Rosanna Bellini

dblp:217/9409 · also Rosanna Frances Bellini · DBLP profile ↗
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18ranked-venue papers
10as first author
12since 2021 · last 2026
0000-0002-2223-2801ORCID · verified

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Human-computer interaction and ubiquitous computing · 13 · 8 first-author · 8 since 2021Security and privacy · 5 · 2 first-author · 4 since 2021
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 Caught in a Mafia Romance: How Users Explore Intimate Narratives with Chatbots
abstract
AI chatbots, built using large language models, are increasingly integrated into society and mimic the patterns of human text exchanges. While previous research has raised concerns that humans may form romantic attachment to chatbots, the range of AI-mediated interactions that people wish to create for themselves or others with chatbots remains poorly understood, particularly given the fast evolving landscape of chatbots. We provide an empirical study of Character.AI (cAI), a popular chatbot platform that enables users to design and share character-based bots, and synthesize this with an analysis of Reddit posts from cAI users. Contrary to popular narratives, we identify that users want to: (1) engage in intimate role-play with young adult, masculine-presenting characters that place users in a position of inferior power in well-defined scenarios and (2) immerse themselves in boundless, fantasy settings. We further find that users problematize both the excessive and insufficient sexualized content in such interactions which warrants novel digital-safety features.
Julia B. Kieserman, Cat Mai, Sara Lignell, Lucy Qin, Athanasios Andreou, Damon McCoy, Rosanna Bellini
CHI7
2025 In the Balance: Insights from Collaborative Financial Technologies
Yeuk-Yu Lee, Rosanna Bellini
CHI2
2025 A Framework for Abusability Analysis: The Case of Passkeys in Interpersonal Threat Models
Alaa Daffalla, Arkaprabha Bhattacharya, Jacob Wilder, Rahul Chatterjee 0001, Nicola Dell, Rosanna Bellini, Thomas Ristenpart
USENIX Security Symposium6
2024 Shortchanged: Uncovering and Analyzing Intimate Partner Financial Abuse in Consumer Complaints
abstract
Digital financial services can introduce new digital-safety risks for users, particularly survivors of intimate partner financial abuse (IPFA). To offer improved support for such users, a comprehensive understanding of their support needs and the barriers they face to redress by financial institutions is essential. Drawing from a dataset of 2.7 million customer complaints, we implement a bespoke workflow that utilizes language-modeling techniques and expert human review to identify complaints describing IPFA. Our mixed-method analysis provides insight into the most common digital financial products involved in these attacks, and the barriers consumers report encountering when doing so. Our contributions are twofold; we offer the first human-labeled dataset for this overlooked harm and provide practical implications for technical practice, research, and design for better supporting and protecting survivors of IPFA.
Arkaprabha Bhattacharya, Kevin Lee 0001, Vineeth Ravi, Jessica Staddon, Rosanna Bellini
CHI5
2024 SoK: Safer Digital-Safety Research Involving At-Risk Users
abstract
Research involving at-risk users—that is, users who are more likely to experience a digital attack or to be disproportionately affected when harm from such an attack occurs—can pose significant safety challenges to both users and researchers. Nevertheless, pursuing research in computer security & privacy (S&P) is crucial to understanding how to meet the digital-safety needs of at-risk users and to design safer technology for all. To standardize and bolster safer research involving such users, we offer an analysis of 196 academic works to elicit 14 research risks and 36 safety practices used by a growing community of researchers. We pair this inconsistent set of reported safety practices with oral histories from 12 domain experts to contribute scaffolded and consolidated pragmatic guidance that researchers can use to plan, execute, and share safer digital-safety research involving at-risk users. We conclude by suggesting areas for future research regarding the reporting, study, and funding of at-risk user research.
