Securing dynamic networks against adversarial actions is challenging because of the need to anticipate and counter strategic disruptions by adversarial entities within complex network structures. Traditional game-theoretic models, while insightful, often fail to model the unpredictability and constraints of real-world threat assessment scenarios. We refinesabotage gamesto reflect the realistic limitations of the saboteur and the network operator. By transforming sabotage games into reachability problems, our approach allows applying existing computational solutions to model realistic restrictions on attackers and defenders within the game. Modifying sabotage games into dynamic network security problems successfully captures the nuanced interplay of strategy and uncertainty in dynamic network security. Theoretically, we extend sabotage games to model network security contexts and thoroughly explore if the additional restrictions raise their computational complexity, often the bottleneck of game theory in practical contexts. Practically, this research sets the stage for actionable insights for developing robust defense mechanisms by understanding what risks to mitigate in dynamic networks under threat.

Abstract We argue that turning a logic program into a set of completed definitions can be sometimes thought of as the “reverse engineering” process of generating a set of conditions that could serve as a specification for it. Accordingly, it may be useful to define completion for a large class of Answer Set Programming (ASP) programs and to automate the process of generating and simplifying completion formulas. Examining the output produced by this kind of software may help programmers to see more clearly what their program does, and to what degree its behavior conforms with their expectations. As a step toward this goal, we propose here a definition of program completion for a large class of programs in the input language of the ASP grounder gringo, and study its properties.