VLDB 2026 Research / reviewers in the wild / expert
Gerui Wang
dblp:217/4872
· DBLP profile ↗
4ranked-venue papers
0as first author
4since 2021 · last 2026
0000-0003-3378-8861ORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 3 · 3 since 2021Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 since 2021Databases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 1 · 1 since 2021
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | A Heterogeneous Sharding Architecture for Privacy-Preserving Consortium Blockchains
Zhuocheng Pan, Andi Liu, Haojun Tan, Gerui Wang, Mingchao Wan, Yizhong Liu |
KSEM (4) | 7 |
| 2023 | Player-Replaceability and Forensic Support Are Two Sides of the Same (Crypto) Coin
Peiyao Sheng, Gerui Wang, Kartik Nayak, Sreeram Kannan, Pramod Viswanath |
FC (1) | 2 |
| 2022 | Minotaur: Multi-Resource Blockchain ConsensusabstractResource-based consensus is the backbone of permissionless distributed ledger systems. The security of such protocols relies fundamentally on the level of resources actively engaged in the system. The variety of different resources (and related proof protocols, some times referred to as PoX in the literature) raises the fundamental question whether it is possible to utilize many of them in tandem and build multi-resource consensus protocols. The challenge in combining different resources is to achieve fungibility between them, in the sense that security would hold as long as the cumulative adversarial power across all resources is bounded. Matthias Fitzi, Xuechao Wang, Sreeram Kannan, Aggelos Kiayias, Nikos Leonardos, Pramod Viswanath, Gerui Wang |
CCS | 7 |
| 2021 | BFT Protocol ForensicsabstractByzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) protocols allow a group of replicas to come to consensus even when some of the replicas are Byzantine faulty. There exist multiple BFT protocols to securely tolerate an optimal number of faults t under different network settings. However, if the number of faults f exceeds t then security could be violated. In this paper we mathematically formalize the study of forensic support of BFT protocols: we aim to identify (with cryptographic integrity) as many of the malicious replicas as possible and in as distributed manner as possible. Our main result is that forensic support of BFT protocols depends heavily on minor implementation details that do not affect the protocol's security or complexity. Focusing on popular BFT protocols (PBFT, HotStuff, Algorand) we exactly characterize their forensic support, showing that there exist minor variants of each protocol for which the forensic supports vary widely. We show strong forensic support capability of LibraBFT, the consensus protocol of Diem cryptocurrency; our lightweight forensic module implemented on a Diem client is open-sourced and is under active consideration for deployment in Diem. Finally, we show that all secure BFT protocols designed for 2t+1 replicas communicating over a synchronous network forensic support is inherently nonexistent; this impossibility result holds for all BFT protocols and even if one has access to the states of all replicas (including Byzantine ones). Peiyao Sheng, Gerui Wang, Kartik Nayak, Sreeram Kannan, Pramod Viswanath |
CCS | 2 |