We consider designing reward schemes that incentivize agents to create high-quality content (e.g., videos, images, text, ideas). The problem is at the center of a real-world application where the goal is to optimize the overall quality of generated content on user-generated content platforms. We focus on anonymous independent reward schemes (AIRS) that only take the quality of an agent's content as input. We prove the general problem is NP-hard. If the cost function is convex, we show the optimal AIRS can be formulated as a convex optimization problem and propose an efficient algorithm to solve it. Next, we explore the optimal linear reward scheme and prove it has a 1/2-approximation ratio, and the ratio is tight. Lastly, we show the proportional scheme can be arbitrarily bad compared to AIRS.

Motivated by a new generation of Internet advertising that has emerged in the live streaming e-commerce markets (e.g., Tiktok) over the past five years, we study a variant of online bipartite matching problem: advertisers send ad requests to influencers (aka, key opinion leaders) on a social media platform. Each influencer has a maximum number of ad requests she can accommodate. We assign a fixed number of influencers to an advertiser when she enters the platform. The advertiser then matches with each of the assigned influencers with a probability, which can be thought of as a set of negotiations between the advertiser and the set of assigned influencers. Unlike the standard online assignment problems, the outcome of any of these matches is not revealed throughout the session (negotiations take time). Our goal is to maximize the expected number of matches between advertisers and influencers. We put forward a new deterministic algorithm with a competitive ratio of $1/2$ and prove that no deterministic algorithm can achieve a better competitive ratio. We also show that the competitive ratio can be improved when randomness is allowed. We then study a setting where a match is successful with either probability 0 or a fixed $p$. We present an optimal randomized algorithm that achieves a competitive ratio of $1-1/e$ in this setting.

We consider the principal-agent problem with heterogeneous agents. Previous works assume that the principal signs independent incentive contracts with every agent to make them invest more efforts on the tasks. However, in many circumstances, these contracts need to be identical for the sake of fairness. We investigate the optimal common contract problem. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to consider this natural and important generalization. We first show this problem is NP-complete. Then we provide a dynamic programming algorithm to compute the optimal contract in O(n2m) time, where n,m are the number of agents and actions, under the assumption that the agents' cost functions obey increasing difference property. At last, we generalize the setting such that each agent can choose to directly produce a reward in [0,1]. We provide an O(log n)-approximate algorithm for this generalization.

Film release time play an important part in box office revenues due to obvious seasonality demand in the film industry and severe competition among films shown at the same time. In this paper, we study how film studios choose release time for movies they produce to maximize their box offices. We first formalize this problem as an attraction competition game where players (film studios) consider both potential profits and competitors' choices when deciding the release time. Then we prove that there always exists a pure Nash equilibrium and give the sufficient condition of the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. Our model can be generalized to an extensive game and we compute the subgame-perfect equilibrium for homogeneous players. For the case that one film studio could have multiple movies to release, we prove that finding a player's best response is NP-hard and it does not guarantee the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium. Experiments are provided to support the soundness of our model. In the final state, most of the film studios, accounting for 84 percent of the market, would not change their release time. The behaviors of film studios imply they are following some strategies to reach a Nash equilibrium.

Over the past few years, ride-sharing has emerged as an effective way to relieve traffic congestion. A key problem for the ride-sharing platforms is to come up with a revenue-optimal (or GMV-optimal) pricing scheme and a vehicle dispatching policy that incorporate geographic and temporal information. In this paper, we aim to tackle this problem via an economic approach. Modeled naively, the underlying optimization problem may be non-convex and thus hard to solve. To this end, we use a so-called ``ironing'' technique to convert the problem into an equivalent convex optimization one via a clean Markov decision process (MDP) formulation, where the states are the driver distributions and the decision variables are the prices for each pair of locations. Our main finding is an efficient algorithm that computes the exact revenue-optimal (or GMV-optimal) randomized pricing scheme, which naturally induces the accompany vehicle dispatching policy. We also conduct empirical evaluations of our solution through real data of a major ride-sharing platform and show its advantages over fixed pricing schemes as well as several prevalent surge-based pricing schemes.