Causal abstraction provides a theoretical foundation for mechanistic interpretability, the field concerned with providing intelligible algorithms that are faithful simplifications of the known, but opaque low-level details of black box AI models. Our contributions are (1) generalizing the theory of causal abstraction from mechanism replacement (i.e., hard and soft interventions) to arbitrary mechanism transformation (i.e., functionals from old mechanisms to new mechanisms), (2) providing a flexible, yet precise formalization for the core concepts of polysemantic neurons, the linear representation hypothesis, modular features, and graded faithfulness, and (3) unifying a variety of mechanistic interpretability methods in the common language of causal abstraction, namely, activation and path patching, causal mediation analysis, causal scrubbing, causal tracing, circuit analysis, concept erasure, sparse autoencoders, differential binary masking, distributed alignment search, and steering.

This paper explores the space of (propositional) probabilistic logical languages, ranging from a purely ‘qualitative’ comparative language to a highly ‘quantitative’ language involving arbitrary polynomials over probability terms. While talk of qualitative vs. quantitative may be suggestive, we identify a robust and meaningful boundary in the space by distinguishing systems that encode (at most) additive reasoning from those that encode additive and multiplicative reasoning. The latter includes not only languages with explicit multiplication but also languages expressing notions of dependence and conditionality. We show that the distinction tracks a divide in computational complexity: additive systems remain complete for NP, while multiplicative systems are robustly complete for ∃R. We also address axiomatic questions, offering several new completeness results as well as a proof of non-finite-axiomatizability for comparative probability. Repercussions of our results for conceptual and empirical questions are addressed, and open problems are discussed.

The aim of this paper is to make clear and precise the relationship between the Rubin causal model (RCM) and structural causal model (SCM) frameworks for causal inference. Adopting a neutral logical perspective, and drawing on previous work, we show what is required for an RCM to be representable by an SCM. A key result then shows that every RCM---including those that violate algebraic principles implied by the SCM framework---emerges as an abstraction of some representable RCM. Finally, we illustrate the power of this ameliorative perspective by pinpointing an important role for SCM principles in classic applications of RCMs; conversely, we offer a characterization of the algebraic constraints implied by a graph, helping to substantiate further comparisons between the two frameworks.

This paper presents a topological learning-theoretic perspective on causal inference by introducing a series of topologies defined on general spaces of structural causal models (SCMs). As an illustration of the framework we prove a topological causal hierarchy theorem, showing that substantive assumption-free causal inference is possible only in a meager set of SCMs. Thanks to a known correspondence between open sets in the weak topology and statistically verifiable hypotheses, our results show that inductive assumptions sufficient to license valid causal inferences are statistically unverifiable in principle. Similar to no-free-lunch theorems for statistical inference, the present results clarify the inevitability of substantial assumptions for causal inference. An additional benefit of our topological approach is that it easily accommodates SCMs with infinitely many variables. We finally suggest that our framework may be helpful for the positive project of exploring and assessing alternative causal-inductive assumptions.

We propose a formalization of the three-tier causal hierarchy of association, intervention, and counterfactuals as a series of probabilistic logical languages. Our languages are of strictly increasing expressivity, the first capable of expressing quantitative probabilistic reasoning—including conditional independence and Bayesian inference—the second encoding do-calculus reasoning for causal effects, and the third capturing a fully expressive do-calculus for arbitrary counterfactual queries. We give a corresponding series of finitary axiomatizations complete over both structural causal models and probabilistic programs, and show that satisfiability and validity for each language are decidable in polynomial space.

Deep neural networks are revolutionizing the way complex systems are designed. Consequently, there is a pressing need for tools and techniques for network analysis and certification. To help in addressing that need, we present Marabou, a framework for verifying deep neural networks. Marabou is an SMT-based tool that can answer queries about a network’s properties by transforming these queries into constraint satisfaction problems. It can accommodate networks with different activation functions and topologies, and it performs high-level reasoning on the network that can curtail the search space and improve performance. It also supports parallel execution to further enhance scalability. Marabou accepts multiple input formats, including protocol buffer files generated by the popular TensorFlow framework for neural networks. We describe the system architecture and main components, evaluate the technique and discuss ongoing work.

We propose analyzing conditional reasoning by appeal to a notion of intervention on a simulation program, formalizing and subsuming a number of approaches to conditional thinking in the recent AI literature. Our main results include a series of axiomatizations, allowing comparison between this framework and existing frameworks (normality-ordering models, causal structural equation models), and a complexity result establishing NP-completeness of the satisfiability problem. Perhaps surprisingly, some of the basic logical principles common to all existing approaches are invalidated in our causal simulation approach. We suggest that this additional flexibility is important in modeling some intuitive examples.