• Introducing ShaTS, an xAI method tailored to time series ML/DL models. • Proposes a priori feature grouping to preserve temporal dependencies in data. • ShaTS enables actionable insights by identifying sensors and processes under attack. • ShaTS achieves real-time explainability in a realistic IIoT scenario. • ShaTS outperforms SHAP in IIoT settings in terms of accuracy and resource usage. Industrial Internet of Things environments increasingly rely on advanced Anomaly Detection and explanation techniques to rapidly detect and mitigate cyberincidents, thereby ensuring operational safety. The sequential nature of data collected from these environments has enabled improvements in Anomaly Detection using Machine Learning and Deep Learning models by processing time windows rather than treating the data as tabular. However, conventional explanation methods often neglect this temporal structure, leading to imprecise or less actionable explanations. This work presents ShaTS (Shapley values for Time Series models), which is a model-agnostic explainable Artificial Intelligence method designed to enhance the precision of Shapley value explanations for time series models. ShaTS addresses the shortcomings of traditional approaches by incorporating an a priori feature grouping strategy that preserves temporal dependencies and produces both coherent and actionable insights. Experiments conducted on the SWaT dataset demonstrate that ShaTS accurately identifies critical time instants, precisely pinpoints the sensors, actuators, and processes affected by anomalies, and outperforms SHAP in terms of both explainability and resource efficiency, fulfilling the real-time requirements of industrial environments.

Abstract When detecting cyberattacks in Industrial settings, it is not sufficient to determine whether the system is suffering a cyberattack. It is also fundamental to explain why the system is under a cyberattack and which are the assets affected. In this context, the Anomaly Detection based on Machine Learning (ML) and Deep Learning (DL) techniques showed great performance when detecting cyberattacks in industrial scenarios. However, two main limitations hinder using them in a real environment. Firstly, most solutions are trained using a supervised approach, which is impractical in the real industrial world. Secondly, the use of black‐box ML and DL techniques makes it impossible to interpret the decision made by the model. This article proposes an interpretable and semi‐supervised system to detect cyberattacks in Industrial settings. Besides, our proposal was validated using data collected from the Tennessee Eastman Process. To the best of our knowledge, this system is the only one that offers interpretability together with a semi‐supervised approach in an industrial setting. Our system discriminates between causes and effects of anomalies and also achieved the best performance for 11 types of anomalies out of 20 with an overall recall of 0.9577, a precision of 0.9977, and a F1‐score of 0.9711.

In the realm of industrial anomaly detection, machine and deep learning models face a critical vulnerability to adversarial attacks. In this context, existing attack methodologies primarily target continuous features, often in the context of images, making them unsuitable for the categorical or discrete features prevalent in industrial systems. To fortify the cybersecurity of industrial environments, this paper introduces a groundbreaking adversarial attack approach tailored to the unique demands of these settings. Our novel technique enables the creation of targeted adversarial samples that are valid within the framework of supervised cyberattack detection models in industrial scenarios, preserving the consistency of discrete values and correcting cases where an adversarial sample transitions into a normal one. Our approach leverages the SHAP interpretability method to identify the most salient features for each sample. Subsequently, the Projected Gradient Descent technique is employed to perturb continuous features, ensuring adversarial sample generation. To handle categorical features for a specific adversarial sample, our method scrutinizes the closest sample within the normal training dataset and replicates its categorical feature values. Additionally, Decision Trees trained within a Random Forest are utilized to ensure that the resulting adversarial samples maintain the essential abnormal behavior required for detection. The validation of our proposal was conducted using the WADI dataset obtained from a water distribution plant, providing a realistic industrial context. During validation, we assessed the mean error and the total number of adversarial samples generated by our approach, comparing it with the original Projected Gradient Descent method and the Carlini & Wagner attack across various parameter configurations. Remarkably, our proposal consistently achieved the best trade-off between mean error and the number of generated adversarial samples, showcasing its superiority in safeguarding industrial systems.

Summary Industrial control systems (ICS) are considered cyber‐physical systems that join both cyber and physical worlds. Due to their tight interaction, where humans and robots co‐work and co‐inhabit in the same workspaces and production lines, cyber‐attacks targeting ICS can alter production processes and even bypass safety procedures. As an example, these cyber‐attacks could interrupt physical industrial processes and cause potential injuries to workers. In this article, we present SafeMan, a unified management framework based on the Edge Computing paradigm that provides high‐performance applications for the detection and mitigation of both cyber‐attacks and safety threats in industrial scenarios. Three use cases show specific threats in manufacturing as well as the SafeMan actions carried out to detect and mitigate them. In order to validate our proposal, a pool of experiments was performed with Electra, an industrial dataset with normal network traffic and different cyber‐attacks by using a given number of Modbus TCP and S7Comm devices. The experiments measured the runtime performance of anomaly detection techniques based on machine learning and deep learning to detect cyber‐attacks in control networks. The experimental results show that Neural Networks report the best performance, being able to examine 217 feature vectors per second over Electra, and therefore demonstrating that it can be used as detection model for SafeMan in real scenarios.

We propose a simple method for computing a metric rectification of a plane from multiple views taken by Ki = diag ( fi, fi,1) cameras. The orthogonality properties of this camera model are exploited from an early stage to achieve a straightforward optimization process with only two degrees of freedom, even if the fi in all views are unknown. We study the optimization landscapes for several typical camera motions and varying amounts of image noise. We conclude that the problem is extremely ill conditioned and can only be realistically solved for rich camera motions and small amounts of image noise, preferably with at least one fi known in the sequence. 1

This paper describes the software architecture of a mobile robot which is able to build in real time a structural interpretation of indoor environments using only visual and proprioceptive sensory information. Navigation is guided by this interpretation, improving on classical reactive approaches. We follow a predictive design criterion: the system must anticipate the consequences of its actions, showing predictive understanding of the scene. Specific solutions are given to all perception stages, from low level segment extraction to 3D scene reconstruction based on the current interpretation, including autocalibration of the camera-robot system. This paper focuses in the architecture that integrates all these elements into a high level perception system. A key point is the process of generation, tracking and confirmation of hypothesis which are maintained in a stable internal representation tuned with the agent movements. There is constant interaction between the bottomup perceptive processes, guided by sensory stimuli, and the top-down ones, guided by the previously constructed models.