Demo Data from VLDB 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Adèle Morisset
dblp:210/6902
· DBLP profile ↗
2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2020
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Systems, architecture and hardware · 1Security and privacy · 1
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Hardware security and side channels · 61% Systems and software security · 30% Web and mobile security · 9% |
Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Hardware security and side channels › fault attacks
fault injection attack |
0.4 | 1 | 2020 | Laser-Induced Fault Injection on Smartphone Bypassing the Secure Boot-Extended Version · IEEE Trans. Computers 2020 |
Hardware security and side channels › fault attacks › fault injection attack
laser fault injection |
0.4 | 1 | 2020 | Laser-Induced Fault Injection on Smartphone Bypassing the Secure Boot-Extended Version · IEEE Trans. Computers 2020 |
Systems and software security › trusted computing
secure boot |
0.4 | 1 | 2020 | Laser-Induced Fault Injection on Smartphone Bypassing the Secure Boot-Extended Version · IEEE Trans. Computers 2020 |
Web and mobile security
mobile security |
0.1 | 1 | 2020 | Laser-Induced Fault Injection on Smartphone Bypassing the Secure Boot-Extended Version · IEEE Trans. Computers 2020 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
laser fault injection · 0.4die sensitivity characterization · 0.4
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 | Laser-Induced Fault Injection on Smartphone Bypassing the Secure Boot-Extended VersionabstractThis paper describes the outcome of a laser attack study on an Android smartphone targeting specifically the secure boot sequence. Laser fault injection has become a classical attack path in the secure chip industry to investigate potential security mitigation. The implementation of such attacks on a recent mobile phone remains relatively unexplored and represents different challenges, both at hardware and software levels. In this paper, we show how the device is crafted to get a direct access to the silicon and explain the corresponding experimental setup. By inserting our own software into the boot sequence, it was possible to achieve a fine characterization of the die sensitivity to laser emissions. With the knowledge of potential perturbations, several attack scenarios were built, allowing to malevolently get the highest level of privilege within the mobile phone. Aurélien Vasselle, Hugues Thiebeauld, Quentin Maouhoub, Adèle Morisset, Sébastien Ermeneux |
IEEE Trans. Computers | 4 |
| 2017 | Laser-Induced Fault Injection on Smartphone Bypassing the Secure BootabstractThis paper describes the outcome of a laser attack study on an Android smartphone targeting specifically the secure boot sequence. Laser fault injection has become a classical attack path in the secure chip industry to investigate potential security mitigation. The implementation of such attacks on a recent mobile phone remains relatively unexplored and represents different challenges, both at hardware and software levels. In this paper, we show how the device is crafted to get a direct access to the silicon and explain the corresponding experimental setup. By inserting our own software into the boot sequence, it was possible to achieve a fine characterization of the die sensitivity to light. With the knowledge of potential perturbations, it was possible to build an attack scenario allowing to malevolently get the highest level of privilege within the mobile phone. Aurélien Vasselle, Hugues Thiebeauld, Quentin Maouhoub, Adèle Morisset, Sébastien Ermeneux |
FDTC | 4 |