Counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) algorithms are a foundational class of methods for solving imperfect-information games, with the time average of their iterates converging to a Nash equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games. Prior state-of-the-art variants, Discounted CFR (DCFR) and Predictive CFR+ (PCFR+), achieved the fastest known practical performance by improving convergence rates over vanilla CFR through discounting early iterations with a fixed discounting scheme. More recently, Dynamic DCFR (DDCFR) introduced agent-learned dynamic discounting schemes to further accelerate convergence, at the cost of increased complexity. To address this, we propose Hyperparameter Schedules (HSs), a remarkably simple, training-free framework that dynamically adjusts CFR discounting over time. HSs aggressively downweight early updates and gradually transition to trusting late-stage strategies, leading to substantially faster convergence with only a few lines of code modifications. We show that HSs derived from just three small extensive-form games generalize effectively to 17 diverse games (including large-scale realistic poker) in both extensive-form and normal-form settings, without any game-specific tuning. Our method establishes a new state of the art for solving two-player zero-sum games.

Dynamic mechanism design is a challenging extension to ordinary mechanism design in which the mechanism designer must make a sequence of decisions over time in the face of possibly untruthful reports of participating agents. Optimizing dynamic mechanisms for welfare is relatively well understood. However, there has been less work on optimizing for other goals (e.g., revenue), and without restrictive assumptions on valuations, it is remarkably challenging to characterize good mechanisms. Instead, we turn to automated mechanism design to find mechanisms with good performance in specific problem instances. We extend the class of affine maximizer mechanisms to MDPs where agents may untruthfully report their rewards. This extension results in a challenging bilevel optimization problem in which the upper problem involves choosing optimal mechanism parameters, and the lower problem involves solving the resulting MDP. Our approach can find truthful dynamic mechanisms that achieve strong performance on goals other than welfare, and can be applied to essentially any problem setting---without restrictions on valuations---for which RL can learn optimal policies.

We present Llemma, a large language model for mathematics. We continue pretraining Code Llama on the Proof-Pile-2, a mixture of scientific papers, web data containing mathematics, and mathematical code, yielding Llemma. On the MATH benchmark Llemma outperforms all known openly released models, as well as the unreleased Minerva model suite on an equi-parameter basis. Moreover, Llemma is capable of tool use and formal theorem proving without any finetuning. We openly release all artifacts, including 7 billion and 34 billion parameter models, the Proof-Pile-2, and code to replicate our experiments.

Autonomous agents deployed in the real world need to be robust against adversarial attacks on sensory inputs. Robustifying agent policies requires anticipating the strongest attacks possible. We demonstrate that existing observation-space attacks on reinforcement learning agents have a common weakness: while effective, their lack of information-theoretic detectability constraints makes them \textit{detectable} using automated means or human inspection. Detectability is undesirable to adversaries as it may trigger security escalations. We introduce \textit{\eattacks{}}, a novel form of adversarial attack on sequential decision-makers that is both effective and of $\epsilon-$bounded statistical detectability. We propose a novel dual ascent algorithm to learn such attacks end-to-end. Compared to existing attacks, we empirically find \eattacks{} to be significantly harder to detect with automated methods, and a small study with human participants\footnote{IRB approval under reference R84123/RE001} suggests they are similarly harder to detect for humans. Our findings suggest the need for better anomaly detectors, as well as effective hardware- and system-level defenses. The project website can be found at https://tinyurl.com/illusory-attacks.

Deploying reinforcement learning (RL) systems requires robustness to uncertainty and model misspecification, yet prior robust RL methods typically only study noise introduced independently across time. However, practical sources of uncertainty are usually coupled across time. We formally introduce temporally-coupled perturbations, presenting a novel challenge for existing robust RL methods. To tackle this challenge, we propose GRAD, a novel game-theoretic approach that treats the temporally-coupled robust RL problem as a partially-observable two-player zero-sum game. By finding an approximate equilibrium within this game, GRAD optimizes for general robustness against temporally-coupled perturbations. Experiments on continuous control tasks demonstrate that, compared with prior methods, our approach achieves a higher degree of robustness to various types of attacks on different attack domains, both in settings with temporally-coupled perturbations and decoupled perturbations.

