Demo Data from VLDB 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Wennan Zhu
dblp:203/8213
· DBLP profile ↗
9ranked-venue papers
1as first author
4since 2021 · last 2024
0000-0001-7761-5626ORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 4 · 1 first-author · 3 since 2021Applied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 4 · 1 since 2021Theory of computation · 2Databases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 1 · 1 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Theoretical computer science
2 papers |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100% | |
| Network and information security
2 papers |
Privacy and data protection · 100% | |
| Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
1 paper |
Distributed systems · 100% |
Topics — the 12 heaviest of 13, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Privacy and data protection
differential privacy |
1.3 | 2 | 2023 | Private Federated Frequency Estimation: Adapting to the Hardness of the Instance · NeurIPS 2023 Algorithms for bounding contribution for histogram estimation under user-level privacy · ICML 2023 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design
auction design |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Efficiency of Non-Truthful Auctions in Auto-bidding with Budget Constraints · WWW 2024 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › auction theory › bidding strategy
auto-bidding |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Efficiency of Non-Truthful Auctions in Auto-bidding with Budget Constraints · WWW 2024 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design
budget constraints |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Efficiency of Non-Truthful Auctions in Auto-bidding with Budget Constraints · WWW 2024 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › auction theory › sealed-bid auction
first-price auction |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Efficiency of Non-Truthful Auctions in Auto-bidding with Budget Constraints · WWW 2024 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
price of anarchy |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Efficiency of Non-Truthful Auctions in Auto-bidding with Budget Constraints · WWW 2024 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design › algorithmic mechanism design
randomized mechanism |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Efficiency of Non-Truthful Auctions in Auto-bidding with Budget Constraints · WWW 2024 |
Privacy and data protection › privacy-preserving data analysis
histogram estimation |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | Algorithms for bounding contribution for histogram estimation under user-level privacy · ICML 2023 |
Privacy and data protection › privacy analysis › privacy models
user-level differential privacy |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | Algorithms for bounding contribution for histogram estimation under user-level privacy · ICML 2023 |
Distributed systems › distributed machine learning
federated learning |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | Private Federated Frequency Estimation: Adapting to the Hardness of the Instance · NeurIPS 2023 |
Distributed systems › distributed machine learning › federated learning
secure aggregation |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | Private Federated Frequency Estimation: Adapting to the Hardness of the Instance · NeurIPS 2023 |
Internet architecture and protocols
internet exchange point |
0.1 | 1 | 2021 | Forming Better Stable Solutions in Group Formation Games Inspired by Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) · AAAI 2021 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
sketching algorithms · 1.3differential privacy · 1.3price of anarchy analysis · 0.8zeroth-order optimization · 0.7countsketch · 0.7count sketch · 0.7approximation algorithm · 0.7
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | Efficiency of Non-Truthful Auctions in Auto-bidding with Budget ConstraintsabstractWe study the efficiency of non-truthful auctions for auto-bidders with both return on spend (ROS) and budget constraints. The efficiency of a mechanism is measured by the price of anarchy (PoA), which is the worst case ratio between the liquid welfare of any equilibrium and the optimal (possibly randomized) allocation. Our first main result is that the first-price auction (FPA) is optimal, among deterministic mechanisms, in this setting. Without any assumptions, the PoA of FPA is n which we prove is tight for any deterministic mechanism. However, under a mild assumption that a bidder's value for any query does not exceed their total budget, we show that the PoA is at most 2. This bound is also tight as it matches the optimal PoA without a budget constraint. We next analyze two randomized mechanisms: randomized FPA (rFPA) and "quasi-proportional'' FPA. We prove two results that highlight the efficacy of randomization in this setting. First, we show that the PoA of rFPA for two bidders is at most 1.8 without requiring any assumptions. This extends prior work which focused only on an ROS constraint. Second, we show that quasi-proportional FPA has a PoA of 2 for any number of bidders, without any assumptions. Both of these bypass lower bounds in the deterministic setting. Finally, we study the setting where bidders are assumed to bid uniformly. We show that uniform bidding can be detrimental for efficiency in deterministic mechanisms while being beneficial for randomized mechanisms, which is in stark contrast with the settings without budget constraints. Christopher Liaw, Aranyak Mehta, Wennan Zhu |
