Abstract Following the finitist’s rejection of the complete totality of the natural numbers, a finitist language allows only propositional connectives and bounded quantifiers in the formula-construction but not unbounded quantifiers. This is opposed to the currently standard framework, a first-order language. We conduct axiomatic studies on the notion of truth in the framework of finitist arithmetic in which at least smash function $\#$ is available. We propose finitist variants of Tarski ramified truth theories up to rank $\omega $ , of Kripke–Feferman truth theory and of Friedman–Sheard truth theory, and show that all of these have the same strength as the finitist arithmetic of one higher level along Grzegorczyk hierarchy. On the other hand, we also show that adding Burgess-style groundedness schema, adjusted to the finitist setting, makes Kripke–Feferman truth theory as strong as primitive recursive arithmetic. Meanwhile, we obtain some basic results on finitist theories of (full and hat) inductive definitions and on the second order axiom of hat inductive definitions for positive operators.

Abstract We investigate which part of Brouwer’s Intuitionistic Mathematics is finitistically justifiable or guaranteed in Hilbert’s Finitism, in the same way as similar investigations on Classical Mathematics (i.e., which part is equiconsistent with $\textbf {PRA}$ or consistent provably in $\textbf {PRA}$ ) already done quite extensively in proof theory and reverse mathematics. While we already knew a contrast from the classical situation concerning the continuity principle, more contrasts turn out: we show that several principles are finitistically justifiable or guaranteed which are classically not. Among them are:(i)fan theorem for decidable fans but arbitrary bars;(ii)continuity principle and the axiom of choice both for arbitrary formulae; and(iii) $\Sigma _2$ induction and dependent choice. We also show that Markov’s principle MP does not change this situation; that neither does lesser limited principle of omniscience LLPO (except the choice along functions); but that limited principle of omniscience LPO makes the situation completely classical.

Abstract We determine the proof-theoretic ordinals (i) of ${\cal C} - {\bf{TI}}[\alpha ]$ , the transfinite induction along α, for any hyperarithmetical level ${\cal C}$ , in the first order setting and (ii) of any combination of iterated arithmetical comprehension and ${\cal C} - {\bf{TI}}[\alpha ]$ for ${\cal C}\, \equiv \,{\rm{\Pi }}_k^i ,{\rm{\Sigma }}_k^i$ ( $i\, = \,0,1$ ) in the second order setting.

Abstract BON+ is an applicative theory and closely related to the first order parts of the standard systems of explicit mathematics. As such it is also a natural framework for abstract computations. In this article we analyze this aspect of BON+ more closely. First a point is made for introducing a new operation τN, called truncation, to obtain a natural formalization of partial recursive functions in our applicative framework. Then we introduce the operational versions of a series of notions that are all equivalent to semi-decidability in ordinary recursion theory on the natural numbers, and study their mutual relationships over BON+ with τN.

Abstract This article reports that some robustness of the notions of predicativity and of autonomous progression is broken down if as the given infinite total entity we choose some mathematical entities other than the traditionalω. Namely, the equivalence between normal transfinite recursion scheme and newdependent transfinite recursionscheme, which does hold in the context of subsystems of second order number theory, does not hold in the context of subsystems of second order set theory where the universeVof sets is treated as the given totality (nor in the contexts of those ofn+3-th order number or set theories, where the class of alln+2-th order objects is treated as the given totality).