In competitive two-agent environments, deep reinforcement learning (RL) methods like Policy Space Response Oracles (PSRO) often increase exploitability between iterations, which is problematic when training in large games. To address this issue, we introduce anytime double oracle (ADO), an algorithm that ensures exploitability does not increase between iterations, and its approximate extensive-form version, anytime PSRO (APSRO). ADO converges to a Nash equilibrium while iteratively reducing exploitability. However, convergence in these algorithms may require adding all of a game's deterministic policies. To improve this, we propose Self-Play PSRO (SP-PSRO), which incorporates an approximately optimal stochastic policy into the population in each iteration. APSRO and SP-PSRO demonstrate lower exploitability and near-monotonic exploitability reduction in games like Leduc poker and Liar's Dice. Empirically, SP-PSRO often converges much faster than APSRO and PSRO, requiring only a few iterations in many games.

Large language models are typically aligned with human preferences by optimizing reward models (RMs) fitted to human feedback. However, human preferences are multi-faceted, and it is increasingly common to derive reward from a composition of simpler reward models which each capture a different aspect of language quality. This itself presents a challenge, as it is difficult to appropriately weight these component RMs when combining them. Compounding this difficulty, because any RM is only a proxy for human evaluation, this process is vulnerable to *overoptimization*, wherein past a certain point, accumulating higher reward is associated with worse human ratings. In this paper, we perform the first study on overoptimization in composite RMs, showing that correlation between component RMs has a significant effect on the locations of these points. We then introduce an approach to solve this issue using constrained reinforcement learning as a means of preventing the agent from exceeding each RM's threshold of usefulness. Our method addresses the problem of weighting component RMs by learning dynamic weights, naturally given by the Lagrange multipliers. As a result, each RM stays within the range at which it is an effective proxy, improving evaluation performance. Finally, we introduce an adaptive method using gradient-free optimization to identify and optimize towards these points during a single run.

Recent works like Tree-of-Thought (ToT) and Reasoning via Planning (RAP) aim to augment the multi-step reasoning capabilities of LLMs by using tree-search algorithms. These methods rely on prompting a pre-trained model to serve as a value function and focus on problems with low search depth. As a result, these methods cannot benefit from in-domain training and only rely on pretraining process — they will not work in domains where the pre-trained LLM does not have enough knowledge to serve as an effective value function or in domains that require long-horizon planning. To address these limitations, we present an AlphaZero-like tree-search learning framework for LLMs (termed TS-LLM), systematically illustrating how tree-search with a learned value function can guide LLM decoding. TS-LLM distinguishes itself in two key ways. (1) Leveraging a learned value function and AlphaZero-like algorithms, our approach can be generally adaptable to a wide range of tasks, language models of any size, and tasks of varying search depths. (2) Our approach can guide LLMs during both inference and training, iteratively improving the LLMs. Empirical results across reasoning, planning, alignment, and decision-making tasks show that TS-LLM outperforms existing approaches and can handle trees with a depth of 64.

A mediator observes no-regret learners playing an extensive-form game repeatedly across T rounds. The mediator attempts to steer players toward some desirable predetermined equilibrium by giving (nonnegative) payments to players. We call this the steering problem. The steering problem captures problems several problems of interest, among them equilibrium selection and information design (persuasion). If the mediator's budget is unbounded, steering is trivial because the mediator can simply pay the players to play desirable actions. We study two bounds on the mediator's payments: a total budget and a per-round budget. If the mediator's total budget does not grow with T, we show that steering is impossible. However, we show that it is enough for the total budget to grow sublinearly with T, that is, for the average payment to vanish. When players' full strategies are observed at each round, we show that constant per-round budgets permit steering. In the more challenging setting where only trajectories through the game tree are observable, we show that steering is impossible with constant per-round budgets in general extensive-form games, but possible in normal-form games or if the per-round budget may itself depend on T. We also show how our results can be generalized to the case when the equilibrium is being computed online while steering is happening. We supplement our theoretical positive results with experiments highlighting the efficacy of steering in large games.

