In the field of algorithmic fairness, many fairness criteria have been proposed. Oftentimes, their proposal is only accompanied by a loose link to ideas from moral philosophy -- which makes it difficult to understand when the proposed criteria should be used to evaluate the fairness of a decision-making system. More recently, researchers have thus retroactively tried to tie existing fairness criteria to philosophical concepts. Group fairness criteria have typically been linked to egalitarianism, a theory of distributive justice. This makes it tempting to believe that fairness criteria mathematically represent ideals of distributive justice and this is indeed how they are typically portrayed. In this paper, we will discuss why the current approach of linking algorithmic fairness and distributive justice is too simplistic and, hence, insufficient. We argue that in the context of imperfect decision-making systems -- which is what we deal with in algorithmic fairness -- we should not only care about what the ideal distribution of benefits/harms among individuals would look like but also about how deviations from said ideal are distributed. Our claim is that algorithmic fairness is concerned with unfairness in these deviations. This requires us to rethink the way in which we, as algorithmic fairness researchers, view distributive justice and use fairness criteria.

This is a one-page summary of the paper "A Philosophical Theory of Fairness for Prediction-based Decisions." The full paper is available on SSRN at the following link: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3450300

We argue that the phenomena of distributed responsibility, induced acceptance, and acceptance through ignorance constitute instances of imperfect delegation when tasks are delegated to computationally-driven systems. Imperfect delegation challenges human accountability. We hold that both direct public accountability via public transparency and indirect public accountability via transparency to auditors in public organizations can be both instrumentally ethically valuable and required as a matter of deontology from the principle of democratic self-government. We analyze the regulatory content of 16 guideline documents about the use of AI in the public sector, by mapping their requirements to those of our philosophical account of accountability, and conclude that while some guidelines refer processes that amount to auditing, it seems that the debate would benefit from more clarity about the nature of the entitlement of auditors and the goals of auditing, also in order to develop ethically meaningful standards with respect to which different forms of auditing can be evaluated and compared.