Rosanna Bellini, Emily Tseng, Noel Warford, Alaa Daffalla, Tara Matthews, Sunny Consolvo, Jill Palzkill Woelfer, Patrick Gage Kelley, Michelle L. Mazurek, Dana Cuomo, Nicola Dell, Thomas Ristenpart
SP1
2024 Abusive Partner Perspectives on Technology Abuse: Implications for Community-based Violence Prevention
abstract
Inaccurate assumptions about people who abuse technology can inhibit effective socio-technical interventions for at-risk populations, including IPV survivors. Our study aims to rectify this concerning oversight through a synthesis of seven research projects on how 152 abusive partners (APs) discuss and understand their malicious use of technology in face-to-face interactions. AP accounts about technology abuse are rich sources of insight into technology abuse, but demonstrate a heterogeneity of awareness of, choice to use, and ability to desist from participating in technology abuse. To ensure immediate practical benefits for practitioner communities, we also engaged 20 facilitators of abusive partner intervention programs (APIPs) in focused group discussions to identify potential solutions for addressing technology abuse in their programming. Findings reveal that facilitators grapple with a complex set of challenges, stemming from the concern about teaching APs new abusive techniques in-session, and lacking professional tools to investigate, evaluate, and resolve technology abuse attacks. Our work provides valuable insights into addressing technology abuse in the APIP ecosystem, offering targeted lessons for the CSCW community and stakeholders in violence prevention.
Rosanna Bellini
Proc. ACM Hum. Comput. Interact.1
2024 Data Stewardship in Clinical Computer Security: Balancing Benefit and Burden in Participatory Systems
abstract
The mass collection and reuse of social data requires a reimagining of privacy and consent, with particular attention to the (in)equitable distribution of benefits and burdens between researchers and subjects. Instrumenting frontline clinical services to collect and steward data might mitigate the exploitation inherent to data collection---with attention to how subjects can meaningfully participate in stewardship. We explore participatory data stewardship in the context of clinical computer security for survivors of intimate partner violence (IPV). Via semi-structured interviews with IPV support workers, we explore how data are produced within the IPV care ecosystem at the Clinic to End Tech Abuse (CETA). We then conduct design provocations with clients of IPV services and their support workers, exploring possibilities for participatory data mechanisms like open records and dynamic consent. We find participation in data stewardship may benefit clients through improved agency, self-reflection, and control of self-narrative, and that incurred burdens may be alleviated by enlisting trusted stewards. We close with future work for CSCW interrogating how knowledge of digital-safety harms can and should be produced from clinical encounters, towards more equitable ways of knowing.
Emily Tseng, Rosanna Bellini, Yeuk-Yu Lee, Lana Ramjit, Thomas Ristenpart, Nicola Dell
Proc. ACM Hum. Comput. Interact.2
2023 Paying the Price: When Intimate Partners Use Technology for Financial Harm
abstract
Financial abuse — the control of a survivor’s access to and use of financial resources — is highly prevalent in intimate partner violence (IPV) cases. Based on the reports of 158 survivors of IPV and 16 financial advocates, we present a comprehensive investigation into how abusers exploit technologies to harm survivors financially through various technical attacks and deceptive strategies. In doing so, we identify four motivations for abusers who use these harmful attacks and how these acts exploit, monitor, restrict, and sabotage a survivor’s financial well-being and independence. As each dimension of these financial harms warrants a tailored approach, we highlight potential directions for practice and research to protect survivors from technology-enabled financial harms. Broadly, we call for the financial technology sector to consider designing for intimate threats through adversarial thinking, recommend strategies for detecting financially abusive activity and provide guidance for how customer service agents may be financially abuse aware.