Applying machine learning to combinatorial optimization problems has the potential to improve both efficiency and accuracy. However, existing learning-based solvers often struggle with generalization when faced with changes in problem distributions and scales. In this paper, we propose a new approach called ASP: Adaptive Staircase Policy Space Response Oracle to address these generalization issues and learn a universal neural solver. ASP consists of two components: Distributional Exploration, which enhances the solver's ability to handle unknown distributions using Policy Space Response Oracles, and Persistent Scale Adaption, which improves scalability through curriculum learning. We have tested ASP on several challenging COPs, including the traveling salesman problem, the vehicle routing problem, and the prize collecting TSP, as well as the real-world instances from TSPLib and CVRPLib. Our results show that even with the same model size and weak training signal, ASP can help neural solvers explore and adapt to unseen distributions and varying scales, achieving superior performance. In particular, compared with the same neural solvers under a standard training pipeline, ASP produces a remarkable decrease in terms of the optimality gap with 90.9% and 47.43% on generated instances and real-world instances for TSP, and a decrease of 19% and 45.57% for CVRP.

In multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), independent learning (IL) often shows remarkable performance and easily scales with the number of agents. Yet, using IL can be inefficient and runs the risk of failing to successfully train, particularly in scenarios that require agents to coordinate their actions. Using centralised learning (CL) enables MARL agents to quickly learn how to coordinate their behaviour but employing CL everywhere is often prohibitively expensive in real-world applications. Besides, using CL in value-based methods often needs strong representational constraints (e.g. individual-global-max condition) that can lead to poor performance if violated. In this paper, we introduce a novel plug & play IL framework named Multi-Agent Network Selection Algorithm (MANSA) which selectively employs CL only at states that require coordination. At its core, MANSA has an additional agent that uses switching controls to quickly learn the best states to activate CL during training, using CL only where necessary and vastly reducing the computational burden of CL. Our theory proves MANSA preserves cooperative MARL convergence properties, boosts IL performance and can optimally make use of a fixed budget on the number CL calls. We show empirically in Level-based Foraging (LBF) and StarCraft Multi-agent Challenge (SMAC) that MANSA achieves fast, superior and more reliable performance while making 40% fewer CL calls in SMAC and using CL at only 1% CL calls in LBF.

In order for agents in multi-agent systems (MAS) to be safe, they need to take into account the risks posed by the actions of other agents. However, the dominant paradigm in game theory (GT) assumes that agents are not affected by risk from other agents and only strive to maximise their expected utility. For example, in hybrid human-AI driving systems, it is necessary to limit large deviations in reward resulting from car crashes. Although there are equilibrium concepts in game theory that take into account risk aversion, they either assume that agents are risk-neutral with respect to the uncertainty caused by the actions of other agents, or they are not guaranteed to exist. We introduce a new GT-based Risk-Averse Equilibrium (RAE) that always produces a solution that minimises the potential variance in reward accounting for the strategy of other agents. Theoretically and empirically, we show RAE shares many properties with a Nash Equilibrium (NE), establishing convergence properties and generalising to risk-dominant NE in certain cases. To tackle large-scale problems, we extend RAE to the PSRO multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) framework. We empirically demonstrate the minimum reward variance benefits of RAE in matrix games with high-risk outcomes. Results on MARL experiments show RAE generalises to risk-dominant NE in a trust dilemma game and that it reduces instances of crashing by 7x in an autonomous driving setting versus the best performing baseline.

