Zero-Knowledge Succinct Non-Interactive Argument of Knowledge (zk-SNARK) schemes have gained significant adoption in privacy-preserving applications, in decentralized systems (e.g., blockchain), and in verifiable computation due to their efficiency. However, the most efficient zk-SNARKs often rely on a one-time trusted setup to generate public parameters, often known as the ''Powers of Tau'' (PoT) string. The leakage of the secret parameter τ in the string would allow attackers to generate false proofs, compromising the soundness of all zk-SNARK systems built on it.

Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) is a crucial challenge in blockchains and cryptocurrencies. A principal countermeasure is using encrypted mempools to hide the transaction payloads until they are committed in a block. However, the existing approaches based on encrypted mempools remain vulnerable to metadata leakage and may not provide sufficient mitigation against block producers due to their sole control in block preparation. In this paper, we propose techniques that utilize randomized permutation on the committed block, offering a multi-layer solution. With a focus on proof-of-stake (PoS) committee-based consensus, we then introduce BlindPerm, a framework that enhances an encrypted mempool with permutation and present various optimizations. Notably, we propose a construction where this enhancement comes at essentially no overhead by piggybacking on the encrypted mempool and without relying on any external entity such as randomness beacon. Further, we illustrate the effectiveness of our solutions by running simulations using historical Ethereum data.

Blockchain protocols implement total-order broadcast in a permissionless setting, where processes can freely join and leave. In such a setting, to safeguard against Sybil attacks, correct processes rely on cryptographic proofs tied to a particular type of resource to make them eligible to order transactions. For example, in the case of Proof-of-Work (PoW), this resource is computation, and the proof is a solution to a computationally hard puzzle. Conversely, in Proof-of-Stake (PoS), the resource corresponds to the number of coins that every process in the system owns, and a secure lottery selects a process for participation proportionally to its coin holdings. Although many resource-based blockchain protocols are formally proven secure in the literature, the existing security proofs fail to demonstrate why particular types of resources cause the blockchain protocols to be vulnerable to distinct classes of attacks. For instance, PoS systems are more vulnerable to long-range attacks, where an adversary corrupts past processes to re-write the history, than Proof-of-Work and Proof-of-Storage systems. Proof-of-Storage-based and Proof-of-Stake-based protocols are both more susceptible to private double-spending attacks than Proof-of-Work-based protocols; in this case, an adversary mines its chain in secret without sharing its blocks with the rest of the processes until the end of the attack. In this paper, we formally characterize the properties of resources through an abstraction called resource allocator and give a framework for understanding longest-chain consensus protocols based on different underlying resources. In addition, we use this resource allocator to demonstrate security trade-offs between various resources focusing on well-known attacks (e.g., the long-range attack and nothing-at-stake attacks).

It is well known that users on open blockchains are tracked by an industry providing services to governments, law enforcement, secret services, and alike. While most blockchains do not protect their users' privacy and allow external observers to link transactions and addresses, a growing research interest attempts to design add-on privacy solutions to help users regain their privacy on non-private blockchains.

Decentralized exchanges (DEXs) allow parties to participate in financial markets while retaining full custody of their funds. However, the transparency of blockchain-based DEX in combination with the latency for transactions to be processed, makes market-manipulation feasible. For instance, adversaries could perform front-running — the practice of exploiting (typically non-public) information that may change the price of an asset for financial gain.In this work we formalize, analytically exposit and empirically evaluate an augmented variant of front-running: sandwich attacks, which involve front- and back-running victim transactions on a blockchain-based DEX. We quantify the probability of an adversarial trader being able to undertake the attack, based on the relative positioning of a transaction within a blockchain block. We find that a single adversarial trader can earn a daily revenue of over several thousand USD when performing sandwich attacks on one particular DEX — Uniswap, an exchange with over 5M USD daily trading volume by June 2020. In addition to a single-adversary game, we simulate the outcome of sandwich attacks under multiple competing adversaries, to account for the real-world trading environment.

Abstract The Bitcoin network has offered a new way of securely performing financial transactions over the insecure network. Nevertheless, this ability comes with the cost of storing a large (distributed) ledger, which has become unsuitable for personal devices of any kind. Although the simplified payment verification (SPV) clients can address this storage issue, a Bitcoin SPV client has to rely on other Bitcoin nodes to obtain its transaction history and the current approaches offer no privacy guarantees to the SPV clients. This work presents T 3, a trusted hardware-secured Bitcoin full client that supports efficient oblivious search/update for Bitcoin SPV clients without sacrificing the privacy of the clients. In this design, we leverage the trusted execution and attestation capabilities of a trusted execution environment (TEE) and the ability to hide access patterns of oblivious random access machine (ORAM) to protect SPV clients’ requests from potentially malicious nodes. The key novelty of T 3 lies in the optimizations introduced to conventional ORAM, tailored for expected SPV client usages. In particular, by making a natural assumption about the access patterns of SPV clients, we are able to propose a two-tree ORAM construction that overcomes the concurrency limitation associated with traditional ORAMs. We have implemented and tested our system using the current Bitcoin Unspent Transaction Output (UTXO) Set. Our experiment shows that T 3 is feasible to be deployed in practice while providing strong privacy and security guarantees to Bitcoin SPV clients.