Rosanna Bellini
CHI1
2023 The Digital-Safety Risks of Financial Technologies for Survivors of Intimate Partner Violence
Rosanna Bellini, Kevin Lee 0001, Megan A. Brown, Jeremy Shaffer, Rasika Bhalerao, Thomas Ristenpart
USENIX Security Symposium1
2023 Account Security Interfaces: Important, Unintuitive, and Untrustworthy
Alaa Daffalla, Marina Sanusi Bohuk, Nicola Dell, Rosanna Bellini, Thomas Ristenpart
USENIX Security Symposium4
2022 Care Infrastructures for Digital Security in Intimate Partner Violence
abstract
Survivors of intimate partner violence (IPV) face complex threats to their digital privacy and security. Prior work has established protocols for directly helping them mitigate these harms; however, there remains a need for flexible and pluralistic systems that can support survivors’ long-term needs. This paper describes the design and development of sociotechnical infrastructure that incorporates feminist notions of care to connect IPV survivors experiencing technology abuse with volunteer computer security consultants. We present findings from a mixed methods study that draws on data from an 8-month, real-world deployment, as well as interviews with 7 volunteer technology consultants and 18 IPV professionals. Our findings illuminate emergent challenges in safely and adaptively providing computer security advice as care. We discuss implications of these findings for feminist approaches to computer security and privacy, and provide broader lessons for interventions that aim to directly assist at-risk and marginalized people experiencing digital insecurity.
Emily Tseng, Mehrnaz Sabet, Rosanna Bellini, Harkiran Kaur Sodhi, Thomas Ristenpart, Nicola Dell
CHI3
2021 Fragments of the Past: Curating Peer Support with Perpetrators of Domestic Violence
abstract
There is growing evidence that digital peer-support networks can have a positive influence on behaviour change and wellbeing outcomes for people who harm themselves and others. However, making and sustaining such networks are subject to ethical and pragmatic challenges, particularly for perpetrators of domestic violence whom pose unique risks when brought together. In this work we report on a ten-month study where we worked with six support workers and eighteen perpetrators in the design and deployment of Fragments of the Past; a socio-material system that connects audio messages with tangible artefacts. We share how crafting digitally-augmented artefacts - ‘fragments’ - of experiences of desisting from violence can translate messages for motivation and rapport between peers, without subjecting the process to risks inherent with direct inter-personal communication. These insights provide the basis for practical considerations for future network design with challenging populations.
Rosanna Bellini, Alexander Wilson, Jan D. Smeddinck
CHI1
2020 Choice-Point: Fostering Awareness and Choice with Perpetrators in Domestic Violence Interventions
abstract
Learning about alternatives to violence is an essential part of change work with domestic violence perpetrators. This is complex work, seeking to tackle a sensitive issue by involving the development of deep, embodied learning for perpetrators who may lack perspective on their behaviour. Interactive storytelling has been providing users with the opportunity to explore speculative scenarios in a controlled environment. We discuss the design of Choice-Point: a web-based application that allows perpetrators adopt the role of different fictional characters in an abusive scenario for conveying the essential skill of perspective-taking. We evaluated Choice-Point through trials with three groups of perpetrators, a support group of victim-survivors and an expert critique from support workers. We discuss challenges in using such technologies - such as our system - for engagement; the value of perpetrator agency in supporting non-violent behaviours, and the potential to positively shape perpetrators' journeys to non-violence within social care settings.
Rosanna Bellini, Simon Forrest, Nicole Westmarland, Daniel Jackson 0002, Jan D. Smeddinck
CHI1
2020 Mechanisms of Moral Responsibility: Rethinking Technologies for Domestic Violence Prevention Work
abstract
This paper provides a critical examination of how digital systems within a charitable organisation in the North of England are being used to both support and challenge male perpetrators of domestic violence. While there exists a range of digital tools to support the victim-survivors of domestic violence, no tools are available to challenge the abusive and harmful behaviours of perpetrators. Through this work, we uncovered the compelling moral responsibilities intrinsic within interactions with technological systems between perpetrators and support workers. As such, we highlight four spaces of negotiation concerning a person's responsibility in changing their abusive behaviour, which we have coined as mechanisms to represent their fundamental and interconnected nature. These mechanisms include self-awareness, acknowledging the extent of harms, providing peer support and respecting authorities. These insights are the basis for offering some practical considerations for HCI scholars, policymakers and intervention designers in their work with perpetrators of violence.