By incorporating regret minimization, double oracle methods have demonstrated rapid convergence to Nash Equilibrium (NE) in normal-form games and extensive-form games, through algorithms such as online double oracle (ODO) and extensive-form double oracle (XDO), respectively. In this study, we further examine the theoretical convergence rate and sample complexity of such regret minimization-based double oracle methods, utilizing a unified framework called Regret-Minimizing Double Oracle. Based on this framework, we extend ODO to extensive-form games and determine its sample complexity. Moreover, we demonstrate that the sample complexity of XDO can be exponential in the number of information sets $|S|$, owing to the exponentially decaying stopping threshold of restricted games. To solve this problem, we propose the Periodic Double Oracle (PDO) method, which has the lowest sample complexity among regret minimization-based double oracle methods, being only polynomial in $|S|$. Empirical evaluations on multiple poker and board games show that PDO achieves significantly faster convergence than previous double oracle algorithms and reaches a competitive level with state-of-the-art regret minimization methods.

Agents capable of carrying out general tasks on a computer can improve efficiency and productivity by automating repetitive tasks and assisting in complex problem-solving. Ideally, such agents should be able to solve new computer tasks presented to them through natural language commands. However, previous approaches to this problem require large amounts of expert demonstrations and task-specific reward functions, both of which are impractical for new tasks. In this work, we show that a pre-trained large language model (LLM) agent can execute computer tasks guided by natural language using a simple prompting scheme where the agent \textbf{R}ecursively \textbf{C}riticizes and \textbf{I}mproves its output (RCI). The RCI approach significantly outperforms existing LLM methods for automating computer tasks and surpasses supervised learning (SL) and reinforcement learning (RL) approaches on the MiniWoB++ benchmark. We compare multiple LLMs and find that RCI with the InstructGPT-3+RLHF LLM is state-of-the-art on MiniWoB++, using only a handful of demonstrations per task rather than tens of thousands, and without a task-specific reward function. Furthermore, we demonstrate RCI prompting's effectiveness in enhancing LLMs' reasoning abilities on a suite of natural language reasoning tasks, outperforming chain of thought (CoT) prompting with external feedback. We find that RCI combined with CoT performs better than either separately. Our code can be found here: https://github.com/posgnu/rci-agent.

Recent algorithms have achieved superhuman performance at a number of two-player zero-sum games such as poker and go. However, many real-world situations are multi-player games. Zero-sum two-team games, such as bridge and football, involve two teams where each member of the team shares the same reward with every other member of that team, and each team has the negative of the reward of the other team. A popular solution concept in this setting, called TMECor, assumes that teams can jointly correlate their strategies before play, but are not able to communicate during play. This setting is harder than two-player zero-sum games because each player on a team has different information and must use their public actions to signal to other members of the team. Prior works either have game-theoretic guarantees but only work in very small games, or are able to scale to large games but do not have game-theoretic guarantees. In this paper we introduce two algorithms: Team-PSRO, an extension of PSRO from two-player games to team games, and Team-PSRO Mix-and-Match which improves upon Team PSRO by better using population policies. In Team-PSRO, in every iteration both teams learn a joint best response to the opponent's meta-strategy via reinforcement learning. As the reinforcement learning joint best response approaches the optimal best response, Team-PSRO is guaranteed to converge to a TMECor. In experiments on Kuhn poker and Liar's Dice, we show that a tabular version of Team-PSRO converges to TMECor, and a version of Team PSRO using deep cooperative reinforcement learning beats self-play reinforcement learning in the large game of Google Research Football.

Policy-Space Response Oracles (PSRO) is an influential algorithm framework for approximating a Nash Equilibrium (NE) in multi-agent non-transitive games. Many previous studies have been trying to promote policy diversity in PSRO. A major weakness with existing diversity metrics is that a more diverse (according to their diversity metrics) population does not necessarily mean (as we proved in the paper) a better approximation to a NE. To alleviate this problem, we propose a new diversity metric, the improvement of which guarantees a better approximation to a NE. Meanwhile, we develop a practical and well-justified method to optimize our diversity metric using only state-action samples. By incorporating our diversity regularization into the best response solving of PSRO, we obtain a new PSRO variant, \textit{Policy Space Diversity} PSRO (PSD-PSRO). We present the convergence property of PSD-PSRO. Empirically, extensive experiments on single-state games, Leduc, and Goofspiel demonstrate that PSD-PSRO is more effective in producing significantly less exploitable policies than state-of-the-art PSRO variants.

