Integrated circuit (IC) split manufacturing has been shown to be one of the most effective protection schemes to prevent reverse engineering from malicious foundries. Among the existing split manufacturing approaches, the 2.5-D split manufacturing using silicon interposer has much less fabrication and testing costs compared to layer splitting approaches. In this article, we propose a Boolean satisfiability (SAT)-based attack to reconstruct the wire connections of the 2.5-D split manufacturing netlists. Our SAT-based attack can fully reconstruct the missing wires between modules with 100% correctness and therefore the functionality of the chip can be completely reverse engineered. In addition, we show that the runtime of attack is significantly reduced compared to existing 2.5-D split manufacturing SAT attacks by applying grouping hints obtained from a satisfiability modulo theories (SMTs)-based grouping algorithm, which is purely depending on the circuit functionality, so no physical defensive mechanisms can prevent such attack. In our experiments, we show that our grouping algorithm can speed up the existing SAT attack runtime by more than 1000× and can successfully reverse engineer reasonable size benchmarks even when the split nets contains more than one fanouts and the total cut size is close to 1000.

Lightweight cryptography has become more and more important in recent years because of the rise of the Internet of Things (IoT) and usage of smart mobile devices. In this paper, we propose a novel secure lightweight entity authentication hardware primitive called SLATE, where its area is about 50% to more than 3X smaller than existing lightweight ciphers and strong physical unclonable functions (PUFs), respectively. Even though the authentication of SLATE is done through challenge response pair (CRP) verification similar to strong PUFs, the source of the key for SLATE must be coming from any existing secret key storage used for any ciphers. A main advantage of SLATE over most existing strong PUFs being an entity authentication primitive is that SLATE is resistant to known attacks to strong PUFs or logic obfuscations, such as model building attacks and Boolean satisfiability (SAT) attacks. Furthermore, we show that the implementation cost of SLATE with a 176-bit key and 244 CRPs is only 663 gate equivalents (GEs). Compared with lightweight ciphers and existing secure strong PUFs, we show that SLATE is a practical security primitive for resource constrained systems for its extremely small footprint and security. Finally, we show that SLATE is information theoretically secure when valid CRPs are communicated through insecure channels.