It was recently observed that Elo ratings fail at preserving transitive relations among strategies and therefore cannot correctly extract the transitive component of a game. We provide a characterization of transitive games as a weak variant of ordinal potential games and show that Elo ratings actually do preserve transitivity when computed in the right space, using suitable invertible mappings. Leveraging this insight, we introduce a new game decomposition of an arbitrary game into transitive and cyclic components that is learnt using a neural network-based architecture and that prioritises capturing the sign pattern of the game, namely transitive and cyclic relations among strategies. We link our approach to the known concept of sign-rank, and evaluate our methodology using both toy examples and empirical data from real-world games.

Many machine learning problems can be abstracted in solving game theory formulations and boil down to optimizing nested objectives, such as generative adversarial networks (GANs) and multi-agent reinforcement learning. Solving these games requires finding their stable fixed points or Nash equilibrium. However, existing algorithms for solving games suffer from empirical instability, hence demanding heavy ad-hoc tuning in practice. To tackle these challenges, we resort to the emerging scheme of Learning to Optimize (L2O), which discovers problem-specific efficient optimization algorithms through data-driven training. Our customized L2O framework for differentiable game theory problems, dubbed “Learning to Play Games" (L2PG), seeks a stable fixed point solution, by predicting the fast update direction from the past trajectory, with a novel gradient stability-aware, sign-based loss function. We further incorporate curriculum learning and self-learning to strengthen the empirical training stability and generalization of L2PG. On test problems including quadratic games and GANs, L2PG can substantially accelerate the convergence, and demonstrates a remarkably more stable trajectory. Codes are available at https://github.com/VITA-Group/L2PG.

Cheung and Piliouras (2020) recently showed that two variants of the Multiplicative Weights Update method - OMWU and MWU - display opposite convergence properties depending on whether the game is zero-sum or cooperative. Inspired by this work and the recent literature on learning to optimize for single functions, we introduce a new framework for learning last-iterate convergence to Nash Equilibria in games, where the update rule’s coefficients (learning rates) along a trajectory are learnt by a reinforcement learning policy that is conditioned on the nature of the game: the game signature. We construct the latter using a new decomposition of two-player games into eight components corresponding to commutative projection operators, generalizing and unifying recent game concepts studied in the literature. We compare the performance of various update rules when their coefficients are learnt, and show that the RL policy is able to exploit the game signature across a wide range of game types. In doing so, we introduce CMWU, a new algorithm that extends consensus optimization to the constrained case, has local convergence guarantees for zero-sum bimatrix games, and show that it enjoys competitive performance on both zero-sum games with constant coefficients and across a spectrum of games when its coefficients are learnt.

Policy gradient methods can solve complex tasks but often fail when the dimensionality of the action-space or objective multiplicity grow very large. This occurs, in part, because the variance on score-based gradient estimators scales quadratically. In this paper, we address this problem through a factor baseline which exploits independence structure encoded in a novel action-target influence network. Factored policy gradients (FPGs), which follow, provide a common framework for analysing key state-of-the-art algorithms, are shown to generalise traditional policy gradients, and yield a principled way of incorporating prior knowledge of a problem domain's generative processes. We provide an analysis of the proposed estimator and identify the conditions under which variance is reduced. The algorithmic aspects of FPGs are discussed, including optimal policy factorisation, as characterised by minimum biclique coverings, and the implications for the bias variance trade-off of incorrectly specifying the network. Finally, we demonstrate the performance advantages of our algorithm on large-scale bandit and traffic intersection problems, providing a novel contribution to the latter in the form of a spatial approximation.

Training multi-agent systems (MAS) to achieve realistic equilibria gives us a useful tool to understand and model real-world systems. We consider a general sum partially observable Markov game where agents of different types share a single policy network, conditioned on agent-specific information. This paper aims at i) formally understanding equilibria reached by such agents, and ii) matching emergent phenomena of such equilibria to real-world targets. Parameter sharing with decentralized execution has been introduced as an efficient way to train multiple agents using a single policy network. However, the nature of resulting equilibria reached by such agents has not been yet studied: we introduce the novel concept of Shared equilibrium as a symmetric pure Nash equilibrium of a certain Functional Form Game (FFG) and prove convergence to the latter for a certain class of games using self-play. In addition, it is important that such equilibria satisfy certain constraints so that MAS are calibrated to real world data for practical use: we solve this problem by introducing a novel dual-Reinforcement Learning based approach that fits emergent behaviors of agents in a Shared equilibrium to externally-specified targets, and apply our methods to a n-player market example. We do so by calibrating parameters governing distributions of agent types rather than individual agents, which allows both behavior differentiation among agents and coherent scaling of the shared policy network to multiple agents.