We introduce a new approach for computing optimal equilibria via learning in games. It applies to extensive-form settings with any number of players, including mechanism design, information design, and solution concepts such as correlated, communication, and certification equilibria. We observe that optimal equilibria are minimax equilibrium strategies of a player in an extensive-form zero-sum game. This reformulation allows to apply techniques for learning in zero-sum games, yielding the first learning dynamics that converge to optimal equilibria, not only in empirical averages, but also in iterates. We demonstrate the practical scalability and flexibility of our approach by attaining state-of-the-art performance in benchmark tabular games, and by computing an optimal mechanism for a sequential auction design problem using deep reinforcement learning.

Adversarial team games model multiplayer strategic interactions in which a team of identically-interested players is competing against an adversarial player in a zero-sum game. Such games capture many well-studied settings in algorithmic game theory, unifying two-player zero-sum games and potential games, but go well-beyond to environments wherein the cooperation of one team---in the absence of explicit communication---is obstructed by competing entities; the latter setting remains poorly understood despite its numerous applications, and serves as an important step towards understanding more realistic strategic interactions that feature both competing and shared interests. Since the seminal work of Von Stengel and Koller (GEB '97), different solution concepts have received attention from an algorithmic standpoint. Yet, the complexity of the standard Nash equilibrium has remained open.

Natural policy gradient has emerged as one of the most successful algorithms for computing optimal policies in challenging Reinforcement Learning (RL) tasks, yet, very little was known about its convergence properties until recently. The picture becomes more blurry when it comes to multi-agent RL (MARL); the line of works that have theoretical guarantees for convergence to Nash policies are very limited. In this paper, we focus on a particular class of multi-agent stochastic games called Markov Potential Games and we prove that Independent Natural Policy Gradient always converges using constant learning rates. The proof deviates from the existing approaches and the main challenge lies in the fact that Markov potential Games do not have unique optimal values (as single-agent settings exhibit) so different initializations can lead to different limit point values. We complement our theoretical results with experiments that indicate that Natural Policy Gradient outperforms Policy Gradient in MARL settings (our process benchmark is multi-state congestion games).

Traditional automated theorem proving systems for first-order logic depend on speed-optimized search and many handcrafted heuristics designed to work over a wide range of domains. Machine learning approaches in the literature either depend on these traditional provers to bootstrap themselves, by leveraging these heuristics, or can struggle due to limited existing proof data. The latter issue can be explained by the lack of a smooth difficulty gradient in theorem proving datasets; large gaps in difficulty between different theorems can make training harder or even impossible. In this paper, we adapt the idea of hindsight experience replay from reinforcement learning to the automated theorem proving domain, so as to use the intermediate data generated during unsuccessful proof attempts. We build a first-order logic prover by disabling all the smart clause-scoring heuristics of the state-of-the-art E prover and replacing them with a clause-scoring neural network learned by using hindsight experience replay in an incremental learning setting. Clauses are represented as graphs and presented to transformer networks with spectral features. We show that provers trained in this way can outperform previous machine learning approaches and compete with the state of the art heuristic-based theorem prover E in its best configuration, on the popular benchmarks MPTP2078, M2k and Mizar40. The proofs generated by our algorithm are also almost always significantly shorter than E’s proofs.

