Meryem Essaidi

dblp:208/0007 · DBLP profile ↗
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4ranked-venue papers
3as first author
3since 2021 · last 2024
—ORCID · none

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Theory of computation · 2 · 2 first-author · 2 since 2021Applied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 2 · 2 first-author · 2 since 2021Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1Databases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 1
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2024 To Regulate or Not to Regulate: Using Revenue Maximization Tools to Maximize Consumer Utility
Meryem Essaidi, Kira Goldner, S. Matthew Weinberg
SAGT1
2022 Credible, Strategyproof, Optimal, and Bounded Expected-Round Single-Item Auctions for All Distributions
abstract
We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with a single item for sale to multiple buyers with i.i.d. valuations. Akbarpour and Li (2020) show that the only optimal, credible, strategyproof auction is the ascending price auction with reserves which has unbounded communication complexity. Recent work of Ferreira and Weinberg (2020) circumvents their impossibility result assuming the existence of cryptographically secure commitment schemes, and designs a two-round credible, strategyproof, optimal auction. However, their auction is only credible when buyers' valuations are MHR or $α$-strongly regular: they show their auction might not be credible even when there is a single buyer drawn from a non-MHR distribution. In this work, under the same cryptographic assumptions, we identify a new single-item auction that is credible, strategyproof, revenue optimal, and terminates in constant rounds in expectation for all distributions with finite monopoly price.
Meryem Essaidi, Matheus V. X. Ferreira, S. Matthew Weinberg
ITCS1
2021 On Symmetries in Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design
Meryem Essaidi, S. Matthew Weinberg
WINE1
2017 Predicting Startup Crowdfunding Success through Longitudinal Social Engagement Analysis
abstract
A key ingredient to a startup's success is its ability to raise funding at an early stage. Crowdfunding has emerged as an exciting new mechanism for connecting startups with potentially thousands of investors. Nonetheless, little is known about its effectiveness, nor the strategies that entrepreneurs should adopt in order to maximize their rate of success. In this paper, we perform a longitudinal data collection and analysis of AngelList - a popular crowdfunding social platform for connecting investors and entrepreneurs. Over a 7-10 month period, we track companies that are actively fund-raising on AngelList, and record their level of social engagement on AngelList, Twitter, and Facebook. Through a series of measures on social en- gagement (e.g. number of tweets, posts, new followers), our analysis shows that active engagement on social media is highly correlated to crowdfunding success. In some cases, the engagement level is an order of magnitude higher for successful companies. We further apply a range of machine learning techniques (e.g. decision tree, SVM, KNN, etc) to predict the ability of a company to success- fully raise funding based on its social engagement and other metrics. Since fund-raising is a rare event, we explore various techniques to deal with class imbalance issues. We observe that some metrics (e.g. AngelList followers and Facebook posts) are more signi cant than other metrics in predicting fund-raising success. Furthermore, despite the class imbalance, we are able to predict crowdfunding success with 84% accuracy.
Qizhen Zhang 0001, Tengyuan Ye, Meryem Essaidi, Shivani Agarwal 0001, Vincent Liu 0001, Boon Thau Loo
CIKM3