Most cryptographic protocols model a player's knowledge of secrets in a simple way. Informally, the player knows a secret in the sense that she can directly furnish it as a (private) input to a protocol, e.g., to digitally sign a message.

We study Privacy Pools, a novel smart contract-based privacy-enhancing protocol. The protocol introduces a mechanism for users to reveal certain properties of their transaction without having to reveal the transaction itself. The core concept involves allowing users to publish a zero-knowledge proof, demonstrating that their funds (do not) originate from known (un-)lawful sources, without publicly revealing their entire transaction history. This is achieved by proving membership in custom association sets, which are designed to demonstrate compliance with regulatory frameworks or social consensus. We illustrate how this mechanism can create a separating equilibrium between compliant and non-compliant withdrawals. Our work describes the technical underpinnings, incentives and broader implications of this mechanism, highlighting how Privacy Pools-like protocols can create more private yet compliant blockchain transactions.

Stealth addresses represent an approach to enhancing privacy within public and distributed blockchains, such as Ethereum and Bitcoin. Stealth address protocols employ a distinct, randomly generated address for the recipient, thereby concealing interactions between entities. In this study, we introduce BaseSAP, an autonomous base-layer protocol for embedding stealth addresses within the application layer of programmable blockchains. BaseSAP expands upon previous research to develop a modular protocol for executing unlinkable transactions on public blockchains. BaseSAP allows for the development of additional stealth address layers using different cryptographic algorithms on top of the primary implementation, capitalizing on its modularity. To demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed protocol, we present simulations of an advanced Secp256k1-based dual-key stealth address protocol. This protocol is developed on top of BaseSAP and deployed on the Ethereum test network as the first prototype implementation. Furthermore, we provide cost analyses and underscore potential security ramifications and attack vectors that could affect the privacy of stealth addresses. Our study highlights the flexibility of the BaseSAP protocol and provides insights into the broader implications of stealth address technology in the realm of blockchain privacy.

We present position-hiding linkability for vector commitment schemes: one can prove in zero knowledge that one or m values that comprise commitment \cm all belong to the vector of size N committed to in \com. Our construction \textsfCaulk can be used for membership proofs and lookup arguments and outperforms all existing alternatives in prover time by orders of magnitude.