs, amongst other terms. We hypothesize that such terminological differences can affect people’s perceptions of properties of ADM systems, people’s evaluations of systems in application contexts, and the replicability of research as findings may be influenced by terminological differences. In two studies (N = 397, N = 622), we show that terminology does indeed affect laypeople’s perceptions of system properties (e.g., perceived complexity) and evaluations of systems (e.g., trust). Our findings highlight the need to be mindful when choosing terms to describe ADM systems, because terminology can have unintended consequences, and may impact the robustness and replicability of HCI research. Additionally, our findings indicate that terminology can be used strategically (e.g., in communication about ADM systems) to influence people’s perceptions and evaluations of these systems.

Machine learning algorithms are increasingly used to assist human decision-making. When the goal of machine assistance is to improve the accuracy of human decisions, it might seem appealing to design ML algorithms that complement human knowledge. While neither the algorithm nor the human are perfectly accurate, one could expect that their complementary expertise might lead to improved outcomes. In this study, we demonstrate that in practice decision aids that are not complementary, but make errors similar to human ones may have their own benefits. In a series of human-subject experiments with a total of 901 participants, we study how the similarity of human and machine errors influences human perceptions of and interactions with algorithmic decision aids. We find that (i) people perceive more similar decision aids as more useful, accurate, and predictable, and that (ii) people are more likely to take opposing advice from more similar decision aids, while (iii) decision aids that are less similar to humans have more opportunities to provide opposing advice, resulting in a higher influence on people’s decisions overall.

How to attribute responsibility for autonomous artificial intelligence (AI) systems’ actions has been widely debated across the humanities and social science disciplines. This work presents two experiments (N=200 each) that measure people’s perceptions of eight different notions of moral responsibility concerning AI and human agents in the context of bail decision-making. Using real-life adapted vignettes, our experiments show that AI agents are held causally responsible and blamed similarly to human agents for an identical task. However, there was a meaningful difference in how people perceived these agents’ moral responsibility; human agents were ascribed to a higher degree of present-looking and forward-looking notions of responsibility than AI agents. We also found that people expect both AI and human decision-makers and advisors to justify their decisions regardless of their nature. We discuss policy and HCI implications of these findings, such as the need for explainable AI in high-stakes scenarios.

Much of political debate focuses on the concern that machines might take over. Yet in many domains it is much more plausible that the ultimate choice and responsibility remain with a human decision-maker, but that she is provided with machine advice. A quintessential illustration is the decision of a judge to bail or jail a defendant. In multiple jurisdictions in the US, judges have access to a machine prediction about a defendant's recidivism risk. In our study, we explore how receiving machine advice influences people's bail decisions. We run a vignette experiment with laypersons whom we test on a subsample of cases from the database of this prediction tool. In study 1, we ask them to predict whether defendants will recidivate before tried, and manipulate whether they have access to machine advice. We find that receiving machine advice has a small effect, which is biased in the direction of predicting no recidivism. In the field, human decision makers sometimes have a chance, after the fact, to learn whether the machine has given good advice. In study 2, after each trial we inform participants of ground truth. This does not make it more likely that they follow the advice, despite the fact that the machine is (on average) slightly more accurate than real judges. This also holds if initially the advice is mostly correct, or if it initially is mostly to predict (no) recidivism. Real judges know that their decisions affect defendants' lives. They may also be concerned about reelection or promotion. Hence a lot is at stake. In study 3 we emulate high stakes by giving participants a financial incentive. An incentive to find the ground truth, or to avoid false positive or false negatives, does not make participants more sensitive to machine advice. But an incentive to follow the advice is effective.

With widespread use of machine learning methods in numerous domains involving humans, several studies have raised questions about the potential for unfairness towards certain individuals or groups. A number of recent works have proposed methods to measure and eliminate unfairness from machine learning models. However, most of this work has focused on only one dimension of fair decision making: distributive fairness, i.e., the fairness of the decision outcomes. In this work, we leverage the rich literature on organizational justice and focus on another dimension of fair decision making: procedural fairness, i.e., the fairness of the decision making process. We propose measures for procedural fairness that consider the input features used in the decision process, and evaluate the moral judgments of humans regarding the use of these features. We operationalize these measures on two real world datasets using human surveys on the Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) platform, demonstrating that our measures capture important properties of procedurally fair decision making. We provide fast submodular mechanisms to optimize the tradeoff between procedural fairness and prediction accuracy. On our datasets, we observe empirically that procedural fairness may be achieved with little cost to outcome fairness, but that some loss of accuracy is unavoidable.

Discrimination via algorithmic decision making has received considerable attention. Prior work largely focuses on defining conditions for fairness, but does not define satisfactory measures of algorithmic unfairness. In this paper, we focus on the following question: Given two unfair algorithms, how should we determine which of the two is more unfair? Our core idea is to use existing inequality indices from economics to measure how unequally the outcomes of an algorithm benefit different individuals or groups in a population. Our work offers a justified and general framework to compare and contrast the (un)fairness of algorithmic predictors. This unifying approach enables us to quantify unfairness both at the individual and the group level. Further, our work reveals overlooked tradeoffs between different fairness notions: using our proposed measures, the overall individual-level unfairness of an algorithm can be decomposed into a between-group and a within-group component. Earlier methods are typically designed to tackle only between-group un- fairness, which may be justified for legal or other reasons. However, we demonstrate that minimizing exclusively the between-group component may, in fact, increase the within-group, and hence the overall unfairness. We characterize and illustrate the tradeoffs between our measures of (un)fairness and the prediction accuracy.

As algorithms are increasingly used to make important decisions that affect human lives, ranging from social benefit assignment to predicting risk of criminal recidivism, concerns have been raised about the fairness of algorithmic decision making. Most prior works on algorithmic fairness normatively prescribe how fair decisions ought to be made. In contrast, here, we descriptively survey users for how they perceive and reason about fairness in algorithmic decision making. A key contribution of this work is the framework we propose to understand why people perceive certain features as fair or unfair to be used in algorithms. Our framework identifies eight properties of features, such as relevance, volitionality and reliability, as latent considerations that inform people»s moral judgments about the fairness of feature use in decision-making algorithms. We validate our framework through a series of scenario-based surveys with 576 people. We find that, based on a person»s assessment of the eight latent properties of a feature in our exemplar scenario, we can accurately (> 85%) predict if the person will judge the use of the feature as fair. Our findings have important implications. At a high-level, we show that people»s unfairness concerns are multi-dimensional and argue that future studies need to address unfairness concerns beyond discrimination. At a low-level, we find considerable disagreements in people»s fairness judgments. We identify root causes of the disagreements, and note possible pathways to resolve them.