Rosanna Bellini, Simon Forrest, Nicole Westmarland, Jan D. Smeddinck
CHI1
2020 The Tools and Tactics Used in Intimate Partner Surveillance: An Analysis of Online Infidelity Forums
Emily Tseng, Rosanna Bellini, Nora McDonald, Matan Danos, Rachel Greenstadt, Damon McCoy, Nicola Dell, Thomas Ristenpart
USENIX Security Symposium2
2020 "So-called privacy breeds evil": Narrative Justifications for Intimate Partner Surveillance in Online Forums
abstract
A growing body of research suggests that intimate partner abusers use digital technologies to surveil their partners, including by installing spyware apps, compromising devices and online accounts, and employing social engineering tactics. However, to date, this form of privacy violation, called intimate partner surveillance (IPS), has primarily been studied from the perspective of victim-survivors. We present a qualitative study of how potential perpetrators of IPS harness the emotive power of sharing personal narratives to validate and legitimise their abusive behaviours. We analysed 556 stories of IPS posted on publicly accessible online forums dedicated to the discussion of sexual infidelity. We found that many users share narrative posts describing IPS as they boast about their actions, advise others on how to perform IPS without detection, and seek suggestions for next steps to take. We identify a set of common thematic story structures, justifications for abuse, and outcomes within the stories that provide a window into how these individuals believe their behaviour to be justified. Using these stories, we develop a four-stage framework that captures the change in a potential perpetrator's approach to IPS. We use our findings and framework to guide a discussion of efforts to combat abuse, including how we can identify crucial moments where interventions might be safely applied to prevent or deescalate IPS.
Rosanna Bellini, Emily Tseng, Nora McDonald, Rachel Greenstadt, Damon McCoy, Thomas Ristenpart, Nicola Dell
Proc. ACM Hum. Comput. Interact.1
2019 Mapping the Margins: Navigating the Ecologies of Domestic Violence Service Provision
abstract
Work addressing the negative impacts of domestic violence on victim-survivors and service providers has slowly been contributing to the HCI discourse. However, work discussing the necessary, pre-emptive steps for researchers to enter these spaces sensitively and considerately, largely remains opaque. Heavily-politicised specialisms that are imbued with conflicting values and practices, such as domestic violence service delivery can be especially difficult to navigate. In this paper, we report on a mixed methods study consisting of interviews, a design dialogue and an ideation workshop with domestic violence service providers to explore the potential of an online service directory to support their work. Through this three-stage research process, we were able to characterise this unique service delivery landscape and identify tensions in services' access, understandings of technologies and working practices. Drawing from our findings, we discuss opportunities for researchers to work with and sustain complex information ecologies in sensitive settings.
Rosanna Bellini, Angelika Strohmayer, Patrick Olivier, Clara Crivellaro
CHI1
2018 "That Really Pushes My Buttons": Designing Bullying and Harassment Training for the Workplace
abstract
Workplace bullying and harassment have been identified as two of the most concerning silent and unseen occupational hazards of the 21st century. The design of bespoke training addressing domain-specific job roles and relations presents a particular challenge. Using the concept of data-in-place where data is understood as being bound and produced by a particular place, this paper describes how locally-situated accounts can be used to engage employees in workplace-specific training seminars. Using higher education as a case study, we describe a four-stage design process for future training efforts: (1) in-depth interviews for further understanding of bullying and harassment; (2) design of digital probes for capturing contextual data; (3) probe deployment and subsequent data analysis; (4) data-driven discussion-based seminars. We outline the potential for digital probes in promoting the denormalization of toxic workplace cultures, considerations for novel sensitive data governance models, and the discussion of data-in-place's temporal dimension.
Rosanna Bellini, Patrick Olivier, Rob Comber
CHI1