Alessandro De Piccoli

dblp:216/6725 · DBLP profile ↗
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3ranked-venue papers
0as first author
3since 2021 · last 2025
0000-0002-6399-3164ORCID · corroborated

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Security and privacy · 3 · 3 since 2021
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 Impossible Differentials Automation: Model Generation and New Techniques
Emanuele Bellini 0002, Alessandro De Piccoli, David Gérault, Paul Huynh, Simone Pelizzola, Andrea Visconti
SAC2
2023 Differential Cryptanalysis with SAT, SMT, MILP, and CP: A Detailed Comparison for Bit-Oriented Primitives
Emanuele Bellini 0002, Alessandro De Piccoli, Mattia Formenti, David Gérault, Paul Huynh, Simone Pelizzola, Sergio Polese, Andrea Visconti
CANS2
2022 Public Key Compression and Fast Polynomial Multiplication for NTRU using the Corrected Hybridized NTT-Karatsuba Method
abstract
NTRU is a lattice-based public-key cryptosystem that has been selected as one of the Round III finalists at the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization. Compressing the key sizes to increase efficiency has been a long-standing open question for lattice-based cryptosystems. In this paper we provide a solution to three seemingly opposite demands for NTRU cryptosystem: compress the key size, increase the security level, optimize performance by implementing fast polynomial multiplications. We consider a specific variant of NTRU known as NTRU-NTT. To perform polynomial optimization, we make use of the Number-Theoretic Transformation (NTT) and hybridize it with the Karatsuba Algorithm. Previous work done in providing 2-part Hybridized NTT-Karatsuba Algorithm contained some operational errors in the product expression, which have been detected in this paper. Further, we conjectured the corrected expression and gave a detailed mathematical proof of correctness. In this paper, for the first time, we optimize NTRU-NTT using the corrected Hybridized NTT-Karatsuba Algorithm. The significance of compressing the value of the prime modulus q lies with decreasing the key sizes. We achieve a 128-bit post-quantum security level for a modulus value of 83,969 which is smaller than the previously known modulus value of 1,061,093,377, while keeping n constant at 2048.
Rohon Kundu, Alessandro De Piccoli, Andrea Visconti
ICISSP2