In temporal-difference reinforcement learning algorithms, variance in value estimation can cause instability and overestimation of the maximal target value. Many algorithms have been proposed to reduce overestimation, including several recent ensemble methods, however none have shown success in sample-efficient learning through addressing estimation variance as the root cause of overestimation. In this paper, we propose MeanQ, a simple ensemble method that estimates target values as ensemble means. Despite its simplicity, MeanQ shows remarkable sample efficiency in experiments on the Atari Learning Environment benchmark. Importantly, we find that an ensemble of size 5 sufficiently reduces estimation variance to obviate the lagging target network, eliminating it as a source of bias and further gaining sample efficiency. We justify intuitively and empirically the design choices in MeanQ, including the necessity of independent experience sampling. On a set of 26 benchmark Atari environments, MeanQ outperforms all tested baselines, including the best available baseline, SUNRISE, at 100K interaction steps in 16/26 environments, and by 68% on average. MeanQ also outperforms Rainbow DQN at 500K steps in 21/26 environments, and by 49% on average, and achieves average human-level performance using 200K ($\pm$100K) interaction steps. Our implementation is available at https://github.com/indylab/MeanQ.

Achieving human-level dexterity is an important open problem in robotics. However, tasks of dexterous hand manipulation even at the baby level are challenging to solve through reinforcement learning (RL). The difficulty lies in the high degrees of freedom and the required cooperation among heterogeneous agents (e.g., joints of fingers). In this study, we propose the Bimanual Dexterous Hands Benchmark (Bi-DexHands), a simulator that involves two dexterous hands with tens of bimanual manipulation tasks and thousands of target objects. Tasks in Bi-DexHands are first designed to match human-level motor skills according to literature in cognitive science, and then are built in Issac Gym; this enables highly efficient RL trainings, reaching 30,000+ FPS by only one single NVIDIA RTX 3090. We provide a comprehensive benchmark for popular RL algorithms under different settings; this includes multi-agent RL, offline RL, multi-task RL, and meta RL. Our results show that PPO type on-policy algorithms can learn to solve simple manipulation tasks that are equivalent up to 48-month human baby (e.g., catching a flying object, opening a bottle), while multi-agent RL can further help to learn manipulations that require skilled bimanual cooperation (e.g., lifting a pot, stacking blocks). Despite the success on each individual task, when it comes to mastering multiple manipulation skills, existing RL algorithms fail to work in most of the multi-task and the few-shot learning tasks, which calls for more future development from the RL community. Our project is open-sourced at https://github.com/PKU-MARL/DexterousHands.

When solving two-player zero-sum games, multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) algorithms often create populations of agents where, at each iteration, a new agent is discovered as the best response to a mixture over the opponent population. Within such a process, the update rules of "who to compete with" (i.e., the opponent mixture) and "how to beat them" (i.e., finding best responses) are underpinned by manually developed game theoretical principles such as fictitious play and Double Oracle. In this paper, we introduce a novel framework—Neural Auto-Curricula (NAC)—that leverages meta-gradient descent to automate the discovery of the learning update rule without explicit human design. Specifically, we parameterise the opponent selection module by neural networks and the best-response module by optimisation subroutines, and update their parameters solely via interaction with the game engine, where both players aim to minimise their exploitability. Surprisingly, even without human design, the discovered MARL algorithms achieve competitive or even better performance with the state-of-the-art population-based game solvers (e.g., PSRO) on Games of Skill, differentiable Lotto, non-transitive Mixture Games, Iterated Matching Pennies, and Kuhn Poker. Additionally, we show that NAC is able to generalise from small games to large games, for example training on Kuhn Poker and outperforming PSRO on Leduc Poker. Our work inspires a promising future direction to discover general MARL algorithms solely from data.

