Marie Farrell

dblp:204/9365 · DBLP profile ↗
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25ranked-venue papers
15as first author
20since 2021 · last 2026
0000-0001-7708-3877ORCID · verified

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 21 · 12 first-author · 16 since 2021Theory of computation · 12 · 6 first-author · 10 since 2021Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Security and privacy · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 Requirements Elicitation, Formalization, and Analysis with FRET: A Tutorial
abstract
Abstract Formal methods enable the verification of system behavior against requirements that are expressed as formal, mathematical properties. However, translating the often ambiguous natural language requirements that are typically produced by developers and engineers into precise mathematical specifications remains a significant bottleneck in the formal verification process. NASA’s Formal Requirements Elicitation Tool ( FRET ) is an open source tool that addresses this challenge by bridging the gap between natural language requirements and formal specifications that are suitable for automated verification. FRET enables practitioners to express requirements in FRETish , a structured natural language, that balances intuitive readability with formal rigor. FRET automatically translates these requirements into formal properties that verification tools can directly process. This tutorial paper introduces FRET and guides readers through expressing requirements in FRETish . We present the tool’s key analysis capabilities, including simulation, realizability checking, test-case generation, and automated generation of verification conditions for external formal verification tools. Our goal is to provide a comprehensive guide that helps practitioners, regardless of their formal methods background, to effectively leverage FRET in their verification and validation (V&V) workflows.
Anastasia Mavridou, Andreas Katis, Mari A. Aoki, Marie Farrell
FM (2)4
2026 Counterexample-Guided Interval Weakening
Ben M. Andrew, Louise A. Dennis, Michael Fisher 0001, Marie Farrell
ABZ4
2026 ABZ 2026 Case Study: A Planetary Rover
Marie Farrell, Tsutomu Kobayashi
ABZ1
2026 Security-Minded Modelling and Verification of Autonomous Satellite Docking
Juel Hussain, Louise A. Dennis, Clare Dixon, Marie Farrell
ABZ4
2026 Encoding BDI Syntax with Theories in Event-B
Mengwei Xu 0002, Peter Riviere, Toshiaki Aoki, Marie Farrell, Yamine Aït-Ameur, Neeraj Kumar Singh 0001, Guillaume Dupont
ABZ4
2025 Quantitative Operational Monitoring for BDI Agents
Marie Farrell, Angelo Ferrando 0001, Mengwei Xu 0002
AAMAS1
2025 Supporting Software Formal Verification with Large Language Models: An Experimental Study
abstract
Formal methods have been employed for requirements verification for a long time. However, it is difficult to automatically derive properties from natural language requirements. SpecVerify addresses this challenge by integrating large language models (LLMs) with formal verification tools, providing a more flexible mechanism for expressing requirements. This framework combines Claude 3.5 Sonnet with the ESBMC verifier to form an automated workflow. Evaluated on nine cyber-physical systems from Lockheed Martin, SpecVerify achieves 46.5% verification accuracy, comparable to NASA’s CoCoSim, but with lower false positives. Our framework formulates assertions that extend beyond the expressive power of LTL and identifies falsifiable cases that are missed by more traditional methods. Counterexample analysis reveals CoCoSim’s limitations stemming from model connection errors and numerical approximation issues. While SpecVerify advances verification automation, our comparative study of Claude, ChatGPT, and Llama shows that high-quality requirements documentation and human monitoring remain critical, as models occasionally misinterpret specifications. Our results demonstrate that LLMs can significantly reduce the barriers to formal verification, while highlighting the continued importance of human-machine collaboration in achieving optimal results.
Marie Farrell, Lucas C. Cordeiro, Liping Zhao 0001
RE2
2025 Sharper Specs for Smarter Drones: Formalising Requirements with FRET
Oisín Sheridan, Leandro Buss Becker, Marie Farrell, Matt Luckcuck, Rosemary Monahan
REFSQ3
2025 Eliciting Explainability Requirements for Safety-Critical Systems: A Nuclear Case Study
Hazel M. Taylor, Matt Luckcuck, Marie Farrell, Caroline Jay, Angelo Cangelosi, Louise A. Dennis
REFSQ3
2024 Adventures in FRET and Specification
Marie Farrell, Matt Luckcuck, Rosemary Monahan, Conor Reynolds, Oisín Sheridan
ISoLA (3)1
2024 FRETting and Formal Modelling: A Mechanical Lung Ventilator
Marie Farrell, Matt Luckcuck, Rosemary Monahan, Conor Reynolds, Oisín Sheridan
ABZ1
2024 Security-Minded Verification of Cooperative Awareness Messages
abstract
Autonomous robotic systems systems are both safety- and security-critical, since a breach in system security may impact safety. In such critical systems, formal verification is used to model the system and verify that it obeys specific functional and safety properties. Independently, threat modelling is used to analyse and manage the cyber security threats that such systems may encounter. Both verification and threat analysis serve the purpose of ensuring that the system will be reliable, albeit from differing perspectives. In prior work, we argued that these analyses should be used to inform one another and, in this paper, we extend our previously defined methodology for security-minded verification by incorporating runtime verification. To illustrate our approach, we analyse an algorithm for sending Cooperative Awareness Messages between autonomous vehicles. Our analysis centres on identifying STRIDE security threats. We show how these can be formalised, and subsequently verified, using a combination of formal tools for static aspects, namely Promela/SPIN and Dafny, and generate runtime monitors for dynamic verification. Our approach allows us to focus our verification effort on those security properties that are particularly important and to consider safety and security in tandem, both statically and at runtime.
