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Pengjun Lu

dblp:210/2393 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2026
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 2 · 1 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 2 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Artificial intelligence
2 papers
Question answering and dialogue systems · 70% Reinforcement learning · 30%
Theoretical computer science
1 paper
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100%
Databases, data mining, and information retrieval
1 paper
Knowledge graphs · 100%
Interdisciplinary, comprehensive, and emerging computing
1 paper
Computational finance and economics · 100%

Topics — the 6 heaviest of 7, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Natural language and speech › Question answering and dialogue systems
knowledge base question answering
1.012026
Assessing LLMs for Serendipity Discovery in Knowledge Graphs: A Case for Drug Repurposing · AAAI 2026
Knowledge graphs
knowledge graph reasoning
1.012026
Assessing LLMs for Serendipity Discovery in Knowledge Graphs: A Case for Drug Repurposing · AAAI 2026
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design
auction design
0.412020
Reinforcement Mechanism Design: With Applications to Dynamic Pricing in Sponsored Search Auctions · AAAI 2020
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
dynamic pricing
0.412020
Reinforcement Mechanism Design: With Applications to Dynamic Pricing in Sponsored Search Auctions · AAAI 2020
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design › auction design
sponsored search auction
0.412020
Reinforcement Mechanism Design: With Applications to Dynamic Pricing in Sponsored Search Auctions · AAAI 2020
Computational finance and economics › mechanism design
revenue maximization
0.112020
Reinforcement Mechanism Design: With Applications to Dynamic Pricing in Sponsored Search Auctions · AAAI 2020

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

large language model · 2.0reinforcement learning · 1.3buyer behavior modeling · 1.3MDP formulation · 1.3
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 Assessing LLMs for Serendipity Discovery in Knowledge Graphs: A Case for Drug Repurposing
abstract
Large Language Models (LLMs) have greatly advanced knowledge graph question answering (KGQA), yet existing systems are typically optimized for returning highly relevant but predictable answers. A missing yet desired capacity is to exploit LLMs to suggest surprise and novel ("serendipitious") answers. In this paper, we formally define the serendipity-aware KGQA task and propose the SerenQA framework to evaluate LLMs' ability to uncover unexpected insights in scientific KGQA tasks. SerenQA includes a rigorous serendipity metric based on relevance, novelty, and surprise, along with an expert-annotated benchmark derived from the Clinical Knowledge Graph for drug repurposing. Additionally, it features a structured evaluation pipeline encompassing three subtasks: knowledge retrieval, subgraph reasoning, and serendipity exploration. Our experiments reveal that while state-of-the-art LLMs perform well on retrieval, they still struggle to identify genuinely surprising and valuable discoveries, underscoring a significant room for future research.
Mengying Wang 0001, Chenhui Ma, Ao Jiao, Tuo Liang, Pengjun Lu, Shrinidhi Hegde, Yu Yin 0001, Evren Gurkan-Cavusoglu, Yinghui Wu 0001
AAAI5
2020 Reinforcement Mechanism Design: With Applications to Dynamic Pricing in Sponsored Search Auctions
abstract
In many social systems in which individuals and organizations interact with each other, there can be no easy laws to govern the rules of the environment, and agents' payoffs are often influenced by other agents' actions. We examine such a social system in the setting of sponsored search auctions and tackle the search engine's dynamic pricing problem by combining the tools from both mechanism design and the AI domain. In this setting, the environment not only changes over time, but also behaves strategically. Over repeated interactions with bidders, the search engine can dynamically change the reserve prices and determine the optimal strategy that maximizes the profit. We first train a buyer behavior model, with a real bidding data set from a major search engine, that predicts bids given information disclosed by the search engine and the bidders' performance data from previous rounds. We then formulate the dynamic pricing problem as an MDP and apply a reinforcement-based algorithm that optimizes reserve prices over time. Experiments demonstrate that our model outperforms static optimization strategies including the ones that are currently in use as well as several other dynamic ones.
Weiran Shen, Binghui Peng, Hanpeng Liu, Ruohan Qian, Zhi Guo, Zongyao Ding, Pengjun Lu, Pingzhong Tang
AAAI9