Lukas Alber

dblp:205/8907 · DBLP profile ↗
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3ranked-venue papers
0as first author
3since 2021 · last 2022
0009-0003-8312-5086ORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 2 · 2 since 2021Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1 · 1 since 2021Applied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 1 · 1 since 2021
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2022 YOU SHALL NOT COMPUTE on my Data: Access Policies for Privacy-Preserving Data Marketplaces and an Implementation for a Distributed Market using MPC
abstract
Personal data is an attractive source of insights for a diverse field of research and business. While our data is highly valuable, it is often privacy-sensitive. Thus, regulations like the GDPR restrict what data can be legally published, and what a buyer may do with this sensitive data. While personal data must be protected, we can still sell some insights gathered from our data that do not hurt our privacy. A data marketplace is a platform that helps users to sell their data while assisting buyers in discovering relevant datasets. The major challenge such a marketplace faces is balancing between offering valuable insights into data while preserving privacy requirements. Private data marketplaces try to solve this challenge by offering privacy-preserving computations on personal data. Such computations allow for calculating statistics or training machine learning models on personal data without accessing the data in plain. However, the user selling the data cannot restrict who can buy or what type of computation the data is allowed.
Stefan More, Lukas Alber
ARES2
2022 What is a (Digital) Identity Wallet? A Systematic Literature Review
abstract
Identity management is crucial for any electronic service that needs to authenticate its users. Different identity-management models have been introduced and rolled out on a large scale during the past decades. Key distinguishing criteria of these models are the storage location of users' identity data and the degree of involvement of central entities such as identity providers, which can potentially track user behavior. Growing privacy awareness has led to a renaissance of user-centric identity-management models during the past few years. In this context, especially the concept of wallets applied to the digital identity domain has recently attracted attention, putting users into direct control of their identity data. Various approaches and solutions relying on this concept have been introduced recently. However, no generally accepted definitions of the concept “digital identity wallet” and of its related features and implementations exist so far, leading to considerable confusion in this domain. This paper addresses this issue by providing a systematic literature review on wallets applied to the digital identity domain to identify, analyze, and compare existing definitions, features, and capabilities of such solutions. By means of two research questions, this paper thereby contributes to a better understanding of identity wallets and the various recent developments in this domain.
Blaz Podgorelec, Lukas Alber, Thomas Zefferer
COMPSAC2
2022 Extending Expressive Access Policies with Privacy Features
abstract
Authentication, authorization, and trust verification are central parts of an access control system. The conditions for granting access in such a system are collected in access policies. Since access conditions are often complex, dedicated languages – policy languages – for defining policies are in use.However, current policy languages are unable to express such conditions having privacy of users in mind. With privacy-preserving technologies, users are enabled to prove information to the access system without revealing it.In this work, we present a generic design for supporting privacy-preserving technologies in policy languages. Our design prevents unnecessary disclosure of sensitive information while still allowing the formulation of expressive rules for access control. For that we make use of zero-knowledge proofs (NIZKs). We demonstrate our design by applying it to the TPL policy language, while using SNARKs. Also, we evaluate the resulting ZK-TPL language and its associated toolchain. Our evaluation shows that for regular-sized credentials communication and verification overhead is negligible.
Stefan More, Sebastian Ramacher, Lukas Alber, Marco Herzl
TrustCom3