Marie Farrell, Matthew Bradbury, Rafael C. Cardoso 0001, Michael Fisher 0001, Louise A. Dennis, Clare Dixon, Al Tariq Sheik, Hu Yuan 0001, Carsten Maple
IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput.1
2023 Exploring Requirements for Software that Learns: A Research Preview
Marie Farrell, Anastasia Mavridou, Johann Schumann
REFSQ1
2023 Building Specifications in the Event-B Institution: A Summary
Marie Farrell, Rosemary Monahan, James F. Power
ABZ1
2022 Journal-First: Formal Modelling and Runtime Verification of Autonomous Grasping for Active Debris Removal
Marie Farrell, Nikos Mavrakis, Angelo Ferrando 0001, Clare Dixon, Yang Gao 0002
IFM1
2022 FRETting About Requirements: Formalised Requirements for an Aircraft Engine Controller
Marie Farrell, Matt Luckcuck, Oisín Sheridan, Rosemary Monahan
REFSQ1
2022 Building Specifications in the Event-B Institution
abstract
This paper describes a formal semantics for the Event-B specification language using the theory of institutions. We define an institution for Event-B, EVT, and prove that it meets the validity requirements for satisfaction preservation and model amalgamation. We also present a series of functions that show how the constructs of the Event-B specification language can be mapped into our institution. Our semantics sheds new light on the structure of the Event-B language, allowing us to clearly delineate three constituent sub-languages: the superstructure, infrastructure and mathematical languages. One of the principal goals of our semantics is to provide access to the generic modularisation constructs available in institutions, including specification-building operators for parameterisation and refinement. We demonstrate how these features subsume and enhance the corresponding features already present in Event-B through a detailed study of their use in a worked example. We have implemented our approach via a parser and translator for Event-B specifications, EBtoEVT, which also provides a gateway to the Hets toolkit for heterogeneous specification.
Marie Farrell, Rosemary Monahan, James F. Power
Log. Methods Comput. Sci.1
2021 Using dafny to solve the VerifyThis 2021 challenges
abstract
This paper provides an experience report of using the Dafny program verifier, at the VerifyThis 2021 program verification competition. The competition aims to evaluate the usability of logic-based program verification tools in a controlled experiment, challenging both the verification tools and the users of those tools. We present the two challenges that we tackled during the competition and discuss our solutions. As a result, we identify strengths and weaknesses of Dafny in the verification of relatively complex algorithms, and report on our experience of applying Dafny in this setting.
Marie Farrell, Conor Reynolds, Rosemary Monahan
FTfJP@ECOOP1
2021 Bridging the gap between single- and multi-model predictive runtime verification
abstract
Abstract This paper presents an extension of the Predictive Runtime Verification (PRV) paradigm to consider multiple models of the System Under Analysis (SUA). We call this extension Multi-Model PRV. Typically, PRV attempts to predict the satisfaction or violation of a property based on a trace and a (single) formal model of the SUA. However, contemporary node- or component-based systems (e.g. robotic systems) may benefit from monitoring based on a model of each component. We show how a Multi-Model PRV approach can be applied in either a centralised or a compositional way (where the property is compositional), as best suits the SUA. Crucially, our approach is formalism-agnostic. We demonstrate our approach using an illustrative example of a Mars Curiosity rover simulation and evaluate our contribution via a prototype implementation.
Angelo Ferrando 0001, Rafael C. Cardoso 0001, Marie Farrell, Matt Luckcuck, Fabio Papacchini, Michael Fisher 0001, Viviana Mascardi
Formal Methods Syst. Des.3
2021 A formal approach to finding inconsistencies in a metamodel
abstract
Abstract Checking the consistency of a metamodel involves finding a valid metamodel instance that provably meets the set of constraints that are defined over the metamodel. These constraints are often specified in Object Constraint Language. Often, a metamodel is inconsistent due to conflicts among the constraints. Existing approaches and tools are typically incapable of pinpointing the conflicting constraints, and this makes it difficult for users to debug and fix their metamodels. In this paper, we present a formal approach for locating conflicting constraints in inconsistent metamodels. Our approach has four distinct features: (1) users can rank individual metamodel features using their own domain-specific knowledge, (2) we transform these ranked features to a weighted maximum satisfiability modulo theories problem and solve it to compute the set of maximum achievable features, (3) we pinpoint the conflicting constraints by solving the set cover problem using a novel algorithm, and (4) we have implemented our approach into a fully automated tool called MaxUSE. Our evaluation results, using our assembled set of benchmarks, demonstrate the scalability of our work and that it is capable of efficiently finding conflicting constraints.
Hao Wu 0017, Marie Farrell
Softw. Syst. Model.2
2019 A Summary of Formal Specification and Verification of Autonomous Robotic Systems
Matt Luckcuck, Marie Farrell, Louise A. Dennis, Clare Dixon, Michael Fisher 0001
IFM2
2019 Using Threat Analysis Techniques to Guide Formal Verification: A Case Study of Cooperative Awareness Messages
Marie Farrell, Matthew Bradbury, Michael Fisher 0001, Louise A. Dennis, Clare Dixon, Hu Yuan 0001, Carsten Maple
SEFM1
2018 Robotics and Integrated Formal Methods: Necessity Meets Opportunity
Marie Farrell, Matt Luckcuck, Michael Fisher 0001
IFM1
2017 Combining Event-B and CSP: An Institution Theoretic Approach to Interoperability
Marie Farrell, Rosemary Monahan, James F. Power
ICFEM1
2017 Specification Clones: An Empirical Study of the Structure of Event-B Specifications
Marie Farrell, Rosemary Monahan, James F. Power
SEFM1