For researchers studying cyber-physical system security, working with realistic datasets is essential. To produce the datasets, the existing methodology is to emulate the cyber network. A challenge is that the industrial control systems (ICS) network consists of not just computers and communication equipment, but also field devices that collect data and execute controls. These devices play a significant role in the operation and the security of the system. However, in comparison to the cyber network, the research reproducibility and realism of the cyber-physical system emulation and its data has received far less attention. This paper thus develops an approach to answer, ”How well can emulated devices replicate the behavior of physical intelligent electronics devices (IEDs) in a realistic cyber attack and defense environment?” To study this, we perform a comparison study based on an emulation experiment using theminimegatestbed environment that is entirely virtual and a hardware-in-the-loop experiment using the Resilient Energy Systems Lab (RESLab) cyber-physical testbed featuring real industrial controllers and communications devices. Results show that under different reconnaissance attack scenarios,RESLabgenerates realistic datasets that validate the emulation-based cybersecurity model inminimega. The approach is generalizable toward validating the realism of other types of ICS devices in security studies.

Network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) are commonly used to detect malware communications, including command-and-control (C2) traffic from botnets. NIDS performance assessments have been studied for decades, but mathematical modeling has rarely been used to explore NIDS performance. This paper details a mathematical model that describes a NIDS performing packet inspection and its detection of malware's C2 traffic. The paper further describes an emulation testbed and a set of cyber experiments that used the testbed to validate the model. These experiments included a commonly used NIDS (Snort) and traffic with contents from a pervasive malware (Emotet). Results are presented for two scenarios: a nominal scenario and a “stressed” scenario in which the NIDS cannot process all incoming packets. Model and experiment results match well, with model estimates mostly falling within 95$\%$confidence intervals on the experiment means. Model results were produced 70-3000 times faster than the experimental results. Consequently, the model's predictive capability could potentially be used to support decisions about NIDS configuration and effectiveness that require high confidence results, quantification of uncertainty, and exploration of large parameter spaces. Furthermore, the experiments provide an example for how emulation testbeds can be used to validate cyber models that include stochastic variability.

Moving target defenses (MTDs) are widely used as an active defense strategy for thwarting cyberattacks on cyber-physical systems by increasing diversity of software and network paths. Recently, machine Learning (ML) and deep Learning (DL) models have been demonstrated to defeat some of the cyber defenses by learning attack detection patterns and defense strategies. It raises concerns about the susceptibility of MTD to ML and DL methods. In this article, we analyze the effectiveness of ML and DL models when it comes to deciphering MTD methods and ultimately evade MTD-based protections in real-time systems. Specifically, we consider a MTD algorithm that periodically randomizes address assignments within the MIL-STD-1553 protocol—a military standard serial data bus. Two ML and DL-based tasks are performed on MIL-STD-1553 protocol to measure the effectiveness of the learning models in deciphering the MTD algorithm: 1) determining whether there is an address assignments change i.e., whether the given system employs a MTD protocol and if it does 2) predicting the future address assignments. The supervised learning models (random forest and k-nearest neighbors) effectively detected the address assignment changes and classified whether the given system is equipped with a specified MTD protocol. On the other hand, the unsupervised learning model (K-means) was significantly less effective. The DL model (long short-term memory) was able to predict the future addresses with varied effectiveness based on MTD algorithm's settings.

Trust in a microelectronics-based system can be characterized as the level of confidence that a system is free of subversive alterations made during system development, or that the development process of a system has not been manipulated by a malicious adversary. Trust in systems has become an increasing concern over the past decade. This article presents a novel game-theoretic framework, called GPLADD (Graph-based Probabilistic Learning Attacker and Dynamic Defender), for analyzing and quantifying system trustworthiness at the end of the development process, through the analysis of risk of development-time system manipulation. GPLADD represents attacks and attacker-defender contests over time. It treats time as an explicit constraint and allows incorporating the informational asymmetries between the attacker and defender into analysis. GPLADD includes an explicit representation of attack steps via multi-step attack graphs, attacker and defender strategies, and player actions at different times. GPLADD allows quantifying the attack success probability over time and the attacker and defender costs based on their capabilities and strategies. This ability to quantify different attacks provides an input for evaluation of trust in the development process. We demonstrate GPLADD on an example attack and its variants. We develop a method for representing success probability for arbitrary attacks and derive an explicit analytic characterization of success probability for a specific attack. We present a numeric Monte Carlo study of a small set of attacks, quantify attack success probabilities, attacker and defender costs, and illustrate the options the defender has for limiting the attack success and improving trust in the development process.

Energy resilience has emerged as a national security priority over the past fifteen years. Recent research efforts have aimed to develop metrics and analysis methods for energy resilience, but most of those efforts have focused on extreme weather and other natural hazards as the threat of interest. This paper introduces a novel set of resilience metrics and exemplifies how they can be applied to analyze resilience for growing concerns about cyber threats. The metrics are formally described with mathematical equations and demonstrated in a case study that evaluates the resilience benefits of a new moving target defense technology.

Considerable effort is currently being spent designing neuromorphic hardware for addressing challenging problems in a variety of pattern-matching applications. These neuromorphic systems offer low power architectures with intrinsically parallel and simple spiking neuron processing elements. Unfortunately, these new hardware architectures have been largely developed without a clear justification for using spiking neurons to compute quantities for problems of interest. Specifically, the use of spiking for encoding information in time has not been explored theoretically with complexity analysis to examine the operating conditions under which neuromorphic computing provides a computational advantage (time, space, power, etc.) In this paper, we present and formally analyze the use of temporal coding in a neural-inspired algorithm for optimization-based computation in neural spiking architectures.