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Patrick Chao

dblp:222/2677 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
1as first author
2since 2021 · last 2024
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 2 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Artificial intelligence
2 papers
Trustworthy machine learning · 87% Language models and text generation · 13%
Network and information security
1 paper
Security and privacy of machine learning · 100%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
AI governance
0.812024
Position: A Safe Harbor for AI Evaluation and Red Teaming · ICML 2024
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › safety evaluation
red teaming
0.812024
Position: A Safe Harbor for AI Evaluation and Red Teaming · ICML 2024
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack
jailbreak attack
0.812024
JailbreakBench: An Open Robustness Benchmark for Jailbreaking Large Language Models · NeurIPS 2024
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation
large language model safety
0.212024
JailbreakBench: An Open Robustness Benchmark for Jailbreaking Large Language Models · NeurIPS 2024

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

leaderboard benchmarking · 1.5adversarial prompt evaluation · 1.5policy analysis · 0.8
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2024 Position: A Safe Harbor for AI Evaluation and Red Teaming
abstract
Independent evaluation and red teaming are critical for identifying the risks posed by generative AI systems. However, the terms of service and enforcement strategies used by prominent AI companies to deter model misuse have disincentives on good faith safety evaluations. This causes some researchers to fear that conducting such research or releasing their findings will result in account suspensions or legal reprisal. Although some companies offer researcher access programs, they are an inadequate substitute for independent research access, as they have limited community representation, receive inadequate funding, and lack independence from corporate incentives. We propose that major generative AI developers commit to providing a legal and technical safe harbor, protecting public interest safety research and removing the threat of account suspensions or legal reprisal. These proposals emerged from our collective experience conducting safety, privacy, and trustworthiness research on generative AI systems, where norms and incentives could be better aligned with public interests, without exacerbating model misuse. We believe these commitments are a necessary step towards more inclusive and unimpeded community efforts to tackle the risks of generative AI.
Shayne Longpre, Sayash Kapoor, Kevin Klyman, Ashwin Ramaswami, Rishi Bommasani, Borhane Blili-Hamelin, Yangsibo Huang, Aviya Skowron, Suhas Kotha, Yi Zeng 0005, Weiyan Shi 0001, Xianjun Yang, Reid Southen, Alexander Robey, Patrick Chao, Diyi Yang, Ruoxi Jia 0001, Daniel Kang 0001, Alex Pentland, Arvind Narayanan, Percy Liang, Peter Henderson 0002
ICML16
2024 JailbreakBench: An Open Robustness Benchmark for Jailbreaking Large Language Models
abstract
Jailbreak attacks cause large language models (LLMs) to generate harmful, unethical, or otherwise objectionable content. Evaluating these attacks presents a number of challenges, which the current collection of benchmarks and evaluation techniques do not adequately address. First, there is no clear standard of practice regarding jailbreaking evaluation. Second, existing works compute costs and success rates in incomparable ways. And third, numerous works are not reproducible, as they withhold adversarial prompts, involve closed-source code, or rely on evolving proprietary APIs. To address these challenges, we introduce JailbreakBench, an open-sourced benchmark with the following components: (1) an evolving repository of state-of-the-art adversarial prompts, which we refer to as jailbreak artifacts; (2) a jailbreaking dataset comprising 100 behaviors---both original and sourced from prior work---which align with OpenAI's usage policies; (3) a standardized evaluation framework at https://github.com/JailbreakBench/jailbreakbench that includes a clearly defined threat model, system prompts, chat templates, and scoring functions; and (4) a leaderboard at https://jailbreakbench.github.io/ that tracks the performance of attacks and defenses for various LLMs. We have carefully considered the potential ethical implications of releasing this benchmark, and believe that it will be a net positive for the community.
Patrick Chao, Edoardo Debenedetti, Alexander Robey, Maksym Andriushchenko, Francesco Croce, Vikash Sehwag, Edgar Dobriban, Nicolas Flammarion, George J. Pappas, Florian Tramèr, Seyed Hamed Hassani, Eric Wong 0001
NeurIPS1