WWW | 3 |
| 2023 | Algorithms for bounding contribution for histogram estimation under user-level privacyabstractWe study the problem of histogram estimation under user-level differential privacy, where the goal is to preserve the privacy of all entries of any single user. We consider the heterogeneous scenario where the quantity of data can be different for each user. In this scenario, the amount of noise injected into the histogram to obtain differential privacy is proportional to the maximum user contribution, which can be amplified by few outliers. One approach to circumvent this would be to bound (or limit) the contribution of each user to the histogram. However, if users are limited to small contributions, a significant amount of data will be discarded. In this work, we propose algorithms to choose the best user contribution bound for histogram estimation under both bounded and unbounded domain settings. When the size of the domain is bounded, we propose a user contribution bounding strategy that almost achieves a two-approximation with respect to the best contribution bound in hindsight. For unbounded domain histogram estimation, we propose an algorithm that is logarithmic-approximation with respect to the best contribution bound in hindsight. This result holds without any distribution assumptions on the data. Experiments on both real and synthetic datasets verify our theoretical findings and demonstrate the effectiveness of our algorithms. We also show that clipping bias introduced by bounding user contribution may be reduced under mild distribution assumptions, which can be of independent interest. Yuhan Liu 0007, Ananda Theertha Suresh, Wennan Zhu, Peter Kairouz, Marco Gruteser |
ICML | 3 |
| 2023 | Private Federated Frequency Estimation: Adapting to the Hardness of the InstanceabstractIn federated frequency estimation (FFE), multiple clients work together to estimate the frequency of their local data by communicating with a server, while maintaining the security constraint of $\mathtt{secsum}$ where the server can only access the sum of client-held vectors. For FFE with a single communication round, it is known that count sketch is nearly information-theoretically optimal [Chen et al., 2022]. However, when multiple communication rounds are allowed, we propose a new sketch algorithm that is provably more accurate than a naive adaptation of count sketch. Furthermore, we show that both our sketch algorithm and count sketch can achieve better accuracy when the problem instance is simpler. Therefore, we propose a two-phase approach to enable the use of a smaller sketch size for simpler problems. Finally, we provide mechanisms to make our proposed algorithm differentially private. We verify the performance of our methods through experiments conducted on real datasets. Jingfeng Wu, Wennan Zhu, Peter Kairouz, Vladimir Braverman |
NeurIPS | 2 |
| 2021 | Forming Better Stable Solutions in Group Formation Games Inspired by Internet Exchange Points (IXPs)
Elliot Anshelevich, Wennan Zhu |
AAAI | 2 |
| 2020 | Federated Heavy Hitters Discovery with Differential PrivacyabstractThe discovery of heavy hitters (most frequent items) in user-generated data streams drives improvements in the app and web ecosystems, but can incur substantial privacy risks if not done with care. To address these risks, we propose a distributed and privacy-preserving algorithm for discovering the heavy hitters in a population of user-generated data streams. We leverage the sampling and thresholding properties of our distributed algorithm to prove that it is inherently differentially private, without requiring additional noise. We also examine the trade-off between privacy and utility, and show that our algorithm provides excellent utility while also achieving strong privacy guarantees. A significant advantage of this approach is that it eliminates the need to centralize raw data while also avoiding the significant loss in utility incurred by local differential privacy. We validate our findings both theoretically, using worst-case analyses, and practically, using a Twitter dataset with 1.6M tweets and over 650k users. Finally, we carefully compare our approach to Apple’s local differential privacy method for discovering heavy hitters. Wennan Zhu, Peter Kairouz, H. Brendan McMahan, Haicheng Sun |
AISTATS | 1 |
| 2019 | Awareness of Voter Passion Greatly Improves the Distortion of Metric Social Choice
Ben Abramowitz, Elliot Anshelevich, Wennan Zhu |
WINE | 3 |
| 2019 | Tradeoffs Between Information and Ordinal Approximation for Bipartite Matching
Elliot Anshelevich, Wennan Zhu |
Theory Comput. Syst. | 2 |
| 2018 | Ordinal Approximation for Social Choice, Matching, and Facility Location Problems Given Candidate Positions
Elliot Anshelevich, Wennan Zhu |
WINE | 2 |
| 2017 | Tradeoffs Between Information and Ordinal Approximation for Bipartite Matching
Elliot Anshelevich, Wennan Zhu |
SAGT | 2 |