Policy Space Response Oracles (PSRO) is a reinforcement learning (RL) algorithm for two-player zero-sum games that has been empirically shown to find approximate Nash equilibria in large games. Although PSRO is guaranteed to converge to an approximate Nash equilibrium and can handle continuous actions, it may take an exponential number of iterations as the number of information states (infostates) grows. We propose Extensive-Form Double Oracle (XDO), an extensive-form double oracle algorithm for two-player zero-sum games that is guaranteed to converge to an approximate Nash equilibrium linearly in the number of infostates. Unlike PSRO, which mixes best responses at the root of the game, XDO mixes best responses at every infostate. We also introduce Neural XDO (NXDO), where the best response is learned through deep RL. In tabular experiments on Leduc poker, we find that XDO achieves an approximate Nash equilibrium in a number of iterations an order of magnitude smaller than PSRO. Experiments on a modified Leduc poker game and Oshi-Zumo show that tabular XDO achieves a lower exploitability than CFR with the same amount of computation. We also find that NXDO outperforms PSRO and NFSP on a sequential multidimensional continuous-action game. NXDO is the first deep RL method that can find an approximate Nash equilibrium in high-dimensional continuous-action sequential games.

Many cooperative multiagent reinforcement learning environments provide agents with a sparse team-based reward, as well as a dense agent-specific reward that incentivizes learning basic skills. Training policies solely on the team-based reward is often difficult due to its sparsity. Also, relying solely on the agent-specific reward is sub-optimal because it usually does not capture the team coordination objective. A common approach is to use reward shaping to construct a proxy reward by combining the individual rewards. However, this requires manual tuning for each environment. We introduce Multiagent Evolutionary Reinforcement Learning (MERL), a split-level training platform that handles the two objectives separately through two optimization processes. An evolutionary algorithm maximizes the sparse team-based objective through neuroevolution on a population of teams. Concurrently, a gradient-based optimizer trains policies to only maximize the dense agent-specific rewards. The gradient-based policies are periodically added to the evolutionary population as a way of information transfer between the two optimization processes. This enables the evolutionary algorithm to use skills learned via the agent-specific rewards toward optimizing the global objective. Results demonstrate that MERL significantly outperforms state-of-the-art methods, such as MADDPG, on a number of difficult coordination benchmarks.

Finding approximate Nash equilibria in zero-sum imperfect-information games is challenging when the number of information states is large. Policy Space Response Oracles (PSRO) is a deep reinforcement learning algorithm grounded in game theory that is guaranteed to converge to an approximate Nash equilibrium. However, PSRO requires training a reinforcement learning policy at each iteration, making it too slow for large games. We show through counterexamples and experiments that DCH and Rectified PSRO, two existing approaches to scaling up PSRO, fail to converge even in small games. We introduce Pipeline PSRO (P2SRO), the first scalable PSRO-based method for finding approximate Nash equilibria in large zero-sum imperfect-information games. P2SRO is able to parallelize PSRO with convergence guarantees by maintaining a hierarchical pipeline of reinforcement learning workers, each training against the policies generated by lower levels in the hierarchy. We show that unlike existing methods, P2SRO converges to an approximate Nash equilibrium, and does so faster as the number of parallel workers increases, across a variety of imperfect information games. We also introduce an open-source environment for Barrage Stratego, a variant of Stratego with an approximate game tree complexity of 10^50. P2SRO is able to achieve state-of-the-art performance on Barrage Stratego and beats all existing bots. Experiment code is available at https://github.com/JBLanier/pipeline-psro.

We develop a novel deep learning framework to achieve highly accurate machine fault diagnosis using transfer learning to enable and accelerate the training of deep neural network. Compared with existing methods, the proposed method is faster to train and more accurate. First, original sensor data are converted to images by conducting a Wavelet transformation to obtain time-frequency distributions. Next, a pretrained network is used to extract lower level features. The labeled time-frequency images are then used to fine-tune the higher levels of the neural network architecture. This paper creates a machine fault diagnosis pipeline and experiments are carried out to verify the effectiveness and generalization of the pipeline on three main mechanical datasets including induction motors, gearboxes, and bearings with sizes of 6000, 9000, and 5000 time series samples, respectively. We achieve state-of-the-art results on each dataset, with most datasets showing test accuracy near 100%, and in the gearbox dataset, we achieve significant improvement from 94.8% to 99.64%. We created a repository including these datasets located at mlmechanics.ics.uci.edu.