VLDB 2026 Research / reviewers in the wild / expert
McKenna K. Tornblad
dblp:220/2243
· DBLP profile ↗
2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
2since 2021 · last 2025
0000-0003-1076-4461ORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 2 · 2 since 2021
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | The effects of persuasion principles on perceived honesty during shoulder surfing attacksabstractPurpose This study aimed to investigate how honest participants perceived an attacker to be during shoulder surfing scenarios that varied in terms of which Principle of Persuasion in Social Engineering (PPSE) was used, whether perceived honesty changed as scenarios progressed, and whether any changes were greater in some scenarios than others. Design/methodology/approach Participants read one of six shoulder surfing scenarios. Five depicted an attacker using one of the PPSEs. The other depicted an attacker using as few PPSEs as possible, which served as a control condition. Participants then rated perceived attacker honesty. Findings The results revealed honesty ratings in each condition were equal during the beginning of the conversation, participants in each condition perceived the attacker to be honest during the beginning of the conversation, perceived attacker honesty declined when the attacker requested the target perform an action that would afford shoulder surfing, perceived attacker honesty declined more when the Distraction and Social Proof PPSEs were used, participants perceived the attacker to be dishonest when making such requests using the Distraction and Social Proof PPSEs and perceived attacker honesty did not change when the attacker used the target’s computer. Originality/value To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this experiment is the first to investigate how persuasion tactics affect perceptions of attackers during shoulder surfing attacks. These results have important implications for shoulder surfing prevention training programs and penetration tests. Keith S. Jones, McKenna K. Tornblad, Miriam Armstrong, Akbar Siami Namin |
Inf. Comput. Secur. | 2 |
| 2021 | How social engineers use persuasion principles during vishing attacksabstractPurpose This study aims to examine how social engineers use persuasion principles during vishing attacks. Design/methodology/approach In total, 86 examples of real-world vishing attacks were found in articles and videos. Each example was coded to determine which persuasion principles were present in that attack and how they were implemented, i.e. what specific elements of the attack contributed to the presence of each persuasion principle. Findings Authority (A), social proof (S) and distraction (D) were the most widely used persuasion principles in vishing attacks, followed by liking, similarity and deception (L). These four persuasion principles occurred in a majority of vishing attacks, while commitment, reciprocation and consistency (C) did not. Further, certain sets of persuasion principles (i.e. authority, distraction, liking, similarity, and deception and social proof; , authority, commitment, reciprocation, and consistency, distraction, liking, similarity and deception, and social proof; and authority, distraction and social proof) were used more than others. It was noteworthy that despite their similarities, those sets of persuasion principles were implemented in different ways, and certain specific ways of implementing certain persuasion principles (e.g. vishers claiming to have authority over the victim) were quite rare. Originality/value To the best of authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to investigate how social engineers use persuasion principles during vishing attacks. As such, it provides important insight into how social engineers implement vishing attacks and lays a critical foundation for future research investigating the psychological aspects of vishing attacks. The present results have important implications for vishing countermeasures and education. Keith S. Jones, Miriam Armstrong, McKenna K. Tornblad, Akbar Siami Namin |
Inf. Comput. Secur. | 3 |