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Mehmet S. Ismail

dblp:216/2838 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
1as first author
1since 2021 · last 2021
0000-0002-3232-0776ORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 first-authorGraphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 since 2021Human-computer interaction and ubiquitous computing · 1 · 1 since 2021Theory of computation · 1 · 1 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Theoretical computer science
1 paper
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100%

Topics — the 6 heaviest of 6, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
cooperative game theory
0.412020
One for All, All for One - Von Neumann, Wald, Rawls, and Pareto · EC 2020
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › cooperative game theory › solution concepts
core
0.412020
One for All, All for One - Von Neumann, Wald, Rawls, and Pareto · EC 2020
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › solution concepts in games
equilibrium concepts
0.412020
One for All, All for One - Von Neumann, Wald, Rawls, and Pareto · EC 2020
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › solution concepts in games › equilibrium concepts
nash equilibrium
0.412020
One for All, All for One - Von Neumann, Wald, Rawls, and Pareto · EC 2020
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › matching
matching theory
0.112020
One for All, All for One - Von Neumann, Wald, Rawls, and Pareto · EC 2020
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › matching
stable matching
0.112020
One for All, All for One - Von Neumann, Wald, Rawls, and Pareto · EC 2020

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

pareto optimization · 0.4game theory · 0.4
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2021 Fairer Chess: A Reversal of Two Opening Moves in Chess Creates Balance Between White and Black
abstract
Unlike tic-tac-toe or checkers, in which optimal play leads to a draw, it is not known whether optimal play in chess ends in a win for White, a win for Black, or a draw. But after White moves first in chess, if Black has a double move followed by a double move of White and then alternating play, play is more balanced because White does not always tie or lead in moves. Symbolically, Balanced Alternation gives the following move sequence: After White's (W) initial move, first Black (B) and then White each have two moves in a row (BBWW), followed by the alternating sequence, beginning with W, which altogether can be written as WB/BW/WB/WB/WB… (the slashes separate alternating pairs of moves). Except for reversal of the 3rdand 4th moves from WB to BW (underscored), this is the standard chess sequence. Because Balanced Alternation lies between the standard sequence, which favors White, and a comparable sequence that favors Black, it is highly likely to produce a draw with optimal play, rendering chess fairer. This conclusion is supported by a computer analysis of chess openings and how they would play out under Balanced Alternation.
Steven J. Brams, Mehmet S. Ismail
CoG2
2020 One for All, All for One - Von Neumann, Wald, Rawls, and Pareto
abstract
Applications of the maximin criterion extend beyond economics to computer science, politics, and statistics. However, the maximin criterion---be it von Neumann's, Wald's, or Rawls'---draws fierce criticism due to its extremely pessimistic stance. I propose a novel concept, dubbed the optimin criterion, which is based on (Pareto) optimizing the minimal payoffs of tacit agreements. The optimin criterion generalizes and unifies results in various fields: It not only coincides with (i) maximin strategies in zero-sum games, (ii) the core in cooperative games when the core is nonempty, though it exists even if the core is empty, but it also generalizes (iii) Nash equilibrium in n-person constant-sum games, (iv) stable matchings in matching models, and (v) competitive equilibrium.
Mehmet S